TURKIC WORLDS: COMMUNITY REPRESENTATION AND COLLECTIVE
IDENTITY IN THE RUSSIAN AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES, 1870-1914

BY

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the relationship between leadership politics and the public articulation of collective identity. It explores the ways in which discussions about identity related to power, authority, and politics at the community level. Focusing primarily upon the Muslim borderlands of late imperial Russia, this study engages a number of issues of interest to the historiography of late imperial Russia and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the regional historiographies of Tatarstan, the Crimea, and Azerbaijan. Based upon archival, manuscript, and periodical sources in Russian, Ottoman Turkish, Tatar, and Azeri, research for this dissertation was conducted at archives and libraries in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan, Ufa, Baku, Simferopol, and Istanbul.

In the first section of this study, I compare the ways in which institutions and individuals held the authority, official or otherwise, to mediate problems and communicate messages between the tsarist administration and Muslim communities in two different regions of late imperial Russia: the Middle Volga and the southern Caucasus. My study then analyzes how these systems were undermined by the Russian revolution of 1905 and the ascendance of mass politics. The events of 1905, I argue, helped set off revolutions within Muslim communities across the empire as community reformers dominating new locations of public discourse challenged existing leadership structures for official and popular recognition. In the final two chapters of this dissertation, I demonstrate how political struggles within Muslim communities were reflected in the proliferation of discourses pertaining to collective identity among the Turkic communities of the Russian and Ottoman empires. In this section I also analyze popular resistance to these discourses, the reactions to them of the Russian and Ottoman governments, and their impact upon the emergence of the Turkist movement in Istanbul.
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ABBREVIATIONS

NART  National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan
       Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation

KGU   Lobachevsky Library (Kazan State University),
       Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts

TsGIA RB Central State Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan
              Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, Russian Federation

RGIA  Russian State Historical Archive
       St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

AVPRI Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire
       Moscow, Russian Federation

ADTA  State Historical Archive of Azerbaijan
       Baku, Azerbaijan

GAARK State Archive of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
        Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, Ukraine

BOA   Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive
       Istanbul, Turkey

ARCHIVAL AND PUBLISHED CITATIONS

ch.     chast’
d.      delo
f.      fond
Izd-vo  izdatel’stvo
l. (ll.) list (listy)
ob.     oborot
op.     opis’
p.      page number
s.      sayfa
v.      vesika
DATING AND TRANSLITERATION

This study follows the conventions regarding the dating and transliteration of materials used in the fields of Russian and Ottoman historiography more generally. Dates regarding events taking place in Russia are provided in the old style. Journal and newspaper articles published in the Ottoman Empire are referenced according to both their miladi and hicri dates.

Library of Congress systems of transliteration for Russian, Ottoman Turkish, and the Cyrillic-script forms of Tatar and Azeri have been followed throughout this dissertation. For Arabic-script Tatar and Azeri, I have mostly used the system of Ottoman translation used elsewhere in this study. However, the transliteration of Arabic-script Tatar and Azeri words not existing in Ottoman Turkish has been rendered according to the rules of Cyrillic-script Tatar and Azeri. In the cases of well known individuals, I have kept to conventional spellings rather than those of transliteration (thus Ahmet Ağaoglu rather than Ahmed Ağaoglu, Riziaeddin Fahreddin rather than Fähreddin).
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Finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my daughter, Eszter Virág Meyer, without whom none of this would have taken place.
INTRODUCTION

In October of 1905, just months after revolution had swept the Russian Empire into what would become a twelve-year experiment in parliamentary monarchy, the governor of the province of Tavrida was bombarded with petitions bearing the signatures of Muslims from across the Crimean peninsula.\(^1\) In all, more than seven hundred Crimean Muslims signed the petitions, in which they criticized at length the leader of the Muslim spiritual assembly\(^2\) of Tavrida, Müfti Adil Mirza Karashaikii. The petitioner, identifying themselves as “the Muslim population of the Crimea”, had signed their names to the bottom of several dozen letters, most of which were near-verbatim copies of one another, and sent them to the provincial governor’s office in Simferopol. In these letters, the petitioners complained about the müfti’s “indifference” and “inactivity” with regard to his administrative duties, particularly with regard to the schools and mosques of the

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\(^{1}\) This province, created in the decades following the Crimea’s incorporation into the empire in 1783, included the entirety of the Crimean peninsula as well as three districts immediately adjacent to the peninsula. The müfti of the Tavrida assembly, as was the case with the leaders of the other Muslim assemblies of the empire, was appointed by the Russian Minister of the Interior. On the spiritual assemblies, see Chapter 1 of this study.

\(^{2}\) The first of these to be created was the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, in 1788. In 1794, the Tavrida Muslim Spiritual Assembly was established in the Crimea, 11 years after Crimea’s incorporation into the Russian Empire. In the Caucasus, the Shi’ite and Sunni administrations were not created until 1872, although various attempts to create a Muslim spiritual assembly had been in the works since the late 1830s. On the Orenburg Assembly, see Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006). Also see Crews’, “Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia.” *American Historical Review* vol. 108, No. 1 (February 2003): 50-83; Danil’ Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dakhovnoe sobranie v kontse XVIII-XIX vv.* (Ufa: Gilem, 1999); Danil’ D. Azamatov, “The müftis of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly in the 18th and 19th centuries: The struggle for power in Russia’s Muslim institution,” in *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries: Volume 2, Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations* (Berlin: Schwarz, 1998); Vafa Kuleiva, *Rol’ i pozitsiiia musul’manskogo dakhovenstva v soisial’no-politicheskoi i kul’turnoi zhizni Azerbайдzhana v XIX-nachale XX vv. v rekurse armano-azerbайдzhanskih politicheskikh otnoshenii* (Baku: Nurlan 2003); Dana Sherry, “Mosque and State in the Caucasus, 1828-1841,” *Caucasus and Central Asia Newsletter* 4 (Summer 2003): 3-9; Elena Campbell, “The autocracy and the Muslim clergy in the Russian Empire, 1850s-1917,” *Russian Studies in History*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Fall, 2005), 8-29; I.F. Aleksandrov, “K istorii uchrezhdeniia Tavricheskogo Magometanskogo dakhovnogo pravlenii,” in *Iveststia Tavricheskii uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii* No. 54 (Simferopol, 1918), 316-355; D.Iu. Arapov, *Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovanii Islama v Rossiskoi imperii (posledniaia tret’ XVIII-nachalo XX vv.)* (Moscow: Moskovskii gos. universitet. istoricheskii fakul’tet, 2004).
province, which the petitioners charged had fallen into disrepair. During the course of the müfti’s four years of service, wrote the petitioners, “it has become completely clear that the entirety of his activity consists of nothing more than signing his name to documents of a clerical or administrative nature”. The petitioners asked the governor for the right to remove Karashaiskii from his post and elect his successor themselves.  

Within just a few weeks\textsuperscript{4}, the governor received a second set of petitions. Bearing more than 1000 signatures, these petitions defended the müfti, whom they described as capably fulfilling his post. This group of petitioners, moreover, took issue with the way in which the first group had identified themselves in their correspondence with the governor. In particular, they claimed that the petitioners criticizing the müfti had unrightfully appropriated the mantle of community spokespersons for the peninsula’s Muslim communities. Arguing that the earlier petitioners “do not constitute the voice of Muslims”, the supporters of Müfti Karashaiskii charged that the müfti’s critics had operated in secrecy and without the input of a representative sample of the region’s Muslim population.

There were no elections held regarding this undertaking, no meetings, and no form of representation with regard to this issue. Therefore, the petition by no means constitutes the will of the “Muslim population of the Crimea”. This project is the work of only those individuals who signed the petition.\textsuperscript{5}

The question of who had the right to “represent”, or “speak in the name of” Muslim communities in the empire was a relatively new one in Russia, but not entirely

\textsuperscript{3} State Archive of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea (hereafter cited as GAARK), f. 27, op. 3, d. 766, ll. 4-16-ob. The three müftis and the sheyh ul-Islam in Russia were all appointed by the Interior Ministry, rather than elected by Muslim communities. However, Muslims in the Crimea and the territories of the Orenburg Assembly did elect their own kadis.

\textsuperscript{4} Starting in early November of 1905.

\textsuperscript{5} GAARK, f. 27, op. 3, d. 766, l. 17-ob.
so. For more than a century, many of the most important responsibilities concerning the lives of the empire’s Muslims—such as the teaching of their children, the keeping of community record books, the arbitration of their disputes according to the Islamic legal tradition (or “Sharia”), and the mediation of much of their communication with the tsarist government—had been managed primarily by the empire’s four Muslim spiritual assemblies. While the Muslim assemblies did not represent the entirety of Muslims’ relations with either the state or with Islam, these institutions nevertheless played a central role in the relations of millions of Russian Muslim subjects with both Islam and the state.

In the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution and the creation of a more liberalized and public political environment, the question of who spoke in the name of the empire’s Muslims became a far more politicized one. Indeed, the Russian Revolution of 1904-1905 impacted, in a variety of ways, the question of how Muslims would be represented collectively in negotiations with the tsarist authorities. Following the post-1905 introduction of mass politics in Russia, including the opening of a parliament and of an “All-Russian Muslim” political party (named “Ittifak”), a variety of organizations

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6 Indeed, Russian Orthodox subjects of the empire were the first confessional group to have a state-created spiritual assembly, the Holy Synod, which was created during the reforms of Peter the Great in 1721 in accordance with his so-called Spiritual Reglament. The spiritual assemblies of the empire’s Muslims, Jews, protesters, and others were created during the reign of Catherine the Great. On the confessional administration of other religious groups in the Russian Empire, see Crews, “Empire and the confessional State,” 62-63. Also see George Bourmountian (trans.), Russia and the Armenians of Transcaucasia, 1797–1889: A Documentary Record (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1998); David W. Edwards, “The System of Nicholas I in Church-State Relations,” Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime, Robert L. Nichols and Theofanis George Stavrou, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), Eli Lederhandler, Road to Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Michael Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia, 1825–1855 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983); Nikolas K. Gvozdev, “The Russian Empire and the Georgian Orthodox Church in the First Decades of Imperial Rule, 1801–1830,” Central Asian Survey 14, no. 3 (1995): 407–23. For a discussion of Tsarist policies regarding Buddhist and other communities in Siberia and the Far East, see K. M. Gerasimova, Lamaizm i nasional’no-kolonia’naia politika tsarizma v Zabaikal’e v XIX i nachale XX vekov (Ulan-Ude: Buriat-mongol’skii nauchno-issl. In-t kulture, 1957); E. S. Safronova, Buddhaizm v Rossii (Moscow: Izd-vo RAGS, 1998).
emerged in Russia to articulate the interests of Muslim communities in the parliamentary era. After more than a century of collective Muslim administration in Russia under the auspices of the empire’s spiritual assemblies, the issue of who, if anyone, would represent Muslims collectively in the country’s new infrastructure of representative politics posed a question that no one in the government or in Muslim communities was able to answer decisively.

The opening of mass politics in Russia also had an impact upon the ways in which many Muslims understood and publicly defined the communities to which they belonged. Indeed, Muslim communities in the Volga region, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia had rarely shared extensive contacts with one another. For more than a century, Muslims in the Russian Empire had lived in bureaucratic-administrative communities based in Ufa, Simferopol, and Tbilisi, the centers of the empire’s four Muslim assemblies. Beginning in 1904-1905, however, Muslims from across the empire began to articulate political and cultural programs in the name of “Crimean Muslims”, “Caucasian Muslims”, “Tatars”, “Russian Muslims”, and other rhetorically invoked communities.

As was the case with the competing petition-writers of the Crimea discussed above, divisions over issues relating to political or cultural reform frequently spilled over into discussions and arguments over what constituted the community and who had the right to speak in its name. Across Russia in the years after the 1905 Revolution, various forms of collective identity would repeatedly be invoked by Muslims in their battles with one another over a variety of cultural, ideological, and political issues. “Identity” and “politics” did not simply represent separate (“intellectual” and “political”) expressions of

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7 There were two assemblies in the Caucasus, one for Shiite Muslims and another for Sunni Muslims.
a common manifestation of “national revival”. Rather, the public invocation of collective identity was itself often used as a political instrument in the leadership politics that dominated, and divided, Muslim communities in the months and years immediately following the revolution.

This study focuses upon the issue of community leadership politics within the Muslim populations of two provinces (guberniias) in late imperial Russia. The first of these is the province of Kazan, located in the Middle Volga region, approximately 800 miles east of Moscow. The second province discussed in this study is that of Baku, located in the southern Caucasus. These two provinces, located almost 1500 miles away from another on a nearly direct longitudinal axis, were both populated primarily by Muslims, yet shared little else in common. Kazan had become part of the Russian Empire when it was conquered in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible, and even before this date the leaders and inhabitants of the Khanate of Kazan had maintained considerable political and commercial relations with Russians and the Muscovite state. Long an important site of Islamic learning and culture, Kazan had served as a regional center of education, trade,

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8 The historiography of the Russian Muslim borderlands does, of course, recognize the “process” of “modern community identity formation” and the “politics” of “national revival” as closely related phenomena. However, little exploration is generally made into how the politics of community representation and concepts regarding the community’s parameters shaped one another, or into how the emergence of Muslim community leadership politics after 1905 politicized the ways in which people talked about and defined the “community” (millet). Rather, “politics” is viewed as the politics of Muslim “unity” in resistance to the “Russian” government. For this view, see Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: A profile in national resistance (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), especially 104-124; Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford, Calif.; Hoover Institution Press, 1992), especially 50-73; Hakan Kirimli, National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 116-149.

9 The historiography of the Russian Muslim borderlands does, of course, recognize the “process” of “modern community identity formation” and the “politics” of “national revival” as closely related phenomena. However, since the stability of the “community” in these cases tends to be taken for granted, little exploration is generally made into how the politics of community representation and concepts regarding the community’s parameters shaped one another. See the historiography section of this Introduction.

10 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, 24-31.
politics, and religion for several centuries. By the late nineteenth century, the city of Kazan was also an important administrative center within the Russian government, and the city contained a large non-Muslim population.

The province of Baku, meanwhile, had only become the site of provincial administration in 1859 after an earthquake wiped out the previous provincial capital, Şemahi. The incorporation of the southern Caucasus into the Russian Empire had occurred just recently, over the course of the early decades of the nineteenth century, through the treaties of Gülistan (1813) and Türkmenchai (1828) between Russia and Iran. Differences between the Muslim populations of Kazan and Baku guberniias existed not only with respect to language, religious practices, and ethnicity, but also in terms of their level of familiarity with the Russian language and tsarist administration.

Moreover, there were also many differences with respect to the education, welfare, and living conditions of these populations. Economically, the provinces differed considerably from one another. In the Volga region, a new generation of capitalist Muslims prospered, while Muslim peasants newly emancipated from serfdom often suffered. In the Caucasus, meanwhile, the oil boom of the late nineteenth century created a small number of millionaires but also an active labor movement. Administration and communication were also undertaken differently in the two regions, and relations between the tsarist authorities, Muslim populations, and Muslim community leaders often unfolded in different directions and according to differing sets of regional logic. Finally,

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12 Muslims in the Volga region are Sunni, while the majority of Muslims in the southern Caucasus are Shiite.
13 Such as the Huseynov brothers of Orenburg. See chapters 3 and 4 of this study.
the historical legacies of the two provinces were also quite different, and in each of these provinces different decisions undertaken at different times had led, by the late nineteenth century, to a different set of options available to Muslims, their community leaders, and the regional and local branches of government.

Focusing first upon late nineteenth century locations of authority, power, and prestige among Muslim communities in these two regions, this dissertation argues that the 1905 Revolution set in motion a series of revolutions within Muslim communities across the empire as Muslims in the Volga region, the Caucasus, the Crimea, and Central Asia took advantage of opportunities afforded by the changed political landscape to challenge existing locations of administrative, cultural, and political authority. These events, moreover, had serious implications for the ways in which Muslims thought about and discussed the parameters and nature of the communities in which they lived. “Identity” and “politics” were closely related to one another. The public expression of identity was not only influenced by the politics of the time within Muslim communities, but also was used as a political instrument in attempts to resolve the struggles surrounding these issues.

**Historiography**

Until the end of the Cold War, the study of the Russian Muslim borderlands in North America and Europe was dominated by a small number of individuals possessing a unique combination of languages relating to the communities of the region, including Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, S. Enders Wimbush,¹⁵ while Serge

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Zenkovsky’s *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* has also proven both influential and long-standing. In the middle and late 1980s, however, the field of Muslim nationality studies became more crowded, as a new series of books was produced which examined the “national” histories of the Volga Tatars, Crimean Tatars, “Azerbaijani Turks”, Uzbeks, and others. Like those written by Zenkovsky and Bennigsen, most of these studies were produced by scholars able to research effectively in both Russian and in the Turkic languages of the region. Often focusing upon the years 1905-1917, a period considered by these scholars to be one of “national revival” for non-Russian populations of the empire, these Cold War era “studies of nationalities of the USSR” focus largely upon the theme of “national awakening” in the face of “Russification” and “Russian” rule, an analogy which was often carried over into discussions of Muslim “resistance” to the Soviet authorities in the 1980s.


19 See, for example, Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic threat to the Soviet State*. 

8
The Muslim periodical press, particularly post-1905 newspapers operated by individuals sympathetic to the jadidist\(^\text{20}\) movement and the \textit{Ittifak} party,\(^\text{21}\) plays an important, though at times problematic, role in this historiography.\(^\text{22}\) Indeed, Muslim newspapers and journals, whose publication expanded exponentially after the liberalization of press laws in the wake of the October Manifesto of 1905,\(^\text{23}\) can be a highly valuable source for the historical study of Muslim populations in the Russian Empire. At the same time, however, the heavy reliance upon Turkic-language newspapers of some scholars working on the region has also contributed to the production of an historical narrative which is discussed primarily from the perspective of the jadid movement and the \textit{Ittifak} party leadership. Jadids and jadidism, as well as the \textit{Ittifak} party, are presented in this historiography as the best hope for “a cultural renaissance that would thrust Islamic society into the modern world,”\(^\text{24}\) while those who opposed them are

\(^{20}\) Jadidism, coming from the Arabic word for “new”, is the term used to describe Muslim community reformers in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. On Jadidism in Central Asia, see especially Adeb Khalid, \textit{The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). On jadidism and new method education in the Volga region and southern Caucasus, see Chapter 3 of this study.

\(^{21}\) \textit{Ittifak} (taken from the Arabic word for “Unity” or “Alliance”), was the name given to the “All-Russian Muslim” political movement begun in late 1904 and early 1905. Its leadership included Ismail Gasprinskii, Yusuf Akçura, Abdürrüşid Ibrahimov, Rizaeddin Fahreddin, and other community reformers. The name “Ittifak” also carried a connotation of ‘solidarity’ and mutual assistance, and giving the movement this name constituted an implicit recognition of the many divisions existing among the Muslims in whose name its leadership was speaking, including regional, linguistic, sectarian, ideological, economic, and cultural. In the studies of Landau and others, however, the choice of “Ittifak” as the name of the Muslim political movement is sometimes interpreted as evidence of a broader plan among Russian Muslims to “unite” politically. See Landau, \textit{Pan-Turkism in Turkey}, 10-11. On \textit{Ittifak}, see especially Chapter 4 of this study.

\(^{22}\) In this respect, the study of the Muslim borderlands of Russia is hardly unique. Bernard Lewis, for example, likewise focuses upon the roles of intellectuals and newspapers in formulating Turkish nationalism. See Bernard Lewis, \textit{The Emergence of Modern Turkey} (3\textsuperscript{rd} edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 180-189; Şükrü Hanioglu, \textit{The Young Turks in Opposition} (New York: Oxford, 1995), especially 209-216.

\(^{23}\) The Manifesto of October 18, 1905, granted broad freedoms to Russian subjects, including freedoms for both Russians and non-Russians to publish newspapers. See especially Chapter 5 of this study.

derided as “defenders of the old”, whose schools taught “blind memorization” and were “backward relics” of an age gone by. Meanwhile, locations of political authority outside of the İttifak leadership—such as the Muslim spiritual assemblies—receive relatively little attention. Adopting a narrow concept of the term “Muslim politics,” studies by scholars such as Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, Audrey Altstadt, Tadeusz Świetochowski, and Edward Allworth, as well as more recent studies by Hakan Kırmılı and Brian G. Williams, tend to present the issue of Muslim political activity generally in terms of the activities of Muslim liberal publicist figures such as İsmail Gasprinskii and the “All-Russian” Muslim İttifak party. Muslim opposition to İttifak, meanwhile, tends

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25 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, 89.
26 Shissler, Between two Empires, 47, 48, 108. After blasting the “blind memorization” techniques that Ahmet Ağaoğlulu would later be depicted as having fought against, Shissler later notes without irony that, when Ağaoğlulu begins to learn French while living in Paris, he himself worked “every day with his books and dictionaries to read and memorize more works by de Musset, Lamartine, Hugo and Gautier” (Shissler, 65). On traditional Muslim schools in Azerbaijan, Świetochowski writes “The schools as an institution throughout the centuries had maintained a sacred character, immune to change, with the effect that it turned into a bastion of militant conservatism”. Russian Azerbaijan, 29.
27 Kırmılı, National Movements, 23. See Adeb Khalid’s discussion of this question. Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, 5.
28 Kırmılı, for example, mentions the activities of Müfti Karashainskii of the Tavrida (Crimean) spiritual assembly on only a handful of occasions, see Kırmılı, National Movements, 65, 66, 69. While Kırmılı does briefly mention some of the jadidist rhetoric against the heads of the spiritual assemblies, little indication is given of the continued role of the assemblies in Muslim politics after 1905. See Kırmılı, National Movements, 68-69. Rorlich mentions Müfti Soltanov’s name just twice in The Volga Tatars, (pages 57, 91). Altstadt devotes just five pages to the Muslim spiritual assemblies of the Caucasus, and does not mention them at all in the context of post-1905 “politics”, see The Azerbaijani Turks, 57-62. Świetochowski’s Russian Azerbaijan, meanwhile, scarcely mentions the spiritual assemblies at all.
29 Adeb Khalid defines this term more broadly to “denote contests over authority in Muslim society.” This is the way in which this term will generally be discussed in this study. See Khalid, “Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan.” Slavic Review Vol. 55, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), 270-297, especially p. 272. However, the term “Muslim politics” in this earlier historiography tends to refer to the activities of the İttifak party alone.
30 Rorlich’s treatment of “Muslim Politics” comes in a chapter entitled “Jadids in Politics”. While this chapter does mention socialist and “religious” opposition to İttifak, this is done very briefly and the general focus is upon the activities of İttifak. See Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, 104-122, especially 106-107, 113. Kırmılı’s chapter on “politics” is similarly called “The Revolution of 1905 in the Crimea and the All-Russian Muslim Movement”. As is the case with Rorlich, this discussion of Muslim “politics” is enframed conceptually to include only the İttifak party. Kırmılı, like Rorlich, briefly mentions the activities of “students” and of Müfti Karashainskii, but treats their “reluctance” to support İttifak as isolated incidents. See Kırmılı, National Movements and National Identity, 56-72, especially 61-62, 67.
to be dismissed as having only taken place among a handful of "socialists" or "the more conservative ulema".31

Meanwhile, the historiography of the region produced in the lands of the former Soviet Union has been more varied over time. Under Lenin, many former jadids were employed in the Bolshevik administration, taking on positions of considerable power and prestige while they continued to write and publish.32 During parts of the Stalin era, however, many of these individuals33 fell into disfavor and were accused of harboring "pan-Turkist" views, and this focus upon a subversive "pan-Turkism" constitutes an important component of the historiography produced during this period.34

During the Brezhnev years, the theme of "friendship between peoples" became more pronounced in the historiography, and studies of the pre-1917 Russian Muslim borderlands began to focus less upon a separatist "pan-Turkism" and more upon themes which appeared to place the role of Russian Muslim cultural and political activism in a somewhat more positive light. Regarding the Volga region, studies emerged which studied Tatar publishing,35 the "formation" of the Tatar national idea,36 and other topics which addressed a narrative of cultural-political enlightenment, even if they revealed a

31 Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, 104-105.
32 Galimcan Barudi, one of the leading jadid figures prior to 1917, would become the first spiritual leader of the first Soviet muftiat. His successor would be Rizaeddin Fahreddin, another important reformist and Itifak figure. Fatih Kerimi, meanwhile, received a position in Moscow working at a state institution for the publication of Tatar literature.
33 Such as Kerimi, who was executed in 1937 because of his alleged connections to "pan-Turkism" and Yusuf Akçura.
34 As it has been, occasionally, in North American and European historiography of the region as well. As an example of Stalinist historiography of the pre-Bolshevik Russian borderlands, see A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, Ocherki panislamizma i panturkizma v Rossii (Moscow: Bezbozhnik, 1931).
35 A.G. Karimullin, Tartarskaia kniga nachala XX veka (Kazan, 1974).
“national-bourgeois” character that was usually frowned upon. The historiography of the Caucasus during the 1960s and 1970s, moreover, likewise focused more closely upon more positive interpretations of community activist figures and Muslim political action. A number of histories were produced which emphasized themes such as the “multi-national” character of the labor strikes in the Baku oil fields at the turn of the century, the “Azerbaijani” periodical press, and other subjects emphasizing actions of the Muslim cultural reformers that were looked upon more favorably during the Brezhnev era than had been the case previously.

Since the era of Gorbachev, there has been increased focus among scholars from the former Soviet Union upon the place of “nationalism” and (more recently) “Islam” in the Muslim politics of the late imperial era. While the “nationalism” of İttifak leaders had been acknowledged in the pre-perestroika Soviet historiography, it was considered “bourgeois” and downplayed in comparison with their “democratic” activities. From the late 1980s onwards, however, issues which had previously been interpreted according to Marxist-Soviet categories now began to be increasingly viewed through national ones. In recent years, historians in the former Soviet Union have been investigating a great number of issues that previously had not received much particular attention, including the

37 For an example of this approach, see Kh. Khasanov, Formirovanie tatarkoi burzhuaznoi natsii (Kazan, 1977).
38 I. Mëdëtov, 1905-ýi ildi Ñëbët proletariátànin ingilibi til’til hërrakätî tarikhindän (Baku: Azërbaycan Dövlet Náshriyyätî, 1965).
39 N. Zëynalov, Azërbayjan mätbuati tarikhì (Baku, 1974).
41 See, for example, Ravil Amirkhanov, Tatärskaià demokraticheaskaia pechat’ 1905-1907gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).
formation of the Muslim spiritual assemblies\textsuperscript{42} and the activities of other (mostly elite) groupings from the Volga region and southern Caucasus.\textsuperscript{43}

Among North American historiography produced since the mid-1990s, a number of exciting studies have been written which challenge existing notions of Islam and empire in the Russian context. Historians such as Robert Geraci, Paul Werth, Robert Crews, Firouzeh Mostashari, and others have begun reinvestigating in detail a variety of issues which previously had received only cursory treatment in the historiography. Using archival sources and other materials that were largely unavailable to an earlier generation of (non-Soviet) historians working on the region, these scholars and others have produced a series of excellent studies examining tsarist policies and attitudes towards Muslims with regard to education, conversion, administration, and other matters.

The more archivally-based approaches of recent studies constitute a welcome correction in the wake of more than two generations of historiography drawing largely upon Turkic-language periodical sources.\textsuperscript{44} However, a notable aspect of many of these newer studies is that, while benefitting from Russian archival sources, these studies have generally been produced by Russianist-trained scholars who lack training in the study of Muslim communities and who are usually unable to conduct research in the Turkic

\textsuperscript{42} Azamatov, Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie; Azamatov, “The Muftis of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly”; Kulieva, Rol’ i pozitsiiia musul’manskogo dukhovenstva.

\textsuperscript{43} See, for example, Diliara Usmanova, Musul’manskia fraktsiia i problemy “svobody sovesti” v gosudarstvennoi dume Rossii (1906–1917), (Kazan: Master Lain, 1999); Ildus Zagidullin, Perepis’1897 goda i Tatary Kazanskoi gubernii. (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 2000); Radik R. Sallikhov, “Obshchestvenno-reformatskaia deiatel’nost’ tatarkoi burzhuazii Kazani (vtoria polovina XIX-nachalo XX vv.), Dissertation, Kazan State University, 2002; also see Aiat Khabutdinov, “Tatarskoe obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossiskom soobshchestve (konets XVIII-nachalo XX vekov), Dissertation, Kazan State University, 2002.

\textsuperscript{44} Such as Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, Krimli, National Movements and National Identity.
languages of the region. Although these studies have often provided excellent insights into questions pertaining to the nature of tsarist rule, their discussions of events taking place within Muslim communities can often be rather limited in scope. In most of these studies, Muslim voices are heard only occasionally, while scholarly attention is paid primarily to the activities, goals, attitudes, and approaches of the tsarist government. When the voices of Muslims are heard at all in these studies, they tend to be mediated by figures such as the bureaucrat, the missionary, the bailiff, or the jailer. On other occasions, outdated or discredited sources are relied upon in these studies to provide a direct voice to Muslims, sometimes with rather problematic results.

45 Notable studies of the Russian borderlands to be produced in recent years include Robert P. Geraci, Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001; Wayne Dowler, Classroom and Empire: The Politics of Schooling Russia's Eastern Nationalities, 1860-1917 (Montreal & Kingston, 2001); Paul W. Werth, At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827-1905. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002; Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier, Campbell, “The autocracy and the Muslim clergy in the Russian Empire”, Sherry, “Mosque and State in the Caucasus, 1828-1841, ,” and Kelly O’Neill, “Allegiance to Tsar and Allah: Crimean Tatars in the Russian Empire, 1783-1853,” Central Eurasian Studies Review Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), 31-35. Meanwhile, there are a few scholars, such as Robert Crews and Douglas Northrop, who employ a handful of Turkic-language sources in their studies, mostly secondary sources written in modern Turkish. See, for example, Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State,” and For Prophet and Tsar. Also see Douglas Taylor Northrop, Veiled empire: gender and power in Stalinist Central Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). Adeeb Khalid is one of the rare scholars of the region who not only can effectively research in both Russian and Turkic languages, but who also engages both the regional historiography of Muslim communities and that of late imperial Russia more generally. See Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform.

46 Indeed, it would be difficult to come up with another example for the historiography of late imperial Europe in which the historiography of such numerically large communities could be so dominated by studies written by scholars unable to read the source material produced by these communities. Indeed, this state of affairs would be almost unthinkable in the historiography of other late imperial communities, such as the Czechs and Hungarians of the Hapsburg Empire, or the Armenians and Jews of the Ottoman and Russian Empires.

47 See Robert Geraci’s discussion of Muslim political activity and “pan-Turkism”, Window on the East, 264-284. A large part of this discussion is based upon a study published more than four decades earlier, Zenkovsky’s Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia. In this problematic section of an otherwise excellent study, Geraci also uncritically employs Jacob Landau’s highly flawed Pan-Turkism: from Irredentism to Cooperation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). Moreover, following Bennigsen (53-54), Geraci writes that “no sharp ideological boundaries existed between Tatar periodicals before February 1917” (p. 268, fn. 13), which is a grossly inaccurate statement. In a similar, though somewhat less problematic, manner, Firouzeh Mostashari’s discussion of the “concept” of the “Azerbaijani nation” in the pre-revolutionary Caucasus is largely adapted from the work of Swietochowski and Altstadt. This can also be seen in the work of as eminent an historian of the region as Andreas Kappeler, who relies upon the work of Lazzerini, Allworth, Fisher, and Bennigsen in producing a rather schematic narrative of “processes” of
Furthermore, the approach of many Russianist studies of Muslims in the empire has typically been one of gauging Muslim “response” to tsarist policies specifically, rather than investigating events taking place within Muslim communities more broadly.48 While these more state-centric approaches to examining Muslim communities have often explained a great deal about tsarist administration and rule, their occasional forays into discussions of events taking place specifically within Muslim communities can be problematic because these issues are usually explained only from the perspective of the relations of these communities with the government.49

Meanwhile, a number of scholars with training primarily in the field of Oriental Studies and its offshoots50 have produced valuable studies benefiting from Turkic-language sources and, usually, Russian-language secondary sources as well. Scholars

48 Mostashari’s chapter on this topic, for example, is entitled “Muslim society and its response to Russification”. In this chapter, nearly all of the constituent parts of the Muslim communities that are discussed by Mostashari (the ulema, the Muslim gentry, merchants, intellectuals, and others) are discussed principally in the context of their relations with the regional government. The place of these individuals within Muslim communities is left largely unexplored. See Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier, 113-128, 129-145. Paul Werth writes with great sensitivity and nuance in his first-rate study of conversion policies in the Volga-Kama region in At the Margins of Orthodoxy. The primary concerns of this study, however, are the policies of the Russian state, reactions by non-Russians to these policies, and the ways in which these problems were engaged by the state. While Werth provides a sophisticated analysis of the activities of non-Russian populations in these contexts, At the Margins of Orthodoxy does not closely examine these issues from the perspective of contexts emerging from within the non-Russian communities he studies.

49 Also see, for example, Elena Campbell’s discussion of the relationship between the state and the Muslim “clergy” [sic] in Russia, which focuses almost exclusively upon state policy and Muslim responses to these policies. See Campbell, “The Autocracy and the Muslim Clergy.” While this article is an example of the some of the fine scholarship which has both produced outlining the relations between the state and the spiritual assemblies, the issue of how the Muslim assemblies were perceived by Muslims is clearly not a subject of particular interest. This is a subject that is explored by Robert D. Crews, who raises a number of provocative, if often problematic, arguments in For Prophet and Tsar and “Empire and the Confessional State.” See, in particular, chapters 1 and 2 of this study, pp. 23, 88 (fn. 127).

50 Such as Near Eastern Studies, Central Asian Studies, and other regional studies programs focusing upon the Middle East and Eurasia.
such as Michael Kemper, Stéphane Dudoignon, Allen Frank, Thierry Zarcone, and others have investigated a number of important issues regarding the region, including Sufism, regional identity, Islamic jurisprudence, and cultural reform. These studies draw from an impressive range of sources, such as village histories, personal correspondence, newspapers, almanacs, and other handwritten and printed materials produced in the Arabic script versions of the languages of the Muslim populations of the empire.

If it can be said that Russianist studies of the Muslim borderlands tend to focus too much upon the role of the state, it should also be mentioned that an important drawback to many of the studies of the region produced by scholars of an Orientalist background is that they frequently ignore the state (and its sources) altogether. Moreover, even as these studies draw from Russian-language secondary literature pertaining to the region, they rarely engage the historiography of the Russian Empire more generally. Indeed, the question of what these studies mean for the ways in which late imperial tsarism can be understood beyond the specifics of the region involved is not generally discussed at length in these works, which tend to treat the experiences of the empire’s Muslim populations in isolation from the empire itself.

This dissertation also engages the historiography of the late period Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. One way in which this is done is through its discussion

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51 Few of these studies use Russian archival sources. See, for example, Allen J. Frank, Muslim religious institutions in Imperial Russia: the Islamic world of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780-1910 (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Qu'est-ce que la 'qadimiyat'? Éléments pour une sociologie du traditionalisme musulman, en Islam de Russie et en Transoxiane (au tournant des XIXe et XIXe siècles)," L'Islam de Russie: Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l'Oural depuis le XVIIIe siècle, Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Dâmir Is'haqov, and Râfyq Môhâmêtshin, eds. (Paris, 1997), 207-25. Michael Kemper discusses the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly and its mûftis at length, but likewise does not use state archival sources, see Kemper, Sufis und Gelehrte in Tatarien und Baschkirien, 1789-1889: der islamische Diskurs unter russischer Herrschaft (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1998). Other recent studies which cite a number of Russian-language secondary literature but little or no references to state archive material are Hakan Kınımlı, National Movements and National Identity, and Brian Glyn Williams, The Crimean Tatars: the Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
of Russian Muslim intellectual figures in the context of their involvement in the so-called "pan-Turkish" movement.\[52\] Turkish-language classics of the field include Cafer Seydahmet Kırmızı's *Gaspıralı İsmail Bey*,\[53\] and Muharrem Feyzi Togay's *Yusuf Akçura'nın Hayatı*,\[54\] while a number of more recent studies on these individuals have also been written.\[55\] Notable works of this sort produced in Turkey, Europe, and North America include François Georgeon's *Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc: Yusuf Akçura*,\[56\] Ufuk Özcan's *Ahmet Ağaoğlu ve Rol Değişikliği*,\[57\] and Holly Shissler's *Between two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the new Turkey*.\[58\]

Like much of the historiography devoted specifically to the "pan-Turkish" movement and its personalities, studies of the late Ottoman period more generally tend to situate the Turkist movement within the context of an emerging Turkish nationalism. While this approach is most pronounced in older studies produced by scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Niyazi Berkes,\[59\] this view of the first decade of the twentieth century

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\[53\] Cafer Seydahmet Kırmızı, *İsmail Bey Gaspıralı* (İstanbul: Matbaacılık ve Neşriyat Türk Anonim Şirketi, 1934).

\[54\] Muharrem Feyzi Togay, *Yusuf Akçura'nın Hayatı* (İstanbul: Hüsünatbiat Basmevi, 1944).


\[57\] Ufuk Özcan, *Ahmet Ağaoğlu ve Rol Değişikliği* (İstanbul: Donkişot, 2002).


is also found in a number of more recent studies.\textsuperscript{60} In this literature, the concept of “pan-Turkism” as an overtly political program\textsuperscript{61} is rejected even as it is presented as part of an organic “process of national formation and the rise of nationalism” among Muslims in Russia and the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{62}

The overwhelming consensus in the historiography of both the Russian borderlands and the Ottoman Empire is thus that the individuals involved in the articulation of “Tatar”, “Azeri”, “Turkish”, and other forms of “national consciousness” were on the winning side of history. As “nationalists” in a pre-national age, they were ahead of their time, looking ahead to “national identity and statehood”\textsuperscript{63} and constituting the national vanguard within a broader phenomenon of “national awakening”.\textsuperscript{64} Most importantly, almost all of the current historiography on the Muslims of Russia examines them from the context of a generally unified “community” which, while perhaps containing the occasional exception\textsuperscript{65}, need not be divided further.\textsuperscript{66}

But Muslim “politics” was a contentious issue in the eyes of Russian Muslim communities as well as the Russian and Ottoman governments. The “All-Russian” Muslim political party, İtîfak, in many ways constituted a broad-based movement in 1904 and 1905, but even in these months there was considerable debate regarding the actual locations of representative authority among Muslims in post-revolutionary Russia.

\textsuperscript{60} Şükrü Hanoğlu, for example, argues that “Turkish nationalism” constituted part of the “agenda” of the CUP as early as 1902, and that this became particularly pronounced after 1906. Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 211-212.
\textsuperscript{61} As it is portrayed, for example, by Zenkovsky and Landau.
\textsuperscript{63} Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, 178.
\textsuperscript{64} Shissler, Between two Empires, 4, 121, 236.
\textsuperscript{65} Such as a handful of socialist opponents to İtîfak, or “kadims”.
\textsuperscript{66} An important exception to this is the work of Robert D. Crews. While flawed in many ways, Crews’ studies have raised a number of important issues, particularly with regard to the relations between the state, the spiritual assemblies, and Muslim populations. Although this dissertation does not emulate the state-centric approach of Crews to questions of religious practice and community ideas, its production has been influenced, particularly in its first two chapters, by Crews’ intelligent and original line of research.
Moreover, many Muslims—particularly on the left—questioned whether “Muslim” representation (either through the spiritual assemblies or İttifak) was necessary in the first place, and instead advocated that Muslims support non-Muslim social democratic and agrarian parties. Meanwhile, Muslim opposition to İttifak grew steadily, particularly in the wake of İttifak’s formal establishment as a political party in August, 1906. This opposition manifested itself both in the form of Muslim support for various Russian political parties, and also through other actions such as failure to vote and Muslim denunciations of İttifak leaders to the police.

As was the case with “politics”, “identity” was also a fractious issue for Muslims in Russia, even for particular individuals for whom the question of “national” identity has become an issue of historiographical importance. Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoglu, and other well-known publicists by turns advocated different variations of identity according to changing circumstances. Often, these circumstances also involved social, political, and professional contexts. At a time when a variety of presumptive Muslim public figures simultaneously spoke in the name of the “community”, the parameters of the community changed according to context and location. “Identity”, moreover, was often used as a political instrument, and politics were often transformed into identity politics.67 Like German-speaking Jews in the Prague of the Hapsburg Empire,68 Syrian community

67 Scholars usually treat “identity” and “politics” as separate expressions of a common “revival” or “awakening” of “national consciousness”. See Chapter 5 of this study. Shissler writes, in discussing the articles she has selected from the “daunting” selection of Ağaoglu’s prolific writings, that she “tried to select pieces that were more oriented towards intellectual questions and less towards the reporting of news”. But Ağaoglu was no mere reporter, and his “reporting of the news” also involved “intellectual questions”. Indeed, no significant distinction can be drawn between “intellectual questions” and “the reporting of the news”, because politics and the public articulation of identity in the “reporting of the news” were both inherently political undertakings.

68 On the confluence of national and aesthetic identities among Franz Kafka and others in his circle, see Scott Spector, Prague Territories: National conflict and cultural innovation in Franz Kafka’s fin de siècle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
leaders during the French mandate, and others living in the late imperial or immediately post-imperial age. Russian Muslims were divided according to a variety of axes, including those pertaining to the question of identity.

While accepting many of the premises of “constructivist” (as opposed to “primordialist”) arguments regarding the “invented” or “imagined” nature of “modern community identity formation”, this study is also interested in communities which were somewhat more tangible. The Muslim spiritual assemblies, the focus of much of the discussion in chapters 1 and 2, constituted for many Muslims a set of actual, rather than “imagined”, communities in the regions of the Russian empire where they operated from the late eighteenth century until the end of the empire. Tied together by an administrative, cultural, and educational network founded upon a religious premise (called “spiritual”) within a distinct ethnic regional particularism, the Muslim spiritual assemblies tied communities together in a manner that was not only ethnic, religious, linguistic, and sectarian, but also administrative and legal.

The question of official toleration in the late period Russian Empire is also of concern to this work. Historians of the Muslim communities of the Russian Empire have traditionally viewed the creation of Muslim spiritual assemblies during the era of

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69 Like Spector, James Gelvin is also interested in breaking up identities that have previously been presented in more monolithic terms. On his discussion of politics in mandate Syria, see Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and mass politics in Syria at the close of empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

70 There are a number of studies concerning confessional politics in the Ottoman Empire. Sarah Abrevaya Stein’s Making Jews Modern: the Yiddish and Ladino press in the Russian and Ottoman empires (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) focuses primarily upon the role of the Jewish periodical press but does to some extent describe tensions taking place between Jewish reformists and their opponents in the Ottoman Empire, see pages 64-82 in particular. Ilan Karmi, The Jewish Community of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century: Social, Legal and Administrative Transformations (Istanbul: Isis, 1996); Stanford Shaw’s The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). On reform politics in the Armenian millet see Vartan Artinian’s The Armenian constitutional system in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1863: a study of its historical development (Istanbul: Vartan Artinian, 1988).
Catherine the Great in terms of growing Muslim “autonomy” from the Russian state. 

More recent studies, however, have begun to focus more upon the place of the Muslim spiritual assemblies within the Russian state bureaucracy and the efforts by the state to regulate “Islam” through the assemblies. While this dissertation is likewise concerned with the role of the spiritual assemblies in the Russian state, it is also concerned with their place within Muslim communities. Focusing upon the variations in the forms in which tsarist administration assumed from region to region, this study examines the emergence of public discourses and politics among Muslim communities in the context of imperial change.

As is the case in the historiography of empires more generally, the comparative aspect of this dissertation is also important. Most studies of the Muslim spiritual assemblies have been regional histories, with little attention paid to the differences taking place in Muslim administration from one region of the empire to another. Regional accounts detailing the emergence of “national” identity among the empire’s Muslim

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71 See, for example, Alan W. Fisher, “Enlightened Despotism and Islam under Catherine II,” Slavic Review 27, No. 4 (December, 1968), 542-553, esp. 547.

72 See Robert D. Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State.” Also see Campbell, “The autocracy and the Muslim clergy.” Another article focusing upon the relationship between the state and the spiritual assemblies is Dana Sherry’s “Mosque and State in the Caucasus.”

73 A recent study comparing late imperial Ottoman administration in Yemen and Albania is Isa Blumi’s Rethinking the Ottoman Empire: a comparative social and political history of Albania and Yemen, 1878-1918 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003).

74 See, for example, Danil’ Azamatov’s Orenburgskoe dukhovnoe sobranie; Vafa Kulieva, Rol’ i pozitsiiia musul’manskogo dukhovenstva. Also see Crews, For Prophet and Tsar. While Crews acknowledges that the form of Muslim administration in Central Asia was different from that of the rest of Russia, his discussion of the Orenburg Assembly ignores many of the important differences which existed in Muslim administration in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and elsewhere in the empire. Indeed, Crews’ discussion can sometimes give the impression that the Orenburg Assembly was responsible for the administration of all of the empire’s Muslims outside of Central Asia, rather than being just one of four Muslim spiritual institutions. While this “Orenburg-centric” approach to Muslim religious administration is also common to much of the historiography of the region produced in Moscow, Kazan, and Ufa, the study of the literature concerning Muslim administration in other regions of the empire provides an important check on this tendency. D. Iu. Arapov has produced perhaps the only truly comparative study of the Muslim spiritual assemblies of Russia, albeit one which does not consult the regional archives but rather those of Moscow. See Arapov, Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovanija Islama.
populations have likewise tended to ignore comparisons with other regions.\textsuperscript{75} In this dissertation, however, an effort has been made to examine a variety of issues from a comparative standpoint. Topics such as spiritual administration, community leadership, educational reform, and political organization are discussed in the context of events taking place in both Kazan and Baku, while examples from the Crimea are also frequently introduced for the sake of comparison or contrast. Elsewhere, the nature and activities of Russian Muslim community activism is compared not only in the contexts of Kazan, Baku, and the Crimea, but also that of the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. Central Asia, which was administered as a colony separate from the rest of the empire, does not factor directly in this study.\textsuperscript{76}

\textit{Outline}

The first two chapters of this dissertation explore the systems and practices of Muslim community leadership in the final decades of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Chapter 1 investigates the most important institution of Muslim administration prior to 1905, the Muslim spiritual assemblies. Contrasting the different ways in which confessional rule functioned as an administrative system in Kazan and Baku, this chapter pays particular attention to the issue of how the state and Muslim communities communicated with one another, and the ways in which the spiritual assemblies facilitated this communication.

Chapter 2 examines some of the other channels of communication which existed between the state and Muslim populations prior to 1905, including the Turkic-language

\textsuperscript{75} See, for example, Rorlich, \textit{The Volga Tatars}; Altstadt, \textit{The Azerbaijani Turks}; Kirmi, \textit{National Movements and National Identity}. When comparisons are made, it is usually in the context of the jadidist cultural reform movement, which is described in empire-wide terms. In \textit{Russian Azerbaijan}, for instance, Tadeusz Swietochowski describes “jadidism” in the Caucasus largely in terms of events taking place in the Crimea. See \textit{Russian Azerbaijan}, 30-31.

\textsuperscript{76} The impact of fifty years of tsarist rule in Central Asia, while considerable, was less so with regard to the cultural and religious life of the native population. Traditional Muslim education also remained outside the purview of the state. See Khalid, “Tashkent 1917,” 273.
press and Muslim notable families. This chapter also investigates the different types of policies adopted by the Russian government in its dealings with Muslim communities in the Volga region and the Caucasus, and the impact of these policies upon relations between the state, Muslim community leaders, and Muslim populations more generally. In the Volga region, a series of new regulations adopted in the post-reform era brought the Orenburg Assembly and the Muslims living under its jurisdiction into much closer contact with the state.\textsuperscript{77} This coincided, meanwhile, with the renewed presence of state-supported missionary activities in the guberniia from the 1860s onward, an issue of great concern to Muslims in the region, particularly in the context of the post-reform expansion of government and the creation of a series of new departments, agencies, and institutions playing a role in the administration of Muslims. These developments are then compared with different conditions and policies undertaken in the administration of Muslims in the Caucasus, with particular emphasis paid towards establishing the political context of community leadership issues in the Volga region and Caucasus in the years immediately preceding the 1905 Revolution.

Chapter 3 discusses the issue of educational reform and how it was conceived by the tsarist government, Muslim community reformers, and Muslim populations more generally. While tsarist and jadidist plans for Muslim educational reform resembled one another in many ways, government bureaucrats distrusted jadids due to their attempts to develop their own institutions of Muslim education. Like many states in the late

\textsuperscript{77} In 1870, for example, new Muslim medreses opening under the authority of the Orenburg Assembly were obliged to offer Russian classes, while in 1874 Muslim schools under the control of the Orenburg Assembly were put under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Education. In 1888, meanwhile, it became necessary for individuals seeking to receive the rank of imam, akhund, or muezzin in the Orenburg Assembly to pass an examination in Russian language and history. None of these regulations applied to Muslim communities in the Caucasus or the Crimea.
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, control over education was of particular importance to the Russian state in the post-reform era, and government policymakers and bureaucrats became increasingly alarmed by the efforts of jadids to set up their own schools without government permission. Meanwhile, many Muslims in the Volga region also resisted the “new method” schools of the jadids, particularly after their rapid expansion in the wake of the 1905 Revolution, and appealed to both the spiritual assemblies and the civil branches of tsarist administration in an effort to curb their influence and expansion. In the Caucasus, on the other hand, a different set of approaches followed by both the regional administration and Muslim educational reformers contributed to the development of a considerably different educational landscape in the years after 1905.

Chapter 4 analyzes the emergence of the “All-Russian Muslim” political party İttifak as well as Muslim opposition to this party. While existing historiography tends to accept uncritically claims (often made by İttifak leaders themselves) of Muslim political “unity” (“ittifak”)78 during this period, this study closely examines monarchist, socialist, and other groups opposed to İttifak, as well as the response of many Muslims to what they perceived as the party’s unjust appropriation of the position of spokespersons for all Muslims in Russia. In this section of my dissertation I demonstrate that Muslims were not only divided among themselves politically, but also that coalitions of Muslims and

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78 This word, which means ‘Unity’ or ‘Unity’ in Arabic and modern Tatar, carried a connotation of ‘solidarity’ and mutual assistance. It was also an implicit recognition of the many divisions existing among the Muslims in whose name it was speaking, including regional, linguistic, sectarian, ideological, economic, and cultural. In the studies of Landau and others, this name is sometimes interpreted as evidence of a broader plan among Russian Muslims to “unite” politically. See Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey, 10-11.
(Christian) Russians were also occasionally formed in opposition to other Muslim-Russian partnerships.

The final section of my project, consisting of chapters 5 and 6, examines the relationship between political conflicts over the right to speak in the name of Muslims and the ways in which the community came to be publicly defined and articulated. New forms of collective identity such as “Russian Muslims” and “Caucasian Muslims” were offered by Muslim community reformers as alternatives to the regional-sectarian forms of community represented through the Muslim spiritual assemblies. Discourses drawing on the themes of unity and solidarity were frequently applied by Russian Muslim community leaders in their public struggles over the question of Muslim community leadership. Projects devoted to imagining new forms of community identity, I argue, were intimately connected with the process of imagining new ‘worlds’ creating new ‘centers’, including new centers of authority and power. Meanwhile, these discourses and politics were carried over to Istanbul, where many of the most important figures in the Muslim community reform movement of Russia became active in the Turkist movement from 1908 onwards.

Chapter 5 discusses not only the rhetoric of ‘solidarity’ and collective identity among Muslims in Russia during the years 1905-1914, but also their international context, political ramifications, and the impression they made upon other Muslims and the Russian government. In chapter 6 I follow Russian Muslim community activists such as Yusuf Akcura, Ahmet Ağaoglu, and Ali Hüseyinzade from Russia to Istanbul, where they become the best-known Russian Muslims in the Turkist (or ‘pan-Turkist’) movement. In this chapter I examine the activities of these so-called “forefathers of
Turkish nationalism” and their involvement in political and intellectual circles in Istanbul. While existing studies of the Turkist movement focus almost exclusively upon the journal and newspaper writings of Akçura, Ağaoğlu, Hüseyinzade and others in focusing upon their “ideas” of nationalism, this dissertation employs not only periodical sources, but also sources from the Ottoman and Russian archives, as well as the personal correspondence of Yusuf Akçura, Fatih Kerimi, and others. Using these materials, I examine not only the ideas of Russian Muslim activists in Istanbul, but also their place within the broader contexts of Russian Muslim activism in Istanbul and Russian Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire more generally.

Drawing upon the experience of these individuals in the political-identity battlefields of Muslim Russia, I argue that for Russian-born Turkists the subject of collective identity was a far more politicized topic than it was to Ottoman-born intellectuals associated with the Turkist movement,79 for whom the Ottoman state was viewed as the most likely source of social and cultural regeneration. Turkism was far more crucial to the political, cultural, and professional interests of Russian-born Turkists since the concept allowed them to remain both intellectually and politically within the communities of Russian Muslims from which they had just departed. Indeed, like many other Russian Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire80, Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and

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79 Such as Ziya Gökalp, Halide Edip, and Ahmet Mithat.
Hüseynzade maintained close ties with their lands of origin and returned to them when they could.\textsuperscript{81}

Contrary to the views of some of the historians who have worked on the Russian Muslim borderlands, “the central issue in the political life” of Muslim communities in the empire was not necessarily “the relationship with the Russians”,\textsuperscript{82} but rather the question of Muslim community leadership and the cultural issues\textsuperscript{83} that changes in this leadership could impact.\textsuperscript{84} Negotiations over these issues, were not, however, limited simply to “political” questions concerning administration, but also impinged upon discussions regarding how the “community” itself was characterized and defined. It is at the meeting place of “politics” and “identity”, this “dark and bloody crossroads,” that the conceptual approach of this dissertation is situated.

\textsuperscript{81} Akçura, for example, was a Tatar from the Volga city of Simbirsk who moved to Istanbul as a child. He later returned to Russia in 1903 after studying in Istanbul and Paris. After moving to Istanbul in 1908, Akçura went back to Russia in February of 1909, where he rented an apartment in St. Petersburg. He returned yet again to Istanbul in the fall of 1909 but continued to draw a significant portion of his income from Russia, and his letters to his editor in Russia, Fatih Kerimi, demonstrate his continued involvement in affairs taking place in Russia as well as a pronounced indecisiveness regarding where he wanted to live. In 1914, tsarist security offices reported that Akçura had again returned to Russia, spending the months January through March in St. Petersburg and Simbirsk before departing again for Istanbul, where he would spend the war years. As was the case with Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ali Hüseynzade also maintained close connections with their lands of origin after their departure for Istanbul. Ağaoğlu continued to publish articles in the Baku newspapers \textit{Hakikat} and \textit{Günes} after his departure for Istanbul in 1909. After World War I ended, he returned to Baku, where he served as a deputy in the parliament of the newly formed Republic of Azerbaijan (whose president was Mehmet Emin Resulzade, another \textit{Türk Yurdu} contributor from the prewar years). In 1919 Ağaoğlu was arrested by the British in Istanbul while traveling to Paris in order to represent Azerbaijan at the postwar peace conferences. Ali Hüseynzade, meanwhile, spent much of his adult life traveling between the two empires. Originally from Baku, Hüseynzade had lived in Istanbul between the years 1889 and 1903, where he worked as a doctor. He then returned to Baku, where he lived for another seven years before settling back in Istanbul in 1910. Hüseynzade returned to Baku during the summer of 1918 but after a few months went back to Istanbul.

\textsuperscript{82} Altstadt, \textit{The Azerbajiani Turks}, xxiii.

\textsuperscript{83} In particular, those concerning education. See Chapter 3 of this study.

\textsuperscript{84} Like Paul Werth, I believe that the concept of “imperial relations” needs to be placed “in a polygonic set of interactions and processes.” Rather than examining the “triangular nature relationship among Russians, non-Russians, and the state”, however, my study seeks to break down both the tsarist administration and Muslim communities and look within them. See Werth, “From Resistance to Subversion: Imperial Power, Indigenous Opposition, and their Entanglement.” \textit{Knížka} Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter, 2000), 21-43, especially pages 33, 35.
Chapter 1

The Russian State and the Muslim Spiritual Assemblies at the turn of the Twentieth Century

The Muslim spiritual authorities were among the most important institutions of Muslim administration in the final century of Russian imperial rule. These institutions, based in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Ufa, were established by the Russian government in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in order to “hear and decide cases belonging to the religious part of the Mohammedan law, like circumcision, marriage, divorces, and mosque service”.¹ Formally components of the Russian Ministry of Interior, the Muslim assemblies held jurisdiction over territories which were defined in both geographical and sectarian terms.² Modeled in part upon the “millet” system of confessional administration in the Ottoman Empire³, the work of the spiritual assemblies was a critical component of administration not only for the Muslims of the Russian Empire, but for other religious groups as well.⁴

The four assemblies were based in the regions most heavily populated by Muslims in the empire. The largest of the four assemblies, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, was first established in 1788 in the city of Ufa. It was responsible for the

¹ Taken from Crews, For Prophet and Tsar, 53.
² In the Caucasus, there were two separate spiritual assemblies—one for Shiites and the other for Sunnis.
³ On confessional administration in the Ottoman Empire, see Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 114-135.
administration of Muslims living in the territories of European Russia and Siberia. The Crimean Assembly and Muftiate were established in 1794, eleven years after Crimea’s incorporation into the Russian Empire. In the Caucasus, the Shiite and Sunni administrations did not assume their “final” pre-revolutionary forms until 1872, but provincially-based spiritual assemblies had been created for Muslim communities in the region not long after the Russian conquest of the region. The three Sunni assemblies of the Russian Empire were each headed by a müfti, while Russia’s only Shiite administration—that of the Caucasus—was headed by the sheykh ul-Islam. Each of the assemblies was made up of imams, akhunds, and muezzins, drawn from the districts and villages from the assembly’s territories. Spiritual personnel, or ulema, took examinations administered by the state in order to receive licenses, at which point they would become a member of their respective assembly.

While the Muslim spiritual assemblies, like those of other confessional communities of the empire, were “religious” in form, their roles in both Muslim communities and the Russian government were also administrative. Officially, the Muslim spiritual assemblies held a monopoly on performing religious tasks such as the reading of sermons and the conduct of ceremonies such as weddings, funerals, and prayer

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5 Kulieva, *Rol’ i pozitsiiia*, 15-43. Also see Mostashari, *On the Religious Frontier*, 86-90; Sherry, “Mosque and State in the Caucasus,” 3-9. However, since the 1820s there had existed predecessors to the Shiite and Sunni assemblies which carried out similar tasks of administration and community mediation. For information regarding the pre-1872 activities of the sheykh ul-Islam, see the 1854 report written by “Müfti of the Caucasian Region” Mehmet Efendi Müftizade, ADTA f. 289, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 1-2-ob. For a similar report, written in 1861, see ADTA f. 289, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 26-41. On the use of the Orenburg Assembly in Ufa as a model for the creation of the spiritual assemblies in the Caucasus, see ADTA f. 289, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 60-63-ob.

6 The largest of the assemblies, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, was made up of more than 2000 spiritual personnel in the early twentieth century.

7 On these examinations, see Azamatov, “Russian Administration and Islam,” 101-102; Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoie dakhovnoe sobranie*, 11-12.

8 The four Muslim spiritual assemblies were components of the Russian Ministry of Interior.
meetings, in addition to often working as teachers. The centers of the assemblies in Ufa, Simferopol, and Tbilisi maintained appellate courts that Muslims could petition, with or without the assistance of their local spiritual personnel. Cases heard in these courts included those involving marriage, divorce, the division of property, and other matters generally falling under the category of “family law” in western legal systems. These were adjudicated according to the Islamic legal tradition, or Sharia. Another responsibility of the spiritual assemblies was applying, on behalf of Muslim communities, to government authorities for permission to construct, repair, or enlarge a mosque. In the Caucasus and Crimea, and to a lesser extent in the Volga region, the spiritual assemblies also managed the pious foundations (vakıflar, or evkaf) of their communities.

The official status of the Muslim spiritual authorities notwithstanding, their authority within Muslim communities with regard to questions of Koranic interpretation was hardly absolute. Particularly in the decades immediately following the creation of

9 Robert Crews says that of the approximately 1,200 cases that the Orenburg Assembly handled annually in the 1880s, the largest number (200-250 annually) involved inheritance disputes, followed by divorce cases (up to 150). See “Empire and the Confessional State,” especially p. 76, fn. 94.
10 Sharia, or the Islamic Legal Tradition, does not have a specific code and therefore varies considerably in its interpretation. The Sharia of the Russian Empire was in the Hanafi tradition of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, on at least one occasion in the late nineteenth century, officials in the Russian Foreign Ministry asked, and received, permission from the Ottoman government to ask the advice of the Ottoman Sheyh ul-Islam with regard to a case involving the granting of custody over an orphan. See BOA, HRH 572/64, s. 1. and later in this chapter.
11 Pious foundations, which created soup kitchens, resting places for travelers and pilgrims, and other buildings designed for the public good, were also an important means of alienating wealth. On the management of pious foundations in the Crimea, see Alan W. Fisher, “Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II,” Slavic Review 27, No. 4 (December, 1968), 542-553, 547. Also see For more on vakıfs in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, see Danil Azamatov, Iz istorii musul’manskoi blagotvoritel’nosti: Vakıfy na territorii evropeiskoi chasti Rossii i Sibiri v kontse XIX-nachale XX veke (Ufa: Gilem, 2000). Also see Norihiro Naganawa, “Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: Mullahs under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905.” Acta Slavica Japanica, Tomus 23, 101-123, especially pp. 116-119. For a discussion of the evkaf holdings of the Sunni and Shiite authorities in the Caucasus, see Vafa Kulieva, Rol’ i pozitsiya musul’manskogo dukhovensva 108-137.
12 In this respect, I disagree with Crews’ argument that, for Muslims in the Russian Empire, “religion came to depend on the institutions of the state.” See For Prophet and Tsar, 10. For Russian Muslims, religious practice assumed a wide variety of forms, many of them having no direct connection to the Orenburg
the spiritual assemblies, a number of Muslims ignored or resisted the new institutions, which represented a synthesis of religion and bureaucracy that was largely foreign to Islam. In the Volga region, ulema who were opposed to the creation of an official Islamic hierarchy attached to the Russian state were often known as part of the “Abzlar movement”, while many Sufi and Sufi-influenced Muslims branded by the Russian government as “heterodox” also resisted the new institutions. While opposition to the spiritual assemblies became less pronounced towards the middle of the nineteenth century, the widespread practice of “unofficial” variants of Islam continued to exist alongside the spiritual assemblies until the end of the empire itself and well into the Soviet period.

While the religious authority of the spiritual assemblies was not uncontested, the administrative importance of the assemblies and their personnel to both the Russian state and Muslim communities was considerable. Spiritual personnel kept the records of Muslim communities, arbitrated their disputes, performed their religious ceremonies,

Assembly. While the Orenburg Assembly and other spiritual institutions in the Russian Empire were institutions of religious administration, there was much regarding religion and Islam in particular that remained outside the purview of the state.


14 “Heterodoxy” meaning in this case any Muslim practices not officially sanctioned by the Russian state through the spiritual assemblies.


16 See, for example, Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Largely destroyed during the Soviet periods, syncretic and sufist influences have gained considerable ground in the region since the late 1980s.
taught their children, and were responsible for all sorts of dealings with the tsarist administration. While many Muslims continued to view the assemblies as an ultimately foreign innovation imposed upon Muslim communities by the Russian government, the important role of these institutions and their personnel in so many aspects of the lives of Muslims sometimes made the prospect of living without these institutions hard to imagine. Following, for example, the death of the third Orenburg Müfti Abdulkhaid Suleimanov in 1862, the Interior Ministry did not appoint a new müfti for more than two years. This delay led to widespread consternation among many Muslims, who contacted a variety of tsarist officials in requesting that a new müfti be named as soon.\footnote{See, for example, one such petition in \textit{Materialy po istorii Tatarii vtoroi poloviny XIX veka: Agrarnyi vopros i krest’ianskoe dvizhenie 50-70 godov XIX v.} (Moscow: Izd-vo akademii nauk SSSR, 1936), 166. Also see Campbell, “The Autocracy and the Muslim Clergy,” 16.} Representatives from some of Kazan’s best-known Muslim families also petitioned government officials in this regard, and met with the governor of Kazan in their effort to gain an audience with the Interior Minister.\footnote{See Daniil D. Azamatov, “The Muftis of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly.” Also see NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4468.}

Several of the müftis and sheyhs ul-Islam appointed by the Russian government lacked a prestigious Islamic education, and did not gain the respect of the better educated ulama of the region.\footnote{For example, the fourth Orenburg Müfti, Salimgirey Tevkelev, was an army officer with hardly any Islamic education whatsoever. See Valtullu Iakupov, \textit{Oshcherossiiskii muftiat i ego muftii} (Kazan: Iman, 2005), 24-30.} Many spiritual personnel, moreover, were greatly disliked in their communities, and were the subject of many complaints.\footnote{Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State,” 73-76.} This did not mean, however, that these institutions were not important to Muslim communities. While the müftis and sheyhs ul-Islam were not always loved or respected, the institutions did include many individuals who were respected in the community. Other than senior spiritual figures
such as the müftis, kadis, and sheyh ul-Islam, spiritual personnel in Russia were elected by their communities.\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, many of the individuals serving in these and other positions in the spiritual assemblies were well respected for their knowledge and intelligence.\textsuperscript{22} Although the assemblies were not necessarily irreplaceable with regard to the religious needs of the empire’s Muslims, by the end of the nineteenth century the spiritual assemblies were viewed by many Muslims as vital to their administrative needs.\textsuperscript{23}

_The administrators of Islam_

One of the most important roles of the Muslim spiritual assemblies was keeping the official records of their communities. This was carried out mainly through the writing of _metricheskie knigi_, or metrical books. This sort of record keeping was the norm for all of Russia’s confessional communities,\textsuperscript{24} and had been taking place within the Muslim assemblies since 1829, when the vice-governor of the _gubernia_ of Orenburg, N. Khanyakov, set aside seven hundred silver rubles for the task.\textsuperscript{25} In the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the lands of the Orenburg Assembly, Muslim religious personnel in villages and in cities were responsible for registering the births, deaths, marriages, and divorces of Russian Muslims, as well as their place of residence.\textsuperscript{26} After universal

\textsuperscript{21} On the election of mullahs in the Orenburg Assembly, see Norihiro Naganawa, “Molding the Muslim Community,” 106.

\textsuperscript{22} The Kazan scholar and religious thinker Shihabeddin Mercani, for example, was widely respected as one of the premier minds of his day. While he was critical of the Orenburg Assembly leadership, it is worth noting that he himself was an imam in the Orenburg Assembly. This is also the case with Rizaaeddin Fahreddin, one of the leaders of _Intifak_ who was in the Orenburg Assembly until resigning in 1906 in order to become the editor of the jadidist journal _Sura_. On Fahreddin, also see Chapter 4 of this study.

\textsuperscript{23} See chapters 2 and 4 of this study in particular.

\textsuperscript{24} Including Russian Orthodox. See Paul Werth, “In the State’s Embrace? Civil Acts in an Imperial Order.” _Kritika_, vol. 7, no. 3. (Summer 2006).

\textsuperscript{25} Azamatov, _Orenburgskoe dukhovnoe sobranie_, 84.

\textsuperscript{26} For more on the _metricheskie knigi_, see Nal’’ Kamilevich Garipov, “Politika rossiiskogo gosudarstva v etnokonfessional’noi sfere v kontse XVIII-nachale XX vv.: opyt dukhovnogo upravleniia musul’mant”
conscription was adopted in Russia in 1874, the records kept in these books were also used in recruitment campaigns.\textsuperscript{27}

Due to the importance of metrical books to the tsarist administrative system more generally, serious difficulties could be created for individuals if their names failed to appear. Often, disputes over the keeping of registry books developed into complaints regarding the conduct of local spiritual personnel. In 1901, for example, a woman named Fesahet Banu Abdul 
\textit{kızı} from the village of İsmail in the \textit{guberniia} of Viatka appealed to the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly for assistance in a dispute with the imam of her village over his keeping of the registry books. Fesahet wrote in her petition\textsuperscript{28} that she wished to get married, but was currently unable to as she had not been entered into the registry books when she had been born. For that reason the imam working in her current village of residence refused to perform the \textit{nikah} service, or wedding. In appealing to the authorities in Ufa to allow her to get married, Fesahet blamed her plight on the stupidity of the “ignorant” imam who had forgotten to register her after her birth.\textsuperscript{29}

In May of 1911, a sixteen year old girl from the village of Ulvi Burunduk in the \textit{guberniia} of Kazan petitioned Orenburg Müfti Soltanov with a request that he intervene on her behalf in another matter pertaining to the keeping of official records. The girl, named Mingli Cihan Mehmet Alim \textit{kızı}, had been born in the city of Ufa prior to moving

\footnotesize{(Dissertation, Kazan State University, 2001), 123-124. Also see Azamatov, \textit{Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dakhovnoe sobranie}, 83-84.
\textsuperscript{27} Naganawa, “Molding the Muslim Community through Tsarist Administration,” 107. Even though Muslims in the Volga region were technically eligible for conscription, in practice Muslims were not actively recruited from the region until the First World War. On Muslim military service in the Russian Empire, see Robert F. Baumann, “Subject Nationalities in the Military Service of Imperial Russia: The Case of the Bashkirs”, \textit{Slavic Review} 46, No. 3/4. (Autumn-Winter, 1987), 489-502. Also see Josh Sanborn, “The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian Nation: A Reexamination,” \textit{Slavic Review} 59, No. 2 (Summer, 2000), 267-289.
\textsuperscript{28} Indeed, women were frequent petitioners to the Sharia courts, which often upheld their side in disputes. Crews also makes this point in his article, see “Empire and the Confessional State”, 76.
\textsuperscript{29} TsGIA RB, f. 1-295, op. 10, d. 264, II. 128. For other cases of disputes concerning \textit{metricheskye knigi}, see, for example, TsGIA RB f. 1-295, op. 10, d. 595, l. 29; f. 1-295, op. 10, d. 596, ll. 21-23.)
to another city, 'Zalatost', in order to work as a maid for a wealthy Muslim family. When the girl was an infant, she wrote, her parents had moved frequently. They had died suddenly when she was still very young, which was why she did not know the name of the village where she had been born or where she had been registered into the metricheskaia kniga. Now as she was trying to get married, her village imam refused to perform the marriage (nikah) service. The couple had been living together anyway and the young woman was now pregnant. She wished to resolve the matter prior to the birth of her child, and therefore had appealed to the central offices of the Orenburg Assembly in Ufa.\(^{30}\)

Along with village elders (sel’skie starosty), Muslim spiritual personnel were important moderators in the resolution of disputes among Muslims. Issues which could not be resolved by local religious personnel, and issues involving religious personnel themselves, were sent to the centers of these administrative communities in Ufa, Simferopol, and Tbilisi. Muslims could write their own petition (often through a scribe), or on some occasions travel to the center to appeal personally. In 1882, Abdullah Mehmedoğlu petitioned the Sunni spiritual assembly of the Caucasus with regard to what he described as the “abduction” (kaçırma) of his wife.\(^{31}\) Mehmedoğlu’s petition to the assembly stated that his wife had been abducted ‘several months” earlier by one Mahi Hüseyinoğlu, with whom she had been living ever since. After the woman’s abduction, Mehmedoğlu wrote, he had approached his local kadi,\(^{32}\) Arif effendi, with a request for a divorce. But Arif effendi had not felt the matter to be urgent and had told Mehmedoğlu

\(^{30}\) TsGIA RB, f. 295, op. 10, d. 264, l. 167.
\(^{31}\) Abductions of unwilling women often occurred in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Having spent the night under the same roof as a man, the woman would usually consent to marry her abductor. In other cases, women would be willingly abducted, and this was often considered a form of elopement.
\(^{32}\) A judge trained in the Islamic legal tradition.
that the problem would be taken care of "in due time" (zaman mururinda). In the meantime, however, Mehmedoğlu's wife had become pregnant, which, said Mehmedoğlu in his petition, had prompted him to appeal to the Orenburg Müfti directly.\(^3\)

The Muslim spiritual authorities also constituted a forum for hearing the complaints of Muslims regarding the activities and behavior of their spiritual personnel. Muslims frequently wrote to the assemblies with claims that their religious personnel drank alcohol, carried on sexual affairs, were ignorant, stole money, and otherwise. Particularly after 1905, moreover, many Muslims in the Volga region also wrote in to complain about their local teachers, criticizing them for using the wrong educational approach in school.\(^34\) Spiritual personnel, like their community members, also contacted the assemblies with complaints about their communities and other spiritual personnel.\(^35\)

**Diversity in rule**

Scholarly treatment of the various communities of Russian Muslims has often ignored or generalized the issue of tsarist policies toward Muslims.\(^36\) Yet the four spiritual assemblies did not all operate under the same rules. Having been created at

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\(^3\) ADTA f. 291, op. 1, d. 490, ll. 1-2. For another wife-stealing incident, see ADTA f. 290, op. 2, d. 2639, l. 31.

\(^34\) During these years, many "jadids" (reformers) advocated the teaching of literacy, while many other teachers believed in the continued importance of the more traditional skills of memorization and recitation. See Chapter 4 of this study.

\(^35\) For cases of villagers complaining about the mullah, see TsGIA RB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 93, l. 79; f. I-295, op. 11, d. 600, ll. 8-9; f. I-295, op. 10, d. 240, l. 103; f. I-295, op. 10, d. 264, l. 29; f. I-295, op. 10, d. 427, l. 3. For cases of mullahs complaining about their communities, see, for example, TsGIA RB f. I-295, op. 10, d. 117, ll. 78-79; f. I-295, op. 10, d. 339, l. 68; f. I-295, op. 10, d. 578, ll. 60-61.

\(^36\) Most studies of the region prior to the 1990s focused very little on the spiritual assemblies. Works by Rorlich, Swietochowski, AliSad, Fisher, and Kirmli devote just a few pages to the activities of the müftüs, sheyh-ul-Islam, or assemblies. See p. 10 of this study, fn. 28. In Robert D. Crews' *For Prophet and Tsar*, meanwhile, the experiences of Muslim spiritual administration in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly are frequently generalized to describe "Muslims" in the empire more generally. While there exist excellent regional studies of the Muslim spiritual assemblies, such as those by Azamatov and Kuliya, the only study to compare the ways in which the four Muslim spiritual assemblies operated is that by Arapov. See Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovania Islama v Rossitskoi imperii. While Arapov's study does not access regional archives, it does make good use of archival material available in Moscow.
different times and under different administrative and cultural circumstances, the four assemblies differed from one another with regard to both their responsibilities and the regulations which governed them. This was the case, for example, with regard to the administration of pious foundations. In the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, pious foundations had been confiscated by the Russian state shortly after the conquest of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible. In the Crimea and the Caucasus, however, no similar confiscations had taken place after these territories were absorbed into the empire. Vakıfs were administered through the spiritual assemblies, giving these institutions of Muslim administration responsibility for managing property and sums of money of considerable value.

The different regions of the empire also differed with regard to the extent to which Muslim communities were exposed to the activities of Christian missionaries. While there was little state-supported missionary activity taking place in the Crimea or the Caucasus, in the Volga region direct and indirect support of missionary activity had been a frequently recurring feature of tsarist rule since the conquest of Kazan in 1552. Yet within the Volga region itself, conditions changed over time. While forced conversions largely came to an end in the sixteenth century, missionary activities continued, albeit decreasingly, through the mid-nineteenth century. In the mid-1860s,

37 Pious foundations (vakıflar, or evkaf) created soup kitchens, resting places for travelers and pilgrims, and other buildings designed for the public good. These were also an important means of alienating wealth. On the foundation of pious foundations in the Ottoman Empire, see Sipai Çataltepe, İslam-Türk medeniyetinde vakıflar (Istanbul: Türkiye Millî Kültür Vakfı, 1991).
38 For more on vakıfs in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, see Danil’ Azamatov, Iz istorii musul’manskoj blagotvoritel’nosti. Also see Naganawa, “Molding the Muslim Community.” For a discussion of the evkaf holdings of the Sunni and Shiite authorities in the Caucasus, see Vafa Kulieva, Rol’ i pozitivna musul’manskogo dukhovnogo 108-137.
39 In the 1840s, “pagan” Maris in the province of Orenburg complained that they had been baptized into Christianity against their will, and appealed to tsarist authorities for the right to renounce Christianity. See Paul W. Werth, “Baptism, Authority, and the Problem of Zakonnost’ in Orenburg Diocese: The Induction of over 800 “Pagans” into the Christian Faith.” Slavic Review 56, No. 3 (Fall, 1997), 456-480.
rumors that the emancipation of the serfs would also grant Christian Tatars the right to return to Christianity contributed to the "apostasy" of more than 10,000 Tatar Christians in 1866.40 This prompted redoubled government support for missionary schools, which had been in decline in recent decades.41 Beginning in 1867, Nikolai Il'minskii's new "system" of converting Turkic-speaking non-Christian populations through native-language education gained considerable influence in the Education Ministry, and Il'minskii's schools were the recipients of the financial support of both the government and private backers.42 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, moreover, issues concerning government support for missionary activities and popular fears of forced conversion were far less galvanizing issues in these areas than they were in the Volga region. Indeed, in the Volga region popular memory of these campaigns continued to shape people's view of the Russian government after 1905.43

Another regional difference in the administration of Muslims in the empire concerned the extent to which Muslim populations were familiar with the practices and traditions of tsarist imperial rule. In the Volga region, Muslims and Russians had been trading with one another and, in some cases, living under common forms of administration since even before the conquest of Kazan. The Orenburg Assembly was not the first experience of tsarist administration for most Muslims in the region, or even the first institution of specifically Muslim administration for the Muslim gentry of Kazan.44 In the Caucasus and the Crimea, however, Muslim spiritual assemblies were

40 Werth, At the Margins of Orthodoxy, 151. On the events of 1866, see Werth, 147-176.
41 Werth, At the Margins of Orthodoxy, 224.
42 Werth, At the Margins of Orthodoxy, 226. On Il'minskii's work, see At the Margins of Orthodoxy, 223-235, and Geraci, Window on the East, 47-84. Also see Dowler, Classroom and Empire, 62-84.
43 See Chapter 4 of this study.
44 Indeed, the Kazan Tatar rattraha, had been established in the late eighteenth century to tend to the administrative (including spiritual) needs of the Muslims of Kazan's lower urban estates. See Rami
developed soon after the incorporation of these two regions into the empire. In these regions, the introduction of the Muslim spiritual assemblies occurred within a broader context of change and colonization. This had ramifications not only for the ways in which the assemblies were perceived in the regions, but also with regard to the institutional demands made upon them by the tsarist administration in these regions.

Relations between the four assemblies and the rest of the tsarist bureaucracy also varied. The Orenburg Assembly, which was the oldest and largest of the four Muslim assemblies, was in many ways the model upon which upon which the other three Muslim assemblies were based. In the 1830s and 1840s, during the early decades of Muslim spiritual administration in the Caucasus (before the official division of Muslim administration in the Caucasus into Shiite and Sunni spheres in 1872), Orenburg spiritual leaders provided advice and instructions to both tsarist bureaucrats and Muslim spiritual personnel in the Caucasus with regard to the administration of the fledgling institutions.\(^{45}\)

Later in the century, Orenburg Müfti Muhammadyar Soltanov, with official encouragement, began to assume a higher domestic and international profile, including an increase in his travels to Muslim communities in Russia outside of the territories of the Orenburg Assembly.\(^{46}\) In 1895, Müfti Soltanov launched a much publicized pilgrimage to Mecca which included a visit with Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II in Istanbul.\(^{47}\)

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\(^{45}\) See, for example, the correspondence between the Orenburg Müfti, the “Müfti of the Caucasus region,” and tsarist officials in the Caucasus in the late 1840s and early 1850s. ADTA, f. 289, op. 1, d. 1.

\(^{46}\) “Orenburgskii mufti v Krymu”, Tercüman, March 8, 1891.

\(^{47}\) Azamatov, Orenburgskoe magometanskoie dakhovnoe sobranie, 136-137. After 1905, the mostly Kazan-based leadership of the Muslim political party Itifak would likewise represent a distinctly Orenburg-centric view of Muslim spiritual administration more generally in Russia, an approach which contributed to the fraying of relations between Muslim community reformers in the Volga region and the Caucasus. See Chapter 4 of this study.
Beginning not long after the Great Reforms of the 1860s, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly and the Muslim populations under its jurisdiction were subjected to a series of new regulations designed to bind them more closely to the Russian government and the Russian language in particular. These administrative changes, which were applied to the Orenburg Assembly but not the Muslim assemblies of the Crimea and the Caucasus, would ultimately have a profound impact upon not only relations between Muslim communities and the tsarist authorities, but also between Muslim communities and the leadership of the Muslim spiritual assemblies.\(^{48}\) This was an impact, moreover, which would continue to be felt after the Revolution of 1905.\(^{49}\)

The degree to which the assemblies functioned administratively in their relations with the Russian government also varied. The Orenburg Assembly ordinarily worked with a minimum of involvement from Russian civil servants. In times of unrest in Muslim populated regions, other branches of the tsarist government would sometimes contact the müfti to request his intervention,\(^{50}\) but most of the tasks carried out by the Orenburg Assembly were undertaken without the oversight of Russian bureaucrats. In the Caucasus, on the other hand, it was necessary for Russian military and civil officials to approve nearly all of the judgments made by the spiritual authorities, including those pertaining to marriage, divorce, and the division of property.\(^{51}\) In the Crimea and the Volga region, Muslims would occasionally take assembly business to the civil and

\(^{48}\) See Chapter 2 of this study.
\(^{49}\) See Chapter 4 of this study.
\(^{50}\) On the question of which authorities Muslims appealed to in their dealings with the Russian government, see Chapter 2 of this study.
\(^{51}\) See, for example, ADTA, f. 289, op. 1, d. 16; f. 289, op. 1, d. 83.
security branches of tsarist administration, something which only rarely happened in the Caucasus.52

As Andreas Kappeler and others have argued, there was no single “Russian government policy” pertaining to the administration of Muslims.53 The Russian state was a complex body whose administration of the empire’s Muslims varied not only according to region, but also according to the branch of government to which an official was posted. Officials posted in the provinces often ignored or selectively implemented regulations handed down to them from St. Petersburg. In 1874, for example, the well-known Orientalist Vassily Radlov—who was also employed as the inspector of Tatar, Bashkir, and Kyrgyz schools in the province of Kazan—received orders from the Ministry of Public Education in St. Petersburg to begin a survey of Muslim schools in the region. The survey was to be undertaken as part of a newly adopted plan of the Russian government to place all Muslim schools located in the territories of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Education. Radlov opposed the plan as impractical and, after encountering stiff resistance to it among the small number of Muslim schools he consulted in 1874, decided to postpone its further implementation.

A full eight years later, Radlov received an angry letter from his superiors in St. Petersburg, demanding to know why their orders had not been implemented. Radlov responded with a lengthy report in which he reminded his superiors that they had told him to execute his orders “with extreme caution” (krainoi ostorožnosti). By not

52 See, for example, documents relating to the Crimean Muslim community in the village of Orta, who went to the police in 1901 with complaints over the improper election of their hatip. GAARK, f. 27, op. 3, d. 127, ll. 1-7, 22. For a similar case from 1902, see GAARK, f. 27, op. 3, d. 266.
informing Muslim schools in the region that they were falling under his personal supervision, argued Radlov, he had been following his orders to proceed cautiously.\textsuperscript{54} Facing criticism in St. Petersburg, Radlov later set out with the governor of the province to meet personally with Muslims in order to inform them personally of the decision to have the state take over their schools. When Muslim protesters continued to oppose the new regulations, the governor told them that he would personally speak on their behalf with the Minister of Education. Moreover, he added, they would not have to obey the regulations until they had been personally reconfirmed to the governor by the minister himself.\textsuperscript{55}

\textit{Shared interests: the battle against heterodoxy}

The regional Muslim spiritual assemblies also played an important role in policing the religious conduct of Muslim communities. While the historiography of the Nikolaevan period has often emphasized the importance of “Russification” and Uvarov’s principles of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality”,\textsuperscript{56} the Russian government throughout the nineteenth century looked to not only Orthodox Christianity, but rather the orthodox (i.e., officially sanctioned) interpretations of all tolerated faiths to act as a bulwark against public disorder. Jewish, Protestant, Catholic, and other “spiritual” community leaders, like the leaders of the four Muslim spiritual assemblies, were

\textsuperscript{54} Such centralization of education policy during this period was hardly unique to Russia. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, a similar project devoted to centralizing and standardizing education was undertaken during the reign of Abdulhamid II. See Benjamin C. Fortna, \textit{Imperial classroom: Islam, the state, and education in the late Ottoman Empire} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also see Chapter 3 of this study.

\textsuperscript{55} NART f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539, l. 1. Also see Chapter 2 of this study for a more detailed discussion of these events.

\textsuperscript{56} See, for example, Nicholas Riasanovsky, \textit{A History of Russia 6\textsuperscript{th} ed.} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 324. Also see Cynthia H. Whittaker, \textit{The Origins of Modern Russian Education: an Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786-1855} (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1984), 190.
regularly called upon by tsarist authorities to assist in the policing of their communities, a task which could include both religious and civil components.\(^5\)

By the end of the nineteenth century, the tsarist administration had accumulated more than a century of experience in working with Muslim administrations in Ufa and the Crimea, and more than fifty years of experience in working with the institutions of Muslim spiritual administration in the Caucasus. Having invested these Muslim authorities with the imprimatur of the Russian government, bureaucrats and policymakers working in the Russian state placed considerable importance upon maintaining the religious and civil authority of the leadership of the spiritual assemblies within Muslim populations. Indeed, maintaining the spiritual orthodoxy of Muslim communities was an important concern to both the spiritual assemblies and the Russian authorities, and constituted a shared interest between them. Relying upon the expanding field of Oriental Studies for reliable and authoritative interpretations of the Koran and the hadiths, some of the earliest tasks of bureaucrats charged with overseeing the creation of the Muslim spiritual assemblies involved devising examinations on “Islamic rites and rituals” for individuals aspiring to become Muslim spiritual personnel.\(^6\)

The Muslim spiritual assemblies were also responsible for cracking down on non-orthodox practices of Islam. In the Caucasus, the Shiite and Sunni religious authorities regularly corresponded with the Interior Ministry and various other agencies of civil administration regarding alleged “zikrist” and “miuridist” activities taking place in the region.\(^7\) In many cases, these were investigations initiated by the Russian civil

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\(^5\) On this point, see Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State,” 67-78.

\(^6\) For examples from these examinations, see TsGIA RB, f. I-295, op. 1, dd. 191, 192.

\(^7\) “Zikrist”, whose name derives from the Arabic word for “recitation” or “repetition” (zikr), refers to the Sufi practice of endlessly repeating a word or phrase in a state of spiritual exultation. The term was used
authorities, but individual mullahs would also frequently take the initiative in reporting suspicious activities to the regional assembly with which they were affiliated. The müfti or sheyh ul-Islam would then pass on this information to the Ministry of Interior, the governor’s office, and other departments in the provincial administration.  

In November of 1884, the müfti of the Sunni religious authority of the Caucuses, Huseyn Efendi Gubayov, dispatched a letter to the office of the governor of the guberniia of Baku, asking the governor’s office to “quickly take the necessary measures” against the “intrigues” of a group of murids uncovered by one of his kadis. The kadi in question, Makhmud Efendi Rahim Efendizade, had earlier reported to Müfti Gubayov that Haci Mahmud Efendi Koranoğlu and his family, residents of Gökchai uezd, were practicing various kinds of behavior that were “forbidden by the Koran”. For example, he wrote, in the villages of Zarbad, Karahali and Mosesli, the group in question was “playing flutes, drums, and various other instruments, the playing of which are forbidden by the Sharia.” Ultimately, a decision was reached to allow Koranoğlu and his family to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire.  

Shiite and Sunni spiritual personnel in the Caucasus filed long reports to the provincial governor of Baku, reporting on the activities of individuals suspected of muridist activity. Indeed, the activities of the murids were considered to be of great  

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60 See, for example, ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 51, ll. 30-34; f. 524, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 1-4. For a report on muridism and zikrism in the Caucasus based largely on intelligence from the Sunni spiritual assembly, see f. 524, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 48-55. Also see ADTA f. 524, op. 1, d. 10, especially ll. 37-45.

61 ADTA f. 524, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 8-11.

62 ADTA, f. 291, op. 1, d. 618, ll. 1-4; f. 291, op. 10, d. 6232, ll. 1-9; f. 288, op. 1, d. 5, ll. 1-2.
importance to spiritual personnel and tsarist bureaucrats alike, and their numbers were thought to be great. In 1903, for example, Müfti Gubayov sent a report to the governor in which he reported that in the Caucasus “most of the population practices muridism.” The report was accompanied by a list of dozens of names of individuals the müfti had heard were involved in non-orthodox Islamic practices.63

In the Volga region as well, religious heterodoxy in the Muslim community was viewed as a problem whose solution required state intervention. In 1862, for example, the Orenburg Assembly under Müfti Abdulvakhid Suleimanov ordered Muslims in the village of Tatar Kanad to desist from “pronouncing prayers aloud,” declaring that those who did not refrain from vocal zikr would be barred from the mosque as “apostates from Sharia”.64 Over a stretch of nearly half a century, meanwhile, tsarist authorities repeatedly prosecuted the Vaisov sect, which did not accept the authority of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly.65 In 1889, police in the uezd of Sviazhskii reported that he had begun an investigation into up to 130 people in the village of Karasham, where “fanatic” followers of the Vaisovs were engaged in various types of suspicious behavior, including participation in “study groups” at the homes of group members.66

**The state’s messenger**

The Muslim spiritual assemblies also played an important role in mediating communication between the state and its Muslim populations. When the state needed to send messages to Muslim communities, the Muslim assemblies were frequently given the

63 ADTA f. 291, op. 10, d. 6232, ll 1-9.
64 Robert Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State”, 69; TsGIARB, f. I–295, op. 3, d. 5048, ll. 9–9 ob.
66 NART f. 1, op. 3, d. 7629.
task of disseminating these messages to the Muslim communities under their jurisdiction. With regard to such tasks, the hierarchical structure of the assemblies provided the state with an efficient means of mass communication. In response to a request from a state agency, the müfti or sheyh ul-Islam would write a fatwa, which would then be sent to all of the personnel within the assembly. These spiritual personnel would then pass the message on to their communities, often reading it aloud at the mosque on Fridays. In this manner, the Russian government appealed to Muslim communities to work hard in the field during harvest time, raise money for wounded soldiers and medical supplies in times of war, collect food and supplies during times of famine and natural disaster, and celebrate noteworthy public events like the Romanov jubilee in 1913.

Moreover, in the late nineteenth century the spiritual assemblies also constituted an important component in the government’s battle against Muslim emigration from Russia. While the Russian government had encouraged Muslim emigration from the Crimea during the Crimean War, since 1860 the government had undertaken a number of measures to prevent a repeat of the massive exodus Muslims that had occurred in the wake of the war. In 1886, Müfti Gubayov of the Caucasian Sunni Assembly penned an announcement to be distributed to the spiritual personnel under his authority in which he denounced Muslim immigration to the Ottoman Empire. Writing that “some ignorant

67 Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State”. fn 72.
68 On collecting money for the navy and the Red Cross effort in the Crimea in 1905, see GAARK, f. 27, op. 3, d. 445, ll. 4-4-ob, 7-7-ob, 9-11. On raising money for injured soldiers in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, see TsGIA RB, f. 1-295, op. 11, d. 230, ll. 48-49-ob; Also see KGU, documents T-1623 and T-1206.
69 On collecting money for earthquake relief in Turkestan, see KGU, Document T-4742. On famine relief, see KGU, documents T-1235 and T-1163.
70 KGU, document T-1623.
71 An estimated 200,000 Crimean Tatars left during the years 1859-1863, approximately two-thirds of their entire population. See A. Markevich, “Pereiseleniia Krymskikh Tatar v Tursiui v sviazi s dvizheniem naseleniia v Krymu”, Vestnik akademii nauk SSSR (otdeleniia gumanitarnykh nauk) 1928 (Moscow), 400-401.
individuals who do not understand when emigration is required have been making the argument that we are obliged by the Sharia to emigrate,” Müfti Gubayov argued that emigration from Russia, which he called the “motherland” (vatank), was not required. Moreover, wrote Gubayov, those people attempting to convince Caucasian Muslims to needlessly undertake the hardships of emigration were themselves acting contrary to the Sharia.72

In 1894, Müfti Soltanov of the Orenburg Assembly was asked by provincial authorities to make a similar declaration. For much of the previous year, rumors had been circulating in the Volga region that the tsar and the Ottoman sultan had come to an agreement whereby Russia would baptize all of its Muslim subjects en masse. This, in turn, had prompted other rumors and speculation among Muslim communities that there would be a massive immigration to the Ottoman Empire in the following year.73 Russian authorities in the local branch of the Interior Ministry (of which the Orenburg Assembly was a component) therefore asked Müfti Soltanov to lend his support in preventing the emigration. In a fatwa issued by the müfti, which was then disseminated among the Muslim population of the region more generally, the müfti stated unequivocally that Muslims should feel no need to leave Russia.

It has come to my attention that rumors have been circulating, even among mullahs, that Muslims are going to be baptized into the Russian faith. These rumors are absurd and nonsensical, as the government has no intention whatsoever of baptizing us. On the contrary, the government allows us to freely confess Islam, to carry out

72 BOA, YA HUS 203/20, s. 11-13. Selim Deringil also discusses this document. See “The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: brothers or rivals?” Central Asian Survey (1994), 13 (3), 409-416.
our religious practices, and construct mosques openly and without constraint. Rumors that they want to baptize us come from people who are either foolish or evil, and who should not be believed. But benighted people do believe them. Some, wishing to immigrate to Turkey, sell off all their land, and ill-intentioned individuals take advantage of this. They collect money to arrange the journey, while others buy up for nothing the last possessions of the frivolous ones who should have thought better.\textsuperscript{74}

The state employed the regional Muslim authorities to plead the state’s case to the Muslim community in times of unrest. In early January of 1897, for example, the commission administering the first All-Russian census in the guberniia of Kazan began to collect data in the villages outside of Kazan. The census commission relied largely upon the Orenburg Assembly to prepare Muslims for the census, and in June of 1896, a full six months before the census was to take place in the Volga region, Mufti Soltanov wrote a directive to local imams informing them that the census was to be used only to count people, and that no harm would come to Muslim or to Muslim schools.\textsuperscript{75} When the actual count began to be carried out, moreover, many of the census takers were themselves Orenburg spiritual personnel.\textsuperscript{76}

In the Caucasus, meanwhile, the Shiite spiritual assembly and the sheyh ul-Islam, along with the Armenian patriarch and spiritual assembly, played a central role in mediating conflict that had broken out between Shiite Muslims and Armenians in 1905. Tripartite talks held between the Russian vice-regency of the Caucasus and nine representatives each from the Armenian and Shiite sides met from February to April of

\textsuperscript{74} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 9603, II. 142, 208-209-ob. A copy of this circulaire can also be found in \textit{Sbornik tsirkularov i inykh runovodstvcchikh raspornachenii po okrugu Orenburgskogo Magometanskago Dukhovnogo Sobraniia 1836-1903 g.} (Ufa, 1905), 112. This translation is taken from Meyer, "Immigration, return, and the politics of citizenship".

\textsuperscript{75} NART f. 2, op. 2, d. 12627, II.246-248.

\textsuperscript{76} See Chapter 2 of this study for a discussion of these events. NART f. 105, op. 1, d. 2. Other rumors had it in 1879, see f. 1, op. 3, d. 4466. Also see 1, op. 3, d. 10496.
1906. The sheyh ul-Islam was responsible for selecting the Shiite representatives, but was requested by the governor of the *guberniia* of Baku to select men drawn from all "regions and classes (sosloviia)." When the fighting had subsided, the Shiite spiritual authority was responsible for distributing government-financed relief to Muslim victims of the fighting. Across the Caucasus hundreds, perhaps thousands, of families petitioned the sheyh ul-Islam with requests for financial recompense for property losses incurred during this period, sending in lists of property losses along with their petitions. When it came time for creating Armenian and Muslim delegations to attend the three-way peace talks sponsored by the Russian government in the spring of 1906, moreover, the Muslim delegates were chosen personally by Sheyh ul-Islam Akhundzade at the personal request of the provincial governor.

*Separate administration*

In an influential article published in 2003, Robert D. Crews argues that Muslims in Russia pursued “two strategies” in their dealings with tsarist authorities. In the first, writes Crews, individuals would bring their case to the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. In the second, “litigants petitioned Russian officials ranging from the local bailiff to the emperor to overturn the rulings of the local ulema”. “Litigants”, argues Crews, “might simultaneously pursue both strategies or, after exhausting the first option, turn to the tsar with confidence that the laws of the empire supported God’s law.”

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77 ADTA, f. 290, op. 2, d. 2639, II.15-16. Also see Chapter 2 of this study.
78 There are hundreds of petitions for relief, addressed to the Sheyh ul-Islam, in ADTA, f. 290, op. 2, d. 2725. One of these letters is written by Hüseyinazed Ali, on behalf of a friend. ADTA, f. 290, op. 2, d. 2725, l. 8.
79 See Chapter 2 of this study, pp. 93-94.
80 Robert D. Crews, "Empire and the Confessional State," 75.
Muslims in Russia did occasionally appeal to tsarist authorities other than the spiritual assemblies in regard to a variety of affairs. However, in arguing that “laypeople [sic] continued to look to the tsar’s justice to overturn religious judgments,” Crews conflates the concept of “religious judgments” with matters of administration. While Muslims did sometimes appeal to tsarist civil authorities with regard to matters such as the selection of a new müfti or complaints about spiritual personnel, cases of Muslims appealing to Russian civil authorities to overrule “religious judgments” pertaining to Koranic interpretation are practically non-existent. Only in 1896 did Muslims in Russia gain the formal right to appeal religious decisions to Russian civil institutions, and prior to this the rare efforts by Muslims to do so were generally referred back to the spiritual assemblies.

Indeed, the practice of leaving matters of Koranic interpretation to Muslim religious authorities had begun even before the creation of the Muslim spiritual assemblies. From 1784 onwards, Muslims belonging to the lower urban estates (kupecheskie and meshanskie sosloviiia) had been able to marry, divorce, and will property through the Kazan Tatar ratusha (municipal council). Officially a component of

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81 Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State,” 65.
82 Of the nine petitions cited by Crews in support of this point, four (fn. 84, 86, 88, 99) involve complaints about spiritual personnel. The five remaining cases include 1) a request that the Interior Minister appoint someone to the vacant position of müfti (fn. 90); 2) a petition addressed to the müfti, which Crews mistakenly describes as having been written to the chief of police (85); 3) a woman petitioning the tsar and the müfti to complain about her husband in a case that would be handled exclusively by the spiritual assembly (94); 4) an example taken from Rizaeddin Fahreddin’s Asür, in which a family first contacted the local police, who in turn contacted the Orenburg Assembly to settle a matter pertaining to a dispute between two families (fn. 92); and 5) a case involving a divorce in 1865, the only case cited by Crews actually involving Muslims turning to Russian officials to “overturn the rulings of the local ulema” (fn. 100). Yet even in this example, the petitioners had first worked through the Orenburg Assembly, turning to the Minister of the Interior (the müfti’s bureaucratic superior, since the Orenburg Assembly was a component of this ministry) only after the Orenburg Assembly had made a ruling. The minister sided with the Assembly and dismissed the case. Indeed, cases of Muslims appealing to tsarist civil authorities with regard to even administrative matters involving the Orenburg Assembly were relatively rare.
83 This is the case even in the examples cited by Crews in his articles, see Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State,” footnotes 84, 86, 88, and 92.
the *ratusha* of Kazan, the distinctive feature of the Tatar *ratusha* was that settlement of its cases generally required written attestation from a mullah stating that all related matters had been carried out in accordance with “Mohammedan law.”

The Tatar *ratusha* often coordinated its activities with a number of other tsarist institutions in resolving the cases brought before it. These institutions tended to be a mix of “Russian” and “Muslim” government bodies. Such was the case, for example, with a woman named Aisha Bikchentaeva, whose division of the estate of her late husband according to “Islamic Law” involved not only the work of the *ratusha* and a local representative of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, but also the Kazan Tatar Orphans’ Court, which was to be one of the beneficiaries of the estate. In order to facilitate the matter, moreover, Bikchentaeva appealed for assistance directly to the governor of the Kazan guberniia, who personally intervened in the case on her behalf.

Securing appropriate Islamic legal opinion in arbitrating matters pertaining to the Koran could also involve the consultation of Islamic authorities outside of the Russian Empire. In 1888, Russian authorities contacted the Ottoman Foreign Ministry with a

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84 See, for example, NART f. 22, op. 1, d. 347, ll. 1-3; f. 22, op. 1, d. 353, ll. 1-5; f. 22, op. 1, d. 359, l. 7. For more on the Tatar *ratusha*, see Khäyruadinov, “The Tatar Ratusha of Kazan,” 27-42.
85 NART, f. 22, op. 1, d. 172, ll. 1-2. While the Tatar *ratusha* was designed to be used solely by Muslims living within the boundaries of Kazan, any Muslim whose administrative issue involved a person or property residing in Kazan was able to turn to the *ratusha* for assistance. As such, throughout the nineteenth century until its absorption into the newly-created Kazan city duma in 1870, an increasing number of Muslims from villages also made use of the *ratusha*. This increase in Muslim villagers using the Tatar *ratusha* was reflective of both the general increase of Muslims living within the boundaries of Kazan, as well as of the increase in the number of Muslims who lived for part of the year in Kazan, and part of the year in their home villages. For example, whereas in the 1840s it was estimated that 4,500 Tatars were living permanently in Kazan, by 1897 this number had grown to nearly 30,000. Meanwhile, there was also a sizeable number of Volga Muslims living primarily in villages who spent part of the year in Kazan for purposes of work or trade. This group was estimated at approximately two thousand in the 1840s or nearly fifty percent of the permanent Muslim presence. As transportation and opportunities for employment and trade grew over the latter half of the nineteenth century, evidence suggests that this number continued to grow. A.N. Zorin, *Goroda i posadoy dorevoliutsionnogo povolzha: istoriko-etnograficheskoe issledovanie naseleniia i poselencheskoi struktury gorodov rossiiskoi provintsii vtoroi poloviny XVI-nachale XX vv.* (Kazan: Izdatel’stvo Kazanskogo universiteta, 2001), 119-122.
request for advice regarding Islamic jurisprudence. The Russian Foreign Ministry wanted to learn the opinion of the Ottoman Sheyh ul-Islam on whether or not it was permissible “under the laws of Sharia” for the paternal grandfather to become the custodian of an underage girl and her estate after the death of her parents. The Ottoman Sheyh ul-Islam responded, through the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, by saying that such an arrangement was appropriate provided the grandfather was “known to be a man of good character”.86

Sometimes tsarist officials would take matters into their own hands regarding the adoption of rules they considered to be Islamically correct, such as when the governor of Kazan ordered the mandatory veiling of Muslim women in the city of Chistopol. In 1890, a group of thirty-two Muslims in Chistopol had sent a petition to Orenburg Müfti Soltanov criticizing what they described as the fast growing number of Muslim “prostitutes”, who were “walking the streets with uncovered faces.” 87 The petitioners asked the müfti to use his powers “according to both the Sharia and the civil code” to take these women off the streets. Müfti Soltanov forwarded the petition to the governor, who in turn contacted the Chistopol director of police, inquiring into the number of Muslim prostitutes in the city and asking if their presence was indeed creating a problem. The police chief responded by stating that there was only one Muslim listed among the thirty-one prostitutes currently registered in the city, and that there had never been more than three or four Muslim prostitutes working in the city at any given time. “Tatar women,” wrote the police chief, “have never been prohibited from working as public women, and there is no plan to take any sort of official action regarding this matter

86 BOA, HRH 572/64, s. 1.
87 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7615, l. 7.
now." 88 The governor, however, ignored this recommendation. In January of 1890 he wrote the mufti to inform him that he had ordered the police chief “to forbid Muslim women in Chistopol from engaging in prostitution and also from appearing on the streets with their faces uncovered.” 89

Since the late eighteenth century, Muslims in Russia had been collectively and confessionally governed through separate institutions and according to separate sets of regulations. This administrative separateness could contribute, at times, to a reluctance within Muslim communities to operate according to the more universal (i.e., not specifically “Muslim”) forms of administration which became more common in Russia after the Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s. 90 In 1887, for example, an official from the bureau overseeing the sales of alcoholic spirits in the gubernia of Kazan wrote the governor in connection to the complaints of Muslims in the uezd of Chistopol regarding the sales of alcoholic products in their villages. The official stated in his letter that he had informed the Muslims that they, “just like the inhabitants of Christian villages,” had the right to regulate such matters on their own by issuing a prigovor, or local regulation. According to the official, however, the Muslims did not wish to issue a prigovor because doing so would constitute an “infringement” (posiagatel’stvo) upon their religious practices. Instead, they wanted the commission regulating alcohol sales in the gubernia to ban the sale of alcohol for them, thus relieving the Muslims of responsibility “of enforcing laws other than the Sharia.” This proposal, however, was not acceptable to the

88 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7615, l. 5.
89 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7615, l. 14. Robert Crews misrepresents this document when he writes “in Kazan (sic), Muslims tried to solicit police intervention” against Muslim women engaged in prostitution. Muslims wrote this petition to the Orenburg Mufti, not the police, and within it there is no indication that the Muslims petitioning the mufti desired or requested that their petition be forwarded to the civil authorities. For Crews’ interpretation of this document, see “Empire and the Confessional State,” 73-74.
90 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this study.
bureaucrats working on the case, who emphasized the principle of bureaucratic universalism with regard to all subjects of the empire. Muslims, like Russian subjects of other faiths, had the right to issue a prigovor in this regard, and in the minds of the civil servants working on the case, it was up to Muslims to understand that the issuance of such prigovors "constitutes no infringement whatsoever on their religion." 91

Ultimately, the question of separate administration would be interpreted for many Muslims in Russia in terms which were often more administrative than religious. While appeals were almost always made in the name of "Islam", these actions involved a number of secular benefits as well. Indeed, in the final decades of the nineteenth century, changes regarding the administration of the Orenburg Assembly would prompt large number of Muslims in the Volga region to appeal to civil and spiritual authorities alike. Moreover, the general expansion of the Russian state in the years following the Great Reforms often placed Muslim communities in the Volga region in the position of defending their semi-autonomous status with regard to administration through a discourse of Islamic distinction.

Conclusions

The Muslim spiritual assemblies were religious in content and administrative in form. For many Muslims in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, these institutions represented an indispensable component of Muslim administration in the empire. Even as Muslim villagers sometimes castigated their local spiritual personnel, and Islamic scholars who had been educated in more prestigious centers of learning92 looked down upon what they considered the relative ignorance of

91 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 6847, ll. 1-2.
92 Such as Bukhara.
the assembly leadership, Muslims in the Volga region fought hard to retain these institutions and defend the degree of autonomy they had attained.

While there were many similarities in the administration of Muslims in the different regions of the empire, there were also a number of important differences. Already diverse with regard to language, religious practices, and social and economic conditions, Muslims in the Volga region, the Caucasus, and the Crimea had all become Russian subjects at different times and under varying circumstances. From the Great Reforms onwards, and especially after the Revolution of 1905, the different concerns of Muslim populations in these three regions and their varying relationships with the tsarist authorities and the spiritual assemblies would become increasingly important with regard to the question of who had the right to speak in the name of Muslim interests in the empire.  

The Muslim spiritual assemblies were a component of the Russian government, and their relations with the rest of tsarist administration were often close. In both the Volga region and the southern Caucasus, the spiritual assemblies cooperated with other branches of the government to keep “Islam” within the bounds of an officially sanctioned and defined set of “rituals” and practices. While “heterodox” Islamic activities in all areas of the empire were monitored and suppressed, “orthodox” Islam was encouraged by a government which viewed religion, even non-Christian ones, as an important pillar of stability and administration.

The communities of the four regional Muslim assemblies were not “invented” or “imagined”, but real. Muslims involved in disputes that could not be resolved in their local communities appealed in person or in writing to the centers of spiritual

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93 This is the subject of discussion in Chapter 4 of this study.
administration in Ufa, Tbilisi, and Simferopol. Moreover, many of the rules under which Muslims lived—and particularly those rules which defined the status of Muslims in the empire—were those of the spiritual assemblies, rather than of other branches of tsarist administration. When the Russian government began changing many of the rules governing Muslims in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly in the 1870s and 1880s, this confluence of administration with religious identity became considerably explosive, especially in the gubernia of Kazan. In Chapter 2 of this study, the repercussions of these actions will be discussed in further detail.

94 Such as regulations governing the construction and maintenance of mosques, the celebration of religious holidays, the qualifications for becoming an imam, and other matters.
Chapter 2

Authority and Representation in the Middle Volga and Southern Caucasus, 1870-1905

In the Russian Empire and elsewhere, the nineteenth century was a period of great change that was characterized, in part, by an increase in the size of the state and the roles it played in the lives of its citizens. Like the Ottoman Empire, Japan, and other imperial (and non-imperial) states of the time, nineteenth century Russia embarked upon a major series of reforms, known as the Great Reforms, which took place in the 1860s and 1870s. While the Great Reforms are best known for the emancipation of serfdom, another important consequence of the reforms was the considerable expansion of the size of the state and the roles it played in the lives of its subjects. Indeed, much of this expansion took place directly as a result of the end of serfdom, with new state institutions being created to undertake many of the tasks which had previously been the responsibility of individual landowners. New departments of government and institutions of administration were created for Russian subjects of all confessions, creating new regulations and laws which affected individuals in a variety of ways, but which also frequently invited anger, confusion, and protest.

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1 On the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire, see Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire. On late nineteenth century reform in Japan, see Takashi Fujitani, Splendid monarchy: power and pageantry in modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), especially 31-104. On the Great Reforms in Russia, see W. Bruce Lincoln, The great reforms: autocracy, bureaucracy, and the politics of change in Imperial Russia (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990); On one of the best known reforms of the era, see Daniel Field, The end of serfdom: nobility and bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976) and Petr A. Zaionchkovskii, Omena krepostnogo prava v Rossii (Moscow: Gos. Izd-vo Polit. lit-ru, 1954); Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881, edited by Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994);
3 It was the case, for example, with the creation of peace mediators, which was a component of the Judicial Reforms of 1864. See Natalia F. Ustians’eva “Accountable Only to God and the Senate,” in Russia’s Great Reforms, 162.
4 On agrarian protests occurring throughout Russia at this time, see Krest’ianskoie dvizhenie v Rossii v 1870-1880 g.: sbornik dokumentov (Ed., P.A. Zaionchkovskii), (Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, 1968). On the creation of peace
Russian subjects of all faiths and nationalities were impacted considerably by the Great Reforms. Among Muslim communities in Russia, Muslims living in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly were most affected by the changes brought by the reforms, as well as by other changes in policy also taking place during these years. In the aftermath of the Great Reforms, more centrally located areas of the empire such as the Volga region witnessed a far more complete implementation of the reforms than the Caucasus, where no zemstva were established and where other reforms, like the founding of city dumas, were implemented piecemeal and often curtailed. Even more importantly, Muslims living in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly were more targeted than others in the empire for mandatory exposure to Russian-language education and to the closer consolidation of the institutions of Muslim administration into the tsarist administration.

Having only recently been feared aliens on the fringes of the empire, the recent acquisition by Russia of the Crimea (1783), the Caucasus (1813-1821), and Central Asia (since 1865) had in many ways made the Volga Tatars the most familiar, and, in the eyes of tsarist authorities, reliable Muslim population in the empire. Indeed, whereas Muslims had previously been often seen by Russian officials primarily in terms of a monolithic “Islam”, these views changed following the incorporation into the empire of so many new Muslim populations. Through the new science of ethnography, for example, Russian academics, scholars, and missionaries devised new ways of categorizing the Muslim populations of its territories. In the bureaucratic writings of the nineteenth century, tsarist officials began to refer increasingly to the arbitrators (mirovye posredniki), and the increased politicization of interests which followed in the wake of this creation, see Roxanne Easley, “Opening Public Space: The Peace Arbitrator and Rural Politicization, 1861-1864.” Slavic Review 61, No. 4 (Winter, 2002), 707-731.

5 The “municipal counter-reform” of 1892, placed limits on the number of Muslim members the Baku city Duma should have, and also harnessed municipal self-government in a number of other ways. Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier, 65-77, 93-95.

6 On ethnography and the Muslim populations of the Volga region, see Geraci, Window on the East, 158-194.
Muslim populations of the territories according to ethnographic “national” designations such as “Tatars”, “Bashkirs”, and “Chuvash”.  

Increased conceptual and scholarly familiarity accompanied the beginnings of a closer relationship between the Russian state and Muslim communities in the Volga region more generally. In the 1870s and 1880s, new regulations pertaining to Muslim education, the study of Russian, and the administrative autonomy of the Orenburg Assembly brought Muslims into much closer contact with the state than had been the case previously. This development, meanwhile, came at a time when the Russian government also sought to increase its spiritual presence among the non-Russian communities of the area, mainly through the resuscitation of missionary activity in the area, which had been largely dormant since the 1830s. While instances of forced conversion of Muslims had largely ended, the establishment of voluntary missionary schools, often taught in the languages of the region’s non-Russian communities, prompted widespread concern. Muslim protests against administrative changes taking place regarding their schools and the Orenburg Assembly in the 1880s and 1890s began to be framed in the lexicon of a community under siege. As rumors circulated alleging their imminent forced conversion, Muslims in the Volga region petitioned civil and spiritual authorities, pleading with them to forsake implementing a number of proposed changes to the status of Muslim schools and the Orenburg Assembly.

In this chapter, I examine the roles of the spiritual assemblies between the tsarist government, of which they were a component, and Muslim populations. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the spiritual assemblies did not hold a monopoly over either the spiritual or the administrative needs of Russian Muslims. They were nevertheless of particular importance to

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7 These were, in fact, terms which Muslims themselves often appropriated in their communications with both the civil and the spiritual institutions of administration in the region.
8 The four Muslim spiritual assemblies were part of the Ministry of Interior. See Introduction to this study, p. 1.
both. Moreover, Muslims who were mobilizing over issues concerning the community and Islam in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often placed the status of the Orenburg Assembly at the center of their concerns.

Nevertheless, in the final decades of the nineteenth century, the Orenburg Assembly came to be viewed with increasing suspicion among a large number of Muslims in the region, and after 1905 many Muslim publicists showed considerable distrust for the leadership of the spiritual assemblies. Indeed, in comparison to Muslim communities in the southern Caucasus and the Crimea at this time, Muslim communities in the Volga region protested loudly over a number of issues they considered to affect them as “Muslims” primarily. While the regulations they protested only affected Muslims living in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, Muslim petitions denouncing these new rules tended to speak in the name of “Muslims” in “Russia” more generally, a tendency that would also be seen among politically active Muslims from the Volga region after 1905. In the Volga region, the divisions over the question of who spoke in the name of “Muslims” became a political issue not in 1905, but in fact decades beforehand.

Notable families

As was discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, the conditions and institutions of tsarist rule regarding the administration of Muslims differed from region to region. This was also the case with regard to the roles of notable families in the two regions. In the Volga region, families such as the Akçurins of Simbirsk, the Ramievs of Orenburg, and the Galievs, Saidashevs, and Iunusovs of Kazan, were also prominent participants in the economic modernization of the region, where they frequently held positions in institutions involved in both the civil and the

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9 See Chapter 5 of this study, especially pp. 210-213.
10 1905 is, in fact, usually seen as the starting point of Muslim politics in the region, and elsewhere. See Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, 104-124; Hakan Kirimli, National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916); Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1917.
spiritual administration of Muslims. Conversant in Russian, representatives of these and other families were frequently engaged in face to face contact with tsarist officials in order to discuss issues of various levels of importance both to themselves and to Muslim populations. Muslim members of the guild, particularly in Kazan, frequently contacted the governor of the guberniya of Kazan as well as other officials, including the Minister of the Interior, to whom they presented themselves as spokespersons for the Muslim population more generally. Meanwhile, these figures assumed an ever larger position in the community in other ways as well, such as through their philanthropic acts, such as the construction of schools.\(^\text{11}\) In Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, Chistopol, and other urban areas in the region, Muslim notables constructed prominent new schools and mosques, often built in the latest architectural styles.\(^\text{12}\) After 1905, many of these individuals\(^\text{13}\) would also become active in the creation of the Ītīfāk movement, finance the publishing of newspapers, and sit in the Duma as Ītīfāk deputies.\(^\text{14}\)

In the Caucasus, meanwhile, there were also many families which could be considered “notable”. Known by various titles such as “ağa”, “bey”, and “shah”, Muslim notables in the Caucasus had been subjected to a number of policy reversals with regard to their legal status in the empire ever since the region’s incorporation into Russia. In the early years of expansion into the region, the Russian government had reached out to local notables, and in 1822 entered the names of Muslim notables into a registry book attesting to their hereditary status.\(^\text{15}\) In 1846, ağas

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\(^{11}\) On the creation of new method schools, see Chapter 3 of this study. On newspapers, see chapters 4 and 5.


\(^{13}\) On the Muslim notable families of the region, also see Radik R. Salikhov, “Obshchestvenno-reformatorskaya deiatel’nost’ tatarskoi burzhuazii Kazan’i (vtoraja polovina XIX-nachalo XX vv.), Dissertation, Kazan State University, 2002, 32-40.

\(^{14}\) See Chapter 4 of this study.

\(^{15}\) Subsequent lists were created in 1831, 1850, 1860, and 1873. Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier, 84.
and beys were formally recognized as hereditary landowners and granted tax-exempt status. This was considered a special category of the nobility and brought them various specified rights.\textsuperscript{16}

In 1870, however, most of these privileges were taken away.\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, ağas, beys, and Muslim notables in the Caucasus often held positions of status and influence within their communities, and many served as spiritual personnel in the Sunni and Shiite spiritual assemblies of the region.\textsuperscript{18} Ağas and beys were also prominently involved in various post-Great Reform undertakings relating to local administration, such as the Baku city Duma,\textsuperscript{19} while in 1905, many of the individuals selected by the Sheykh ul-Islam to represent Muslim interests at the Armenian-Muslim were likewise drawn from these ranks. Unlike Muslim notable families in the Volga region, however, Muslim notables in the Caucasus did not play a large role in the economic modernization of the region.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, ağas, beys, and other Muslim notables from the Caucasus further differed from notable families in the Volga region in that they were often criticized by other Muslims for their semi-privileged status in the regional administration. After 1905, this figures were often publicly derided and criticized, with committees of Muslims appealing to the government to not grant further privileges to Muslim notables.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17} Kappeler, \textit{The Russian Empire}, 177.
\textsuperscript{18} The status of “ağas”, “beys”, “effendis”, “shahs” and others holding titles in the Caucasus was a complicated one after the various Caucasian regions were piecemeal incorporated into Russia. Tsarist policies changed frequently and varied from region to region, with individuals holding these titles repeatedly petitioning tsarist officials to gain the privileges of nobility. Mostashari gives an excellent account of their changing status. See \textit{On the Religious Frontier}, 79-86.
\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, the Muslim millionaires who emerged during this period tended to be of peasant background. See later in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{21} See, for example, “Petitsiia Kavkazskih Musul’man,” \textit{Tercüman} 31, April 22, 1905.
Faces in the community

In the Volga region, increased industrialization after the Great Reforms transformed a number of relatively small family businesses into wealthy, even millionaire, enterprises within one or two generations. Families which had owned a handful of shops in the early nineteenth century had become, by the second half of the century, extremely wealthy dynasties worth millions of rubles. Meanwhile, a much smaller number of other successful industrialists in the region, such as the Hüseyinovs of Orenburg, had emerged from much more modest backgrounds. For all of these families, however, the continued Russian conquest of Central Asia in the latter decades of the nineteenth century brought considerable changes. Whereas prior to the mid-nineteenth century Volga Muslims had been overwhelmingly agricultural, the incorporation into the Russian Empire of Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khiva opened the door to new opportunities for trade. Meanwhile, economic stratification and the loss of markets for local wheat growers contributed to the growth of peasant insurrections among Muslim populations in the region.

The Iunusovs, for example, were one of the most prominent Muslim families in the Volga region. The founder of the family business, Muhamadrahim Iunus uly (1743-1820), was a

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22 Indeed, much of this industrialization had begun before the Great Reforms. This was particularly the case for gentry families, such as the Iunusovs, who were often granted monopolies in some industries, see Peter Gatrell, “The Meaning of the Great Reforms in Russian Economic History,” Russia’s Great Reforms, 95. On the economic development of the Volga region both before and after the reforms, see A.N. Zorin, Goroda i posady dorevoluiutsonnogo povolzh’ia (Kazan: Izd-vo Kazanskogo universiteta, 2001), 149-171.

23 On Ahmet and Gani Hüseyinov, see Chapter 4 of this study, especially pp. 143 (fn. 17) and 175.

24 Rizaeddin Fahreddin, who published a biography of Ahmet Bey Hüseyinov in 1910, discusses in some detail Ahmet Hüseyinov’s rough upbrinnging, see Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Ahmet Bey (Orenburg: Izdatel’stvo “Vakit”, 1910), 7-16. For information on the life of Ahmet Bey’s brother, Gani Bey, see Borhan Sherif, Gani Bey (Orenburg: Izdatel’stvo “Vakit”, 1913), 8-21.


26 Regarding fears of hunger in the region following the abolition of serfdom, see Tatarskaia ASSR Materialy po istorii Tatarst na por noloviny XIX veka chast’ pervaya: Agrarnyi vopros i krest’ianskoe dvizhenie 50-70-x godov XIX v. (Moscow: Akademii nauk SSSR, 1936), 29-30, 34.
tanner. His son, Gubaydullah Muhammadrahim uly (1776-1842) expanded the family business to include dealings in soap products. Whereas his father had owned just one tannery, Gubaydullah Muhammadrahim uly owned two. Like his father, his official public status did not exceed that of third degree master.²⁷ Fortunes waxed for the family during the co-patriarchate of Ibrahim Gubaydullah uly (1806-1886) and his little brother Ishak Gubaydullah uly (1814-1885). Under the oversight of these two brothers, the family business expanded into other enterprises, including the manufacture of candles.

During the early to middle nineteenth century, the family also began its history of service in the Russian Empire, with Ibrahim’s tenure as the chairman of the Kazan Tatar ratusha.²⁸ Several years later, Ishak would serve in the Kazan city Duma,²⁹ as would several other members of this family over the ensuing decades.³⁰ Meanwhile, the brothers Ibrahim and Ishak Iunusov were conspicuous in their donations to the community. As was common among merchants and businessmen of all faiths, wealthy Muslims like the Iunusov brothers contributed tens of thousands of rubles to a variety of charities, as well as to the construction of public buildings of benefit to the community, like soup-kitchens, shelters, and mosques.³¹

The Apanaevs were another illustrious family from the region. A longtime mainstay of Muslim society in Kazan, members of this family held numerous official positions throughout

²⁷ "Iunisovlar", Tatar entsiklopediiia süçlege (Kazan: Tatar entsiklopediiase instituty, 2002), 797.
²⁸ "Iunisovlar", 797.
the nineteenth century. Musa İsmail uly²² (1766-1827) had been a judge in a “vicedan” (sovest’ or “conscience”) court, a forum for hearing minor disputes within families. His son, Muhammad Musa uly (1804-1877) was from 1838-41 the head of the Kazan Tatar ratusha³³ while Muhammad’s son Yusuf Muhammad uly was a member of the Kazan city duma from 1879 to 1887.³⁴ Like the Iunusovs, the Apanaevs began the nineteenth century working mostly in leather goods, then expanded to deal in dry goods and soap.³⁵

This trajectory was not unlike that of other families living in the region. The Akçurins of Simbirsk, for example, had been involved in small-scale trade and manufacturing in the early nineteenth century before opening a number of factories in the final decades of the nineteenth century.³⁶ Family members such as İbrahim Kuramsha uly Akçurin (1859-1933) were involved in municipal administration and held other public positions. İbrahim was a member of the Simbirsk city duma as well as the chairman of the “Simbirsk Textile Manufacturers Association.” ³⁷ Moreover, families such as Iunusovs, Apanaevs, and Akçurins were well represented not only among municipal forms of administrative institutions such as the ratusha and the Duma, but also in the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. While Muhammed Bedreddin Abdulkerim uly Apanaev (1867-1837) was a member of the Kazan city Duma from 1898-1917, for example, his older brother Abdullah Abdulkerim (1862-1919) was an imam and a member of the Orenburg Assembly.³⁸

²² “Uly” is roughly equivalent to the Turkish ending “oğlu”, meaning “son of”. “Uly” is written separately here to indicate that it is the ending of a patronymic, rather than a surname.
³³ „Apanaevlar“, *Tatar Entisiklopediia Sützlege*, 41.
³⁵ *U miloserdiiia drevnie korii*, 24, 95, 162.
³⁸ „Apanaevlar“.
The written word

Muslim print media had existed in Russia since the first half of the nineteenth century. The first Muslim printing house in Kazan, owned by one Abdulaziz Burashev, had been opened in 1800. For the first twenty-nine years of its existence, Burashev's press produced just over a dozen books in Tatar. In 1829, this press was amalgamated into that of Kazan State University, after which time the publication of books in Muslim languages increased steadily. By the end of the century, thousands of Muslim language books were being published in Kazan. Ninety percent of these were published on behalf of missionary organizations, such as those operated by Nikolai Il'minskii.  39

A variety of other printed and manuscript materials were also in circulation in the late nineteenth century. One of the most common of these was the kalendar, or yearly almanac, a genre which was particularly common in the Volga region.  40 Sometimes published at a printing press but also frequently handwritten, kalandars varied considerably in size and scope, but at their most basic provided both the Gregorian and hícri calendars. An almanac for the year 1893, for example, was compiled and written by hand by one Mullah Abdülaziz uly Rahmeteddin uly who, it was written in the kalendars's introduction, had now produced a kalendar for the third year in a row in addition to being employed as an imam and teacher in the village of Çaküñ Alan in the uezd of Zevye.  41 The kalendars, which bore the stamp of approval from the censor's office, was organized according to the Gregorian calendar, beginning on January 1 and ending with the last day of December. Every month featured a list of state holidays, a list of famous historical

39 Abrar Karimullin, Tatarskaia kniga poreformennoi Rossii (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnnoe izdatel'stvo, 1983), 37-43, 57. On Il'minskii, see later in this chapter.
40 Kayum Nasiri, who is today celebrated as one of the intellectual giants among nineteenth century Volga Muslims, was a particularly prolific author of kalandars. See, for example, his kalendars for 1903, KGU, document T-1411. On Nasiri, see Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, 3-4, 65-68.
41 KGU, T-1539.
events in Russian history that had taken place during the month, some information about current events (including news about a lottery to take place in 1894), and, in months when a Muslim holiday occurred, a brief discussion of the holiday and its significance.

The most prominent feature of the kalendar was a breakdown of the precise times of prayer for each day. The information for this, it was announced on the cover of Rehmeddin uly's kalendar, had been "adopted according to the calculations of Professor Zagoskin for the city of Kazan." While kalendar were often published formally by a publishing house, many others were written by hand and were neither submitted to nor approved by the censor's office. This was also the case with a number of other types of handwritten documents, such as collections of fatwas, meditations on religious questions discussed in the form of question-and-answer sessions, and village histories.

In the final decades of the nineteenth century, the Russian government began to experiment with the publication of official and semi-official newspapers written in the languages of the empire's Muslim communities. In Central Asia, the Russian government began publishing the Turkestan Wilayetining Gazet in 1870. In the Caucasus, meanwhile, permission was granted in 1875 to Hasan Bey Zerdabi, today one of the best known Caucasian intellectuals from the period, to launch the newspaper Ekinç. In the Crimea, permission was granted to İsmail Gasprinskii to publish the newspaper Terciiman in 1883. During these years, a small number of

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42 KGU, document T-1539.
43 For an example of a collection of fatwas written by hand, see KGU, documents T-4420 and T-2410. For examples of questions and answers to various questions pertaining to living as a Muslim, see document T-5463. Other fatwas written in Tatar and Arabic can be found in KGU, documents T-4420, T-2410, G-797, G-838, G-1842, G-1922, G-1924, and G-2003.
44 On this newspaper, see Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, 80, 82, 85-89. Also see Bennigsen, La Presse, 25-27.
45 An undertaking which lasted until 1877. On Zerdabi, see Swietochowski, Russian Azerbajian, 29-32.
other Turkic-language newspapers directed towards Muslim audiences were also permitted to open, but most of these were of short duration.\footnote{On the pre-1905 Muslim periodical press in Russia, see Bennigsen, La presse, 21-34.}

The most famous figure in Russian Muslim newspaper publishing is Ismail Gasprinskii. Gasprinskii, also known as "Gaspzrili", was born in 1851 to a lesser noble family holding the honorific title of "mirza".\footnote{Much has been written on Ismail Gasprinskii in English, Turkish, Russian, and several other languages. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii"; Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford University: Hoover Institute Press, 1978); Classic works in Turkish on Gasprinskii include Abdullah Battal-Taymas, “Ben onu gördüm” (Ismail Gaspirali hakkında notlar), Türk Kültürü, VI, No. 69 (1968), 649-652; Ahmet Caferoğlu "Ismail Bey Gasprinski", Azerbaycan Yurt Bilgisi, II, No. 16 (April, 1933), pp. 165-169; and Nadir Devlet, Ismail Bey Gaspirali, 1851-1914 (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988). Also see Hakan Kırımlı, National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars 1905-1916 (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1996), 32-55.}

His family was not well off financially, but Gasprinskii was able to study first at a gymnasium in Simferopol (or Akmescit, as it is known in Tatar), and then at a military academy in Moscow. After working for a few years as a Russian language teacher at medreses in Yalta, Gasprinskii left for Paris in 1872. There he worked as a secretary for Ivan Turgenev and studied French. In 1874 Gasprinskii applied to study at the War College of Istanbul, then travelled to the Ottoman Empire, where he spent one year awaiting a response to his application. Upon learning that his application had been denied, Gasprinskii returned in 1875 to the Crimea, where he once again found employment as a teacher.\footnote{Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii," 4-6. On Gasprinskii's early life, also see Kırımlı, National Movements and National Identity, 32-55. A fairly typical example of the (generally positive) biographical literature on Gasprinskii is Alan W. Fisher's "A Model Leader for Asia, Ismail Gaspirali," in The Tatars of the Crimea: return to the homeland: studies and documents (Edward. A. Allworth, ed.), (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 29-47. Also see Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinski Gaspirali): The Discourse of Modernism and the Russians", Tatars of the Crimea, 48-70. One of the foremost scholars of Gasprinskii from the former Soviet Union is Viktor Gankevic. See his Ismail-Bei Mustafaoglu Gasprinski, biobibliografia (Simferopol: Krymskoe uchebno-pedagog. gos izd-vo, 1995).}

For the first several years after his return to Russia, Gasprinskii struggled. He frequently quarreled with the communities at whose schools he taught. He was also unsuccessful in petitioning the government authorities for permission to publish a newspaper, though in 1881-82 Gasprinskii did receive permission to publish Russkoe Musul'manstvo in a series of six articles
published in the Russian-language Simferopol newspaper *Tavrida* in 1881. In these articles, Gasprinskii expresses hope that Russia will lead Russian Muslims “towards progress and civilization”\(^{50}\). He then emphasizes the need for Muslims in Russia to learn Russian, writing:

> The Muslims of Russia do not realize, do not feel the interests of the Russian fatherland; they are practically ignorant of its sadness, of its joys, they do not understand its ambitions, its ideas. Ignorance of the Russian language isolates them from Russian ideas and literature, not to mention their complete isolation from general culture.\(^{51}\)

Two brochures in Tatar, *Mrat-i Cedid* and *Salname-i Türki*, were also published during these years, with government permission.\(^{52}\) In 1882, Gasprinskii married Zühre Hanım, a cousin of Yusuf Akçura, and with the dowry provided by her wealthy family Gasprinskii was able to finance the initial expenses involved in the publication of *Tercüman*, for which he had received permission from the provincial authorities to start publishing the next year. In the years which followed, Gasprinskii published *Tercüman* on a weekly basis in addition to becoming the best-known proponent of “new method” (*novometodnyi* or *usul i-cedid*) education in the Crimea and the Volga region. In the early 1890s, these pursuits took him as far as Central Asia, where he hoped to influence Russian officials in matters concerning the question of Muslim education in Russia’s newly acquired colonial territories.\(^{53}\)

Yet Gasprinskii’s efforts at winning over Muslim communities to his educational approach continued to yield generally frustrating results. Meanwhile, his recommendations to the Russian colonial authorities in Central Asia regarding the education of Muslims also went unheeded. Among both tsarist bureaucrats and Muslim communities, Gasprinskii’s activism on

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behalf of new method education often met with indifferent, even hostile, reactions.\textsuperscript{54} His newspaper \textit{Tercüman}, however, did manage to stay afloat during these years, continuing to be published once weekly with a circulation ranging between three hundred and six hundred copies. In 1904, permission was granted to expand publication to twice weekly, and then in 1906 this was again raised to three times weekly.\textsuperscript{55}

While \textit{Tercüman} today enjoys a reputation in the historiography as an opposition newspaper, this status is largely a product of the public re-invention of \textit{Tercüman} which took place after the Russian Revolution of 1905. Prior to 1905, \textit{Tercüman}'s relationship with the Russian authorities was not nearly as autonomous as it would grow to be in the aftermath of the October Manifesto of 1905. Indeed, prior to 1905 articles in \textit{Tercüman} appear to have bore at times the imprint of government influence, just like those appearing in other Turkic-language newspapers appearing in the empire during these years, such as \textit{Turkestan Wilayetining Gazeti} and \textit{Şark i-Rus}.\textsuperscript{56} In 1886, for example, \textit{Tercüman} printed a multipart series on the final ruler of the Crimea prior to the Russian takeover in 1783. These articles presented the Russian conquest of the Crimea as a rescue from “disorderly” government and emphasized the positive impact of Russian rule during the century that had followed.\textsuperscript{57} In the 1880s, \textit{Tercüman} also defended the extremely unpopular decision by the Russian government to oblige spiritual personnel in the

\textsuperscript{54} Regarding Gasprinskii's efforts to persuade Russian civil servants, see Lazzerini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii”, 30-31. Also see Kirmli, “National Movements”, 33-34. On his difficulties with Muslim communities in Russia, see Lazzerini “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii”, 19-25.

\textsuperscript{55} Lazzerini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii”, 22.

\textsuperscript{56} An important difference between these newspapers is that, while \textit{Turkestan Wilayetining Gazeti} was a government-operated newspaper, other newspapers such as \textit{Tercüman} and \textit{Şark-i Rus} were officially sanctioned but independently owned. While both \textit{Şark i-Rus} and \textit{Türkestan Vilayetiniz Gazeti} have often been characterized as “pro-Russian” because of the official announcements they published and the lack of government criticism on their pages before 1905, the complex relationship between \textit{Tercüman} and the Russian government is rarely discussed in detail in the historiography. Gasprinskii himself seems to have felt some discomfort at his pre-1905 columns when he wrote, after the Revolution of 1905, that in the years prior to the revolution the newspaper had been obliged to work “between the lines” and “by implication and hint”. See Lazzerini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii,” 211. On the \textit{Türkestan Vilayetiniz Gazeti}, see Kahlid, \textit{Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform}, 80-89. On \textit{Şark-i Rus}, see Bennigsen, \textit{La Presse}, 45-46.

\textsuperscript{57} “Kırımın son hükümдарı”, \textit{Tercüman} 51, December 21, 1886.
Orenburg Assembly to learn Russian. Ignoring the widespread and occasionally violent protests then taking place in the Volga region against these new regulations, the pages of Tercüman instead contained several essays aimed at convincing Muslims of the wisdom of learning Russian generally and of the importance of spiritual personnel knowing Russian in particular.⁵⁸

In the late 1880s and early 1890s, Gasprinskii also tackled the question of Muslim emigration, publishing a number of articles in Tercüman warning Muslims of the dangers of emigration and urging them to stay in Russia. Like müftis Soltanov and Gubayov, who intervened in the 1880s and 1890s on behalf of the Russian state in order to discourage Muslim immigration to Turkey⁵⁹, Gasprinskii blamed the desire of Muslims to leave Russia upon “foolish rumors” and urged his readers to ignore people who spread them.⁶⁰ On occasion, such as in an article written in response to the emigration of several thousand Muslims from the oblast' of Kuban in 1890, Gasprinskii’s words were similar to those employed by müftis Gubayov and Soltanov in their own fatwas against emigration.⁶¹

If the Muslims of the oblast' of Kuban really have decided to abandon their homeland and Russia, have they truly considered the seriousness of this step? What need do you have to leave Russia? Nobody prevents us from confessing our religion. Our religious practices are not constrained.⁶²

On at least one occasion, provincial authorities in the Crimea contacted Gasprinskii to request assistance in using Tercüman as a means of communicating with Muslim populations regarding the question of emigration. Just as tsarist authorities had employed Caucasian Müfti Gubayof and Orenburg Müfti Soltanov in the 1880s and 1890s in an effort to convince Russian

⁵⁸ See, for example, “K vnimaniiu Gg. Muftiye”, Tercüman No. 11, March 24, 1887 and “Russkaia gramota i Musul'manskoe dukhovenstvo”, Tercüman 39, November 11, 1888.
⁵⁹ See chapter 1. On Russian state efforts to discourage Muslim emigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see my article “Immigration, return, and the politics of citizenship: Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1914,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 39:1, (February 2007).
⁶⁰ “Ob ukhode v Turtsiiu”. Tercüman, July 30, 1893.
⁶¹ See Chapter 1, pp. 46-47.
⁶² “Ob emigratsii”. Tercüman, March 18, 1890.
Muslims not to emigrate, in 1902 Crimean authorities asked Gasprinskii to pass on a similar message.\textsuperscript{63} Local authorities in the Crimea had effectively banned Muslim emigration altogether in the wake of another wave of emigration that had begun in late 1901, and police officials, to whom Muslims were obliged to apply for the passports, began turning down all applications, telling the prospective émigrés that “Tatars are absolutely forbidden from going abroad.” \textsuperscript{64}

Before long, incredulous Tatars were petitioning the governor personally for permission to leave, often claiming they had already sold off all of their belongings and had no place to stay.\textsuperscript{65} Others, meanwhile, sought permission to receive foreign travel passports by insisting they had no intention of emigrating.\textsuperscript{66} Over the course of several months, thousands of Tatars began leaving the region without permission altogether.\textsuperscript{67} Facing a worsening situation, the governor of the guberniia of Tavrida contacted Ismail Gasprinskii in May of 1902:

> In my capacity as Governor of the guberniia of Tavrida, I respectfully request you, dear sir, to notify and warn, by means of your newspaper and to the greatest extent possible, those Tatars wishing to renounce their Russian citizenship and leave the country that they should not sell off their belongings until they have received the appropriate permission to emigrate, lest they fall into difficult economic circumstances resulting from their undue haste.\textsuperscript{68}

As provincial authorities had already stopped issuing foreign travel passports to Crimean Muslims altogether, the governor’s request that Tatars defer acting “until they have received the appropriate permission” was essentially aimed at halting, rather than regulating, emigration. As they had done with the spiritual assemblies in earlier years, tsarist authorities believed that

\textsuperscript{63} On the fatwas of Gubayov and Soltanov in this regard, see Chapter 1 of this study. Also see Meyer, “Immigration, return, and the politics of citizenship”, 17-18.

\textsuperscript{64} GAARK, f. 26, op. 3, d. 194, ll. 112-113.

\textsuperscript{65} GAARK, f. 26, op. 3, d. 194, ll. 112-113. For other petitions making similar observations, see GAARK, f. 26, op. 3, d. 194, ll. 47-76, 113-117-ob.

\textsuperscript{66} See, for example, GAARK, f. 26, op. 3, d. 119, ll. 114-114-ob.

\textsuperscript{67} ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 83, l. 67-67-ob.

\textsuperscript{68} GAARK, f. 26, op. 3, d. 194, ll. 133-133 ob.
Gasprinskii’s newspaper could be employed as an effective means of slowing or preventing emigration through mass communication. While it is not known whether or not Gasprinskii responded to the governor’s letter, a number of articles against emigration did appear in *Tercüman* over the next several months.\textsuperscript{69} Later in the year Gasprinskii was awarded for his service to the empire with a golden cigarette case during the visit to the Crimea of Tsar Nicholas II.\textsuperscript{70}

While Muslim newspapers did not have circulations exceeding more than a few hundred copies per week, their importance as a means of communication within Muslim communities was not lost on the leadership of the regional assemblies.\textsuperscript{71} In December of 1903, for example, the Sheyh-ul Islam of the Caucasus, Abdulselam Akhundzade, contacted Muhammed Ağa Shakhtakhtinskii, the editor of *Şark-i Rus*, with the request that the Shiite spiritual assembly be given a column in the newspaper.\textsuperscript{72} Shakhtakhtinskii turned down the request, but this did not dissuade Akhundzade from instructing all of the kadis working under his authority to subscribe to the newspaper. The sheyh ul-Islam stressed the “useful information” disseminated by the newspaper and emphasized to the kadis that the newspaper printed the five times of prayer for each day it was published. While the precise times of prayer changed according to the exact geographical location of each community, Akhundzade noted that “most mullahs are already not leading prayers according to their own time” anyway. If the kadis were unable to pay the


\textsuperscript{70} GAARK, f. 26, op. 3, d. 237, f. 211. Also see Meyer, “Immigration, return, and the politics of citizenship,” 18-19.

\textsuperscript{71} On the circulation of Muslim newspapers after 1905, see Chapter 5 of this study, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{72} ADTA, f. 290, op. 2, d. 2505, li. 1, 10.
subscription fee themselves, wrote Akhundzade, they should take up a collection among their communities.  

In 1908, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly would begin publication of *Mağlumat*, a monthly journal whose every issue was divided into “official” (resmi) and “unofficial” (gayri-resmi) sections. The “official” section printed correspondence between the müfti and government officials regarding various issues of concern to the Orenburg Assembly. The “unofficial” section, meanwhile, contained articles and letters reflecting various opinions and interests. These were frequently the sorts of complaints and questions that communities in the region had long since brought to the assemblies, and also included news items. Alexandre Bennigsen has written that *Mağlumat* “reflected the political opinions of the monarchist müftis Soltanov and Beyazitov.” However, articles appearing in *Mağlumat* contained a variety of political and cultural viewpoints. Writing in to the journal, for example, a reader named Abdullah called for there to be more “open minded” mullahs who are “at least somewhat familiar with what is happening in the world,” while in many other articles authors were quick to distance themselves from both “jadidism” and “kadimism”. A teacher from Tomsk named Al-hac Ahmed Tuktabayev wrote to explain that the main division among Siberian Muslims was not that between “jadids” and “kadims” at all, but rather between “Tatars” who had come from “Russia” and other Muslims who were descendents of immigrants from Central Asia. 

**The Volga region: protests and petitions in the late nineteenth century**

As was the case with other modernizing and reforming states of the late nineteenth century, the Russian government placed considerable emphasis during these years upon the

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73 ADTA, f. 290., op. 2, d. 2505, II. 2-9.  
75 *Mağlumat* No 9, May 15, p. 188.  
76 *Mağlumat* No. 15, August 15, 1908, pp. 331-333.
centralization of education and the consolidation of a common bureaucratic language. Mirroring efforts by the Russian government to reform and standardize education among (Christian) Russian schools in the empire’s heartland, Muslim populations in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly became subject to a series of new rules regarding their administrative status and the status of the Russian language in their educational institutions. Beginning in 1870, new Muslim medreses opening under the authority of the Orenburg Assembly were obliged to offer Russian classes, while in 1874 Muslim schools under the control of the Orenburg Assembly were put under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Education (Ministerstvo narodnogo prosveshchenia). In 1888, moreover, it became necessary to pass an exam in Russian language in order to receive the rank of imam, akhund, or muezzin in the Orenburg Assembly. The implementation of many of these regulations caused considerable outcry in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, and the legacy of the issues surrounding them would ultimately have an important impact upon the development of Muslim leadership politics in the Volga region after the Revolution of 1905. Meanwhile, none of these regulations were applied to Muslim communities in the Caucasus or the Crimea.

Not all of the regulations which incited protest during these years directly affected the status of the Orenburg Assembly or Muslim schools. In March of 1877, new regulations

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77 In the Ottoman Empire, for example, a similar project devoted to centralizing and standardizing education was undertaken during the reign of Abdülhamid II. See Benjamin C. Fortna, Imperial classroom: Islam, the state, and education in the late Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). In Japan, major educational reforms also took place in the early 1870s, see Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the late Meiji period (Princeton, 1985), 104-105. On education in France during this period, see Mona Ozouf, L’Ecole, l’Eglise et la République (Paris: Cana, 1982).

78 On educational reforms taking place more generally, see A. N. Shevelev, Shkola, gosudarstvo, obshchestvo. Ocherki sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii obshchego shkol’nogo obrazovaniia v Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX veka (St. Petersburg, 2001), 36-80.

79 Šbornik zakonov o Misul’manskom dukhovennstve v Tavricheskom i Orenburgskom okrugakh i o Magometanskikh uchebnikh zavedeniah (Kazan: Tipografiia P.K. Kidalinskago, 1899), 29.

80 Both of these rules were, nonetheless, widely ignored, and in the late nineteenth century hundreds of Muslim schools were operating without official licenses in the Volga region. For a list of illegal schools from this period, see NART, f. 160, op. 1, d. 1576, ll. 203-253-ob.
(instruktsiia) mandating, at local expense, the construction, maintenance, and insurance of various types of public buildings was adopted by the zemstvo (provincial assembly) of the guberniia of Kazan. Over the next two years, more than one hundred villages from uezds across the guberniia of Kazan submitted petitions, often nearly identical to one another, calling for their repeal. These petitions were sent to a variety of civil and spiritual representatives of provincial administration, including the Orenburg müfti, the governor of the guberniia of Kazan, and local police officials. A number of petitions were also sent to the Interior Minister and the Emperor.

Muslims were not, in fact, the only ones to oppose the instruktsiia. Indeed, many ethnic Russian and Chuvash villages also protested against the new regulations and were active in petitioning various tsarist officials, usually the governor of the guberniia, in asking for their removal. Like many petitions coming from Muslim villages, those coming from Christian villages stressed the economic implications of the new regulations and pleaded for leniency. Indeed, in many cases, much of the wording of the petitions sent by Christian peasants was nearly identical to those sent by Muslims, suggesting that, at the very least, Muslims and Christians frequented the same scribes.

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81 Such as fire stations and clerical offices for the zemstva and district administration.
82 The leading contemporary authority on Muslim agrarian revolts in the Volga region is Il'dus Zajgudullin. For a discussion of the protests over the instruktsiia, see Zajgudullin, Tatarskie krest'iane Kazanskoj gubernii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. (60-90-e gg.), Kand. diss. Kazanskii nauchnyi tsentr RAN institut iazyka, literatury i istorii im. G. Ibragimova (1992), 134-156.
83 Zajgudullin lists more than 100 Tatar villages as having been involved in the protests, as well as another 14 villages of 'other nationalities', including Chuvash and Russian. How mixed villages were counted in this survey is unclear. See Zajgudullin, Tatarskie krest'iane, 154. For samples of these petitions, see NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345 f. 1, op. 3, d. 4627.
84 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, l. 22.
85 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, l. 40. Indeed, petitioning the Emperor was a long-standing and institutionalized form of appeal that had been available to peasants since before the age of Catherine. See Andrew Verner, "Discursive Strategies in the 1905 Revolution: Peasant petitions from Vladimir Province." Russian Review, Vol. 54, No. 1, 65-90.
86 The Chuvash are a predominantly Christian Turkic community.
87 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4627, ll. 22, 41-43, 83-84-ob.
Over time, however, Muslim petitions to the governor and other officials increasingly contained an additional component, whereby Muslims invoked “Islam” in making their arguments against the implementation of the instruktsiia. This occurred in a number of ways. Muslims living in mixed Christian-Muslim villages complained, for example, that financing the maintenance and insurance of Christian houses of worship constituted an infringement of “Muslim Law”. On other occasions, Muslims invoked more recent traditions of separate Muslim administration in the empire. One petitioner from the volost of Novo-Agaiskii wrote to Müfti Soltanov to complain about the instruktsiia, exclaiming that when he had first seen the regulations he assumed they were “probably mistaken”, since “all the points in the instruktsiia were without exception the same for Russians and for Tatars”. The regulations in the new instruktsiia, he argued, were clearly intended for Christians and not Muslims. “For us this is not necessary”, he wrote, “as we are Muslims”.

Protests in Muslim communities over the instruktsiia were often accompanied by rumors that Muslims would be forcibly baptized. “Among the Tatar population,” wrote one tsarist official in the region, “nasty rumors are circulating that they will be converted to Orthodox Christianity and that church bells will be installed in their villages.” Other rumors reflected Muslim anxieties over the place of Muslim education and the growth of state-supported missionary schools in the guberniia, with Russian officials reporting rumors that Muslim children would be taken away from their parents and placed in Russian schools or in Il’minskii’s missionary schools, where they would then be baptized.

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88 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, l. 1; f. 1, op. 3, d. 4466, ll. 33-34-ob; f. 1, op. 3, d. 4627, ll. 41-43, 144, 175.
89 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, l. 1.
90 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, l. 22.
91 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4466, ll. 33-34; f. 1, op. 3, d. 4627, l. 144.
Opposition to the new regulations was not expressed only through petition campaigns, but also sometimes through violent action. Police in the volost of Baltasinsk reported that on November 23, 1878, a mob of several dozen Muslims descended upon the village of Malye Ayzy, the seat of volost administration. There they beat up the clerk (pisar’) who had met them at the door. The chairman of the volost administration, one Gafar Abdullin, then went outside in an effort to calm the crowd, and was himself given a beating. In a separate incident more than 1000 Muslims were reported to have gathered in the village of Karmish-Kazanbash, where they likewise beat up the clerk and village elder.

Tsarist officials working in the region and in St. Petersburg sought to quell the disturbances by appealing to Muslims through the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. On November 30, 1878 the Minister of the Interior Makov wrote to Müfti Tevkelev from St. Petersburg to report that “The Tatars don’t want to insure their buildings, they say that Muslim law prevents them from doing so.” The Minister explained that he had been receiving petitions from “masses of Tatars” from all over the Volga region demanding that he overturn the instruktsiya.

Rather than viewing Muslim (or non-Muslim) opposition to the instruktsiya as resulting from government policies in the region, the Minister blamed the unrest on lower-level spiritual personnel in the Orenburg Assembly.

Most mullahs are not energetic or quick-witted enough to explain things to them, and some mullahs do not say anything and just keep to themselves. Of greatest necessity is that mullahs convince and impress upon people that Tatars who have always been Muslim will never be baptized into the Orthodox faith and that they freely practice their Muslim faith according to existing laws.

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NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, 53.
NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4627, l. 68.
NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, l. 32.
NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, ll. 32-33. The minister’s reference to “Tatars who have always been Muslims” means that Muslims who had earlier converted to Christianity but who had returned to Islam would still not be recognized as Muslims by the Russian government.
The müfti, wrote the Minister, should send a general fatwa to the imams, mullahs, and akhunds operating under his authority ordering them to persuade their communities to end their petition campaigns and accept the new regulations.96 The müfti, however, did not agree. In his response one week later, Müfti Tevkelev wrote that writing a fatwa was “unlikely to be successful” and instead suggested alternate action.

The preparation and publication of it [the fatwa] would require a significant amount of time, whereas in the current circumstances it is necessary to disseminate the information quickly. It would be more useful, and I therefore recommend, that you send a personal representative to the communities worshipping in the mosques of the lower ranks of the spiritual personnel of Kazan.97

The müfti’s suggestion notwithstanding, no such delegation appears to have been sent to Kazan. Faced with the müfti’s reluctance to become personally involved in the dispute, authorities in St. Petersburg and Kazan did not devote further efforts to communicating with the protesting communities. Provincial authorities, however, did expend considerable energy in investigating the sources of the petitions. In late November 1878, police raided the home of Hüsnü Ata Azamatov in the city of Chistopol. There, they charged, Azamatov had been writing petitions to various figures in the tsarist administration for several months. After writing the petitions, police charged, Azamatov would send them to villages across the region, where they would be signed and sent to their destination. In Azamatov’s house a total of twenty-two petitions in various stages of completion were found, including thirteen addressed to the müfti, seven addressed to the zemstvo of the uezd of Mamadysh, and four addressed to the Minister of the Interior in St. Petersburg.98 Bureaucrats investigating the petitions, unable to see any logic in the arguments of the Muslim protesters, attributed Muslim opposition to the instruktsiia to their

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96 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4345, l. 33.
97 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4637, l. 233.
98 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4677, ll. 93-97-ob.
"fanaticism", or else viewed the whole matter as a "misunderstanding" fueled by "falsehoods" and "rumors". 99

In 1882-1884, a new set of protests spread across the guberniia. Several years earlier, in 1874, the Russian government had decreed that Muslim schools under the control of the Orenburg Assembly would henceforth be under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Education. 100 However, Vassily Radlov, the inspector of Tatar, Bashkir, and Kyrgyz schools in the guberniia of Kazan, had simply ignored the regulations. 101 This, in turn, prompted an angry letter written by Radlov's superiors in St. Petersburg in February of 1882 ordering him to immediately begin a statistical survey of Muslim schools in the guberniia as a first step towards bringing them under government control. 102

In the face of criticism from St. Petersburg and a renewed request from the Education Ministry to enforce the new regulations, Radlov had a copy of the new regulations sent to the heads of all of the medreses under his jurisdiction. These regulations were accompanied by a new policy, mandated on February 5, 1882, requiring the teaching of Russian in these schools. Radlov's announcement of these new policies prompted one mullah, Mullah Salikhov, to travel to Ufa, where he attempted, unsuccessfully, to enlist the support of Mufti Tevkelev in canceling the new regulations. 103 On December 22, the Governor of Kazan, having been informed of rumors of Muslim resistance to the regulations, contacted Radlov and suggested they visit the

99 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 3539, l. 1; f. 1, op. 3, d. 4677, 93, 123, 179.
100 These rules were actually part of Interior Minister Tolstoi's 1870 regulations on Muslim education, but were decreed separately in 1874. For more on the 1870 regulations, see Dowler, Classroom and Empire, 62-84.
101 On this incident, also see Chapter 1 of this study.
102 When pressed to explain by his superiors in St. Petersburg why he had not applied the new regulations, Radlov cited a passage in his initial orders telling him to "proceed with extreme caution so as not to upset the Muslim population". Having initially encountered resistance, Radlov explained, he had found it prudent to sideline the matter. See NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539, l. 2-3.
103 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539, ll. 5-6.
schools together. The undertaking did not proceed smoothly. "It was apparent", wrote Radlov, "that the Tatars had been warned." "At every school", he wrote, "we found the local population filled with rage." The governor had spoken with mullahs, teachers, local residents and students at each school they visited, and all of them said they schools to remain under the authority of the müfti.

After the governor and Radlov had visited the schools, the Kazan merchant İbrahim İnusov invited them to his house for a breakfast meeting. A group of Tatars from the surrounding community had also been invited, and at breakfast they informed the governor that the protests he had seen the day before represented "only the first step", and that resistance would continue. In response to this, the governor promised that he would personally appeal to the Minister of Internal Affairs on their behalf. Moreover, the Governor informed those gathered that he would not implement the changes until a decision confirming their implementation had been handed down by St. Petersburg. The governor's assurances notwithstanding, a petition campaign was undertaken shortly thereafter in which Volga Muslims appealed directly to the Minister of Education in requesting that the new rules governing Muslim schools be overturned. Meanwhile, Kazan kuptsy such as İbrahim İnusov and Murtaza Azim petitioned the Minister of the Interior with similar requests.

Russian police investigations into this petition campaign continued throughout most of 1883. During this time, police officials investigated what appeared to be a human network between Kazan and the villages and towns in the rest of the guberniia which relied upon

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104 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539, l. 6.
105 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539, ll. 5-6.
106 Of the İnusov family described earlier in this chapter.
107 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539, ll. 6-7. Also see Chapter 1 of this study.
108 For examples of this petition, see NART f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539, especially ll. 23, 96, 146.
109 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539, ll. 23-24.
Muslims who traveled to Kazan for purposes of work or trade. Often, the bazaar was a place of particular importance in the circulation of these documents. These go-betweens would then either bring a copy of the petition itself to the village, or else would bring news of the petition, which would then be announced by the village mullah before the Friday prayer. In such cases, a delegate from the village was often elected to travel to Kazan to sign the petition in the name of the village. ¹¹⁰ Unlike the petition campaign opposing the instruktsiia of 1878-79, organized petition campaigns calling for the repeal of regulations putting Muslim medreses in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly under the authority of the Ministry of Education continued for years, resurfacing occasionally throughout the remaining decades of the empire. ¹¹¹

The events of 1882-83 resembled both the petition campaign of 1878-79 and petition campaigns of later years in a number of important ways. First, a number of attempts were made by Muslims to galvanize the Orenburg leadership to protest to the government on behalf of Muslims, but these efforts were rebuffed by a spiritual leadership reluctant to get caught in the middle of a dispute between Russian Muslims and the Russian government. Secondly, tsarist responses to Muslim protests were not manifested in the form of a single voice, but rather were uncoordinated, with officials in the regions often modifying or ignoring policies set in St. Petersburg in formulating responses to local community protest. Finally, these protests are notable for the increasingly large role played in them by local notables in Kazan, such as those from kuptsy and meshchanin families like the Iunusovs, Galievs, and Aitovs. While these families had largely been absent from earlier protests made against the instruktsiia, from the early 1880s onwards individuals from these families would play an increasingly prominent role.

¹¹⁰ NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 15539.
¹¹¹ Indeed, these would become a major feature of Volga Muslim demands after 1905. See Chapter 4 of this study.
in articulating “Muslim” community interests to both the tsarist administration and Volga Muslims themselves.\textsuperscript{112}

**Russian language and the Orenburg Assembly**

On July 16, 1888, Alexander III enacted regulations, scheduled to become effective on January 1, 1891, requiring higher-level spiritual personnel in the Orenburg Assembly (such as imams, hatips, and akhunds)\textsuperscript{113} to obtain certificates attesting to their knowledge of Russian. This was not the first attempt by the Russian government to increase the prominence of Russian in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly. Since 1870, new mekteps (or mukatip) and medreses (or mudaris) had been obliged to offer Russian language courses, and since 1882 students in medreses had been compelled to study Russian.\textsuperscript{114} News of these regulations set off several waves of protest that returned periodically throughout the last years of the century. The most widespread, however, were those which occurred in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the new regulations in 1888. These initial protests were particularly intense, occurring across the gubernias of Kazan, Ufa, and elsewhere in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly. Like regulations requiring medreses to be placed under the authority of the Ministry of Education, these new rules concerning knowledge of Russian applied only to the territories of the Orenburg Assembly.

Throughout most of 1888 until the middle of 1890, hundreds of petitions from across the gubernias of Kazan, Ufa, and elsewhere were sent to the chief of police, the governor’s office, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Education, and the Emperor.\textsuperscript{115} By 1890, several

\textsuperscript{112} Zorin, Goroda i posady, 119-122.
\textsuperscript{113} Lower-ranking personnel would include teachers (mueellsms) and muezzins.
\textsuperscript{114} On the Regulations of March 1870 and language issues in Muslim schools, see Wayne Dowler, “The Politics of Language in non-Russian Elementary Schools in the Eastern Empire, 1865-1914.” Russian Review Vol. 54, No. 4 (October, 1995), 516-538.
\textsuperscript{115} See, for example NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7798, l. 84; f. 1, op. 3, d. 8137, l. 8, 19-27, 45-49, 51. More petitions can be found throughout the NART f. 1, op. 3, d. 7797; f. 1, op. 3, d. 7798, and f. 1, op. 3, d. 8137.
kuptsy and meschanin from Kazan, most notably Ahmetzhan Saidashev and Shakir Imangulov (a meschchanin and memeber of the Kazan city Duma) had also taken up the cause. As was the case in 1878-79, many of these petitions were verbatim copies of one another. In the police investigations which followed the outbreak of the petition campaign, officials concluded that these petitions were mass produced and distributed by individuals whose work took them across the region. One report stated that one Ahmetzhan Kul’mametov, who himself held a position in the tsarist administration as the Ostavnoi Kollezshkii Registrator in Kazan, had distributed these petitions over a two-year period in the guberniias of Kazan, Simbirsk, Orenburg, Penz, Samara, and Viatka. A second subject of the investigation, Khairullah Saifeddinov, was a resident of the village of Bol’shoy Shinghar, not far from the city of Chistopol. At Saifeddinov’s house, a total of one hundred ninety petitions were found. They had already been signed and were being prepared for shipment to various tsarist officials.

Petitions confiscated at these houses and elsewhere were collected in nine different uezds in the gubernia of Kazan. The largest number from a single uezd was fifty-eight, in the district of Mamadysh. As was the case in 1878-79, far more petitions were sent from villages than from urban areas. Among the fifty-eight petitions that had been sent to officials from the district of Mamadysh, only one had been distributed in an urban center (the city of Mamadysh), while all of the other fifty-seven had been signed by Muslims living in the surrounding villages. Many of these petitions explained that its signers had first turned to the müfti in the hopes that the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly would assist them in organizing their protest. The müfti, however,

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116 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7797, l. 205; f. 1, op. 3, d. 7798, ll. 31-32, 35, 60.
117 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 8137, ll. 45-49.
118 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 8137, l. 84.
119 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 8137, ll. 19-27.
120 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 8137, ll. 19-27.
had rebuffed their requests, explaining that the Assembly did not have the power ('vlast') to petition for the repeal of the new regulations.\textsuperscript{121}

While the Orenburg leadership was unwilling or unable to take a leading role in the petition campaigns, many individual mullahs working as spiritual personnel in the countryside did join the campaign.\textsuperscript{122} In the \textit{uezd} of Tetiush in Kazan guberniia, one police official reported that mullahs “in almost every mosque” in the \textit{uezd} were getting their communities to sign the petitions.\textsuperscript{123} Meanwhile, the Orenburg Assembly was given the task of cracking down on village mullahs protesting against the new regulations.\textsuperscript{124} Petition campaigns against the mandatory study of Russian for spiritual personnel continued throughout the 1890s, and demands to rescind this regulation resurfaced after 1905 as well.\textsuperscript{125}

The Russian government’s policies towards the Orenburg Assembly and Muslim education in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly in the 1880s contributed to the development of an increasingly fearful climate among Muslims in the Volga region. In 1890, for example, rumors spread in the Volga region that regulations concerning the place of the Russian language in Muslim communities would be extended to oblige all Muslim schoolchildren to study Russian. Bureaucrats investigating the rumors attributed them to the fantasies of “wealthy Muslim fanatics and mullahs”.\textsuperscript{126} In 1894, various rumors regarding the position of Muslims in Russia again spread throughout the region. According to some versions, all Muslim children would be obliged to attend Russian-Tatar schools, schools which had been set up by the Russian

\textsuperscript{121} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 8137, ll. 8-9.
\textsuperscript{122} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7797, ll. 1-2; f. 1, op. 3, d. 7798, ll. 61,77.
\textsuperscript{123} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7798, l. 61.
\textsuperscript{124} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7797, ll. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{125} The \textit{Itifak} party leadership, which generally supported the study of Russian (particularly for spiritual personnel) did not support rescinding this regulation, but rank and file Muslims attending the Muslim congresses did speak about this issue. See Chapter 4 of this study.
\textsuperscript{126} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 7798, ll. 95-96. On the census, see I.K. Zagiddyullin, \textit{Perepis' 1897 goda i tatars Kazanskoi gubernii} (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 2000).
government from the early 1870s onwards.\textsuperscript{127} Elsewhere, police reported that Muslims in the
countryside were telling one another that the Russian government, according to an agreement it
had made with the Ottoman sultan, would begin converting Volga Muslims \textit{en masse} from 1896
onwards. According to these rumors, mullahs in the Orenburg Assembly would be ordained as
Orthodox ministers.\textsuperscript{128}

Indeed, rumors regarding the assembly, the müfti, and spiritual personnel frequently
evisioned their complicity in the conversion of Muslims. In 1891, for example, Müfti Soltanov
wrote the governor of the \textit{guberniia} of Kazan to provide information regarding “the circulation
of evil rumors that in Russia, and with my approval, Muslim affairs regarding marriage,
separation, and divorce will soon be subordinated to the authority of the Orthodox Christian
spiritual authorities”.\textsuperscript{129} These rumors had, the müfti wrote, accompanied Russian Muslims
during a recent pilgrimage to Mecca. This had prompted a group of outraged pilgrims to send a
letter, whose signers included the Müfti of Mecca, to the Ottoman Sultan denouncing Russia’s
actions.\textsuperscript{130}

Even as these and other rumors frequently implicated the müfti and the Orenburg
Assembly in feared government plots to forcibly convert Russian Muslims, the Russian
government continued to rely upon the Orenburg Assembly as its principal means of
communication with Volga Muslims. In June of 1894, for example, bureaucrats in the local
branch of the Interior Ministry asked Müfti Soltanov (who had become müfti after Tevkelev’s
death in 1885) to dispatch a written directive to all mullahs and \textit{akhunds} in the Orenburg

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Mekteps}, or \textit{mukatip}, were specifically schools for religious training. \textit{Medreses} or \textit{modarim} included a religious
component but also taught math, geography, literature, and other subjects. New method schools were almost always
\textit{medreses}, but not all \textit{medreses} were new method.
\textsuperscript{128} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 9603, ll. 7, 17, 23, 48, 64.
\textsuperscript{129} NART, f. 1, op. 3. d. 9603, l. 48.
\textsuperscript{130} NART, f. 1, op. 3. d 8601, ll. 1-3. The letter can be found in BOA, Y.MTV.57/50, s. 1-3.
assembly, requesting them to tell their congregations that the Russian government had no plans to convert Muslims. The fatwa also specifically warned Muslims against emigrating from Russia. “People spreading these rumors,” read the fatwa that Orenburg spiritual personnel were supposed to read to their congregations, were either “evil” or “foolish”. Individuals who believed these rumors, said the müfti, were falling victim to unscrupulous con artists who were using people’s fears of forced conversion to get them to either sell their property at a discounted price or else pay cash up front to finance the costs of travel to the Ottoman Empire.\footnote{NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 9603, ll. 130, 208-209. Also see Chapter 1 of this study.}

**Muslim deputations**

From the 1870s onwards, Muslim representing the lower urban estates (kup
tsy and meshchanin) in Kazan and elsewhere began to present themselves with increasing frequency as Muslim community spokespersons in their dealings with tsarist officials. On January 29, 1879, for example, the governor of the gubernia of Kazan wrote the Minister of the Interior to report that “once again”, the Kazan kup
tsy Iunusov, Apanaev, Azimov and Galiev were requesting from him permission to petition the Interior Minister directly. These men wanted to talk to the minister about a number of issues pertaining to the region’s Muslims. One of these concerned a proposal in the Russian government to allow Muslims to take cases involving the division of property to Russian state courts, rather than to the Sharia courts of the Muslim spiritual assemblies. The kup

tsy were against this proposal, and planned to stress to the minister that such cases be decided “only according to their worthiness and the Islamic religion, that is to say according to Sharia, without the involvement of the Russian civil court (grazhdanskoe otdeleniia okruzhnago suda).”\footnote{This was a frequent demand of Muslims prior to 1905. Ismail Gasprinskii wrote an editorial on this in 1891, five years before Muslims would eventually be allowed by the Russian state to take to Russian civil courts matters which used to be strictly the purview of the Muslim spiritual assemblies. Crews sees this as an example of Muslims}
from their obligation to learn Russian. A third request was that shākerts studying in Muslim medreses be exempted from military service, just like students at Russian universities. Additionally, wrote the governor, this deputation was interested in discussing the possibility of Muslims in the Orenburg territories electing their own müfti, and of giving Muslim civil servants and others finding themselves in “compulsory service” time to pray on Fridays “in general accordance with the Muslim timetable.”\textsuperscript{133}

In December of 1893, a group of Kazan kuptsy calling themselves representatives of “the Muslim community of Kazan” (Kazanskoе magometanskoе obshchestvo) sent a petition to the governor of the guberniia requesting permission to send a deputation to St. Petersburg. The deputation consisted of the Kazan kuptsy Mukhametzhan Galiev, Murtaz İbrahimov, and Yusuf Apanaev, along with Abdulkaium Abdulvelidov, ukazannyi mullah of the No. 10 mosque in Kazan. These four had been chosen at a meeting of Kazan mullahs, kuptsy, meshchanin, “and other influential Muslims” held on December 12 at the home of İbrahimov, and wished to petition the Emperor regarding “a number of questions regarding Muslim education” and the abolition of compulsory Russian-language examinations for individuals wishing to become mullahs.\textsuperscript{134}

The issue of whom to work through in petitioning the state authorities was a real one to Muslims in the Volga region, particularly those living in rural locations. Sometimes, divisions would break out among Muslims regarding precisely this question. In 1896, for example, there developed a movement in Kazan to petition the Minister of the Interior for the lifting of

\textsuperscript{133} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 4468, ll. 4-6.
\textsuperscript{134} NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 9126, ll. 1-5.
compulsory military service for Muslim religious personnel. According to the Interior Ministry official writing a report summarizing this movement, a debate ensued among the Muslims active in the campaign over to whom to address the petition. "The better educated of the Muslims", wrote the official approvingly, "refused to sign the petition and instead recommended that this issue either be forwarded to the Muslim spiritual assembly or to your Excellency himself, but the majority of them insisted upon their decision and sent the petition directly to his Excellency the Minister." 135

Communications breakdown: the 1897 census

In January of 1897, the Census Commission of the guberniia of Kazan was due to begin collecting data for the first all-Russian census, a project of no small importance and prestige to officials in both St. Petersburg and the region. Aware of rumors spreading across the province over the previous decade, the provincial administration took early steps to avoid a recurrence of violent protest. As usual, this was undertaken primarily through the Orenburg Assembly. In June of 1896, a full six months before the counting was to take place, Müfti Soltanov was asked to write a directive to imams in the assembly informing them that the census was to be used only to count people, and not convert them. Spiritual personnel were instructed by Müfti Soltanov to pass on the message to their communities that "No harm will come from the census either with regard to the Muslim religion, or with regard to Muslim schools". 136 As the count approached, in November, the governor of Kazan guberniia insisted that "a respected mullah" be brought in to attend the meetings of the commission and take part in its planning. Census takers were subsequently informed to be extra careful in working in Muslim villages, where "Muslim

135 NART, f. 1, op. 4, d.,7035, l. 1.
136 NART, f. 2, op. 2, d. 12627, ll. 246-248. Also see KGU, document T-1658.

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customs regarding women” predicated that outsiders should not speak with female residents.¹³⁷

When the actual count began to be carried out, moreover, many of the census takers were
themselves spiritual personnel from the Orenburg Assembly.¹³⁸

Despite the efforts of provincial officials to address Muslim concerns about the census,
fears among Muslims persisted. In December of 1896 the Kazan office of the Interior Ministry
reported that it had received many tips reporting that “Tatars from the villages are traveling to
Kazan to consult with mullahs, notable merchants and wealthy people there” in an effort to
formulate a response to the census.¹³⁹ By the end of the month, petitions addressed to the
governor, the Interior Minister, and other tsarist officials (though not the müfti) had begun
arriving from Muslim villages in the countryside.¹⁴⁰ As in previous cases, these petitions
revealed a great degree of coordination in the community, often matching one another word for
word. They expressed fear in the region that the collection of data was actually the first step
towards their mass conversion.¹⁴¹ Other petitions asked if the government planned to close
Muslim schools and replace them with missionary or Russian-language schools¹⁴², or if the
Orenburg Assembly was going to be closed.¹⁴³

Many petitions, such as the one signed “the peasants of the Muslim faith from the village
of Tatarskii Aisha in the uezd of Mul’minsk”, posed the following four questions.

1) If a school is opened in our village will our children be forced
to study Russian?
2) Will these schools be opened under the supervision of the
   Minister of Education?
3) Will members of the missionary societies be sent to us?

¹³⁷ NART, f. 105, op. 1, d. 2, l. 13, 27.
¹³⁸ NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 46, l. 34.
¹³⁹ NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 46, l. 46.
¹⁴⁰ I.K. Zagidullin, Perepis’ 1897 goda. For examples of some of these petitions, see NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 8137, lls.
   153-192.
¹⁴¹ NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 10495, l. 1; f. 199, op. 1, d. 46, ll. 1-4-ob.
¹⁴² NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 10495, ll. 86; f. 1, op. 3, d. 10165, ll. 17-17-ob; f. 2, op. 2, d. 12627.
¹⁴³ NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 10165, l. 17-18-ob.

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4) If possible, please do not compel mullahs to obtain the sort of
educational qualifications discussed in the journal
Pravitel’stvrenyi vestnik, No. 1, 1892 and in the journal
Orenburgskii Listok in 1892, No. 12328 and No. 35 in 1893.  

Even as the government’s official strategy for engaging Muslim concerns revolved
primarily around the Orenburg Assembly, spiritual personnel assisting in the collection of census
data often received a hostile reaction from their communities. Rumors spread in Muslim
communities that mullahs working for the Census Commission were assisting in the registration
of Muslim boys for Russian-language schools in exchange for large sums of money and
property. In the village of Bol’shye Nyrm, Mullah Khairullah Abdulgaliev complained to the
Census Commission that, after explaining to his community that no harm would come to them
from the collection of census information, he was chased from the village amid accusations that
he had converted to Orthodox Christianity. In the village of Karatai, Mullah Zainullah
Valgullin reported that “a Chuvash came into the village, entered the mosque, and convinced the
peasants to not listen to their mullah’s advice to participate in the census.” Dozens of mullahs
refused outright to work as census takers, leading to their being stripped of their status as
licensed (ukazanny) mullahs and ejected from the Orenburg Assembly. When, moreover, the
collection of data began to take place, reaction grew even stronger. In mid-January, a number of
census takers had appealed to the gendarmes for protection, stating that their participation had
put their lives in danger. In the village of Karmish-Kazanbash, which had been the site of
violence in earlier protests, soldiers were dispatched to combat rioting peasants.

144 NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 10495, l. 6.
145 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 46, ll. 39, 41-41-ob.
146 Zagidullin, Perepis’ 1897 goda, 156-157; NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 46, ll. 69-70-ob.
147 NART, f. 2, op. 2, d. 12627, l.
148 NART, f. 2, op. 2, d. 12627, especially ll. 58-150-ob.
149 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 46, l. 34.
Avenues of communication in the southern Caucasus

In the southern Caucasus, the situation was quite different from that of Kazan. First of all, there was no missionary activity taking place in the Caucasus comparable to that occurring in the Volga region. Secondly, tsarist policies regarding Muslim administration in the Caucasus were quite different from those involving Muslims living in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly. In the Caucasus, much of the expansion of government that had occurred during the Great Reforms had not taken place, since many of the reforms had themselves never been implemented in the Caucasus. Moreover, late nineteenth century regulations concerning the use of Russian among assembly personnel and the state supervision of Muslim schools were never adopted for the Crimea or the Caucasus. While there was more actual official supervision by Russian authorities of the activities of the Muslim spiritual assemblies in the Caucasus, this usually amounted to little more than a formality, requiring no more than a signature from the governor’s office in relation to decisions made by the spiritual assemblies concerning the appointment of spiritual personnel and the adjudication of cases.

When Muslims in the Caucasus did protest, it was usually over issues which also prompted Russians, Armenians, and others in the region to protest as well. In the second half of the nineteenth century, these often came in the form of both agrarian and industrial disturbances. In the years immediately following the introduction of agricultural reforms in the region following the end of serfdom, peasants from all confessions revolted against the introduction of new regulations concerning the amount of money they were required to pay in exchange for land, the amount of work they were required to perform in their cooperatives, and the continuation of


\(^{152}\) These figures were elected by their communities, but required formal approval from the state for their appointment. See ADTA f. 44, op. 1, d. 258, ll. 1-2; f. 290, op. 1, d. 269; f. 290, op. 1, d. 289; f. 290, op. 1, d. 325; f. 291, op. 1, d. 24; f. 291, op. 1, d. 45.
rules binding them to their villages. While most Muslims active in the labor disputes taking place in the oilfields in the Baku region were actually subjects of Iran, in these instances as well demands made by Muslims during the course of these work stoppages and strikes were generally not dissimilar from those made by workers from other confessional groups.

The most galvanizing incident in the southern Caucasus affecting Muslims particularly as a community was the outbreak of fighting between Muslims and Armenians in 1905. This began in February of 1905, with attacks taking place on Armenian and Muslim populations in Baku and Yerevan. Soon, violence had spread throughout the guberniia of Yerevan and, by the end of summer, had spread to the cities of Shusha and Ganja as well. By the end of the year, an estimated 128 Armenian villages and 158 Muslim villages had been seriously damaged or destroyed. Up to 10,000 individuals are estimated to have died by early 1906. In response to this violence Illarian Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Emperor’s emissary to the region, contacted the Shiite Sheyh-ul Islam Akhundzade in December of 1905 with the request that he assemble a group of representatives from the Shiite population to participate in peace negotiations with the Armenians to be held in Tbilisi the following month. In drawing up the list, Akhundzade changed his mind a number of times regarding the individuals he would choose. Initially, figures from Baku’s periodical press, such as Kaspiii editor Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev and Ahmet Bey Ağaoğlu were among those on Akhundzade’s list. Subsequent drafts of the list, however, indicate that they were replaced. Ultimately, Ağaoğlu made his way back onto the list, and not only

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155 Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 40-41.
156 ADTA, f. 290, op. 2, d. 2639, ll. 15-16.
attended the conference as a representative from the Shiite side, he also reported on the peace talks in articles he published in the newspaper Hayat.\footnote{These ran on the pages of Hayat in the second half of February, 1906.}

The formation and composition of the Shiite community representatives at the peace talks is also indicative of how the locations of representative authority in the Muslim Caucasus were perceived by the regional administration. The issue of how to stop the fighting and bring people back to their homes was understood by tsarist officials principally in confessional and sectarian terms, with the spiritual assemblies assuming a major role in the undertaking.\footnote{The Armenian side in the talks had been chosen, meanwhile, by the patriarch of the Armenian Spiritual Assembly.} Of the twenty-five Muslim representatives from Tbilisi, Yerevan, Baku, Gence, Shushe, Nahchevan, and elsewhere, moreover, only one of them ("Soltanov") carried no title at all. Two others called themselves haji, while another two were addressed as kads. The other twenty all bore titles such as "khan" (1 person), "shah" (1), "ağa" (5), or "bey" (13).\footnote{Ahmet Ağaoğlu, "Ermeni-Müsluman Meclisi," Hayat, February 23, 1906.} Finally, it is important to note the absence from this group of certain individuals, most notably the millionaire industrialists Zeynal Adibin Tagiev\footnote{For more on Tagiev, see Adil'-Gerei Gadzhiev, Millioner Tagiev Gadzhi Zeynalabedin (Obshchestvennopoliticheskie vzlady) (Makhachkala, Azerbaijan, 2000); Okan Yeşilot, Haci Zeynelabidin Tagiyev: Azerbaycan için birçok ilki gerçekleştirmiş esふanevi petrol krallının həznən sonu (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2004).}, Musa Nagiev, Shemsi Asadullayev. While these individuals possessed considerable wealth, they were not viewed by either the regional authorities or Muslim populations more generally as locations of community leadership.

**Conclusions**

Differences in both policy and in the conditions of government in the Volga region and the Caucasus impacted not only relations between the tsarist government and Muslim communities, but also between Muslims. As Robert Crews has shown, the creation by the tsarist authorities of the position of müfti and the codification of an official Islamic hierarchy created
divisions within the community.\textsuperscript{161} Yet other decisions made by the Russian government also impacted the lives of Muslims and the viability of the institutions of Muslim administration. Some of these policies were directly related to Muslim education and the status of the Orenburg Assembly, but others were less anticipated consequences of the era of reforms. The economic and social dislocations that were sometimes brought by the reforms were resisted by peasants in many regions of the empire and included both Russian and non-Russian populations. In the Volga region in the final decades of the nineteenth century, economic and social complaints that Muslim communities often shared with their non-Muslim neighbors eventually came to be seen by both Muslims and tsarist officials in increasingly religious terms, particularly with regard to the place of “Islam” in Russia.

The Muslim spiritual assemblies were the official mediators between the state and Muslim communities and played several important roles in the administration of the empire’s Muslim communities, yet there were many figures from outside the spiritual assemblies to whom Muslims also turned in their dealings with the state. In the Volga region, members of various well established families—many of whom had also provided sons to the spiritual assemblies and who, in more recent years, had often become wealthy merchants and traders—became increasingly visible in their representation of “Muslim” community interests when meeting with tsarist officials. While there were also a number of millionaires produced in the Caucasus at this time, the state tended to rely upon the Muslim gentry and the assemblies, and the role of regional notables in dealing with issues of concern to the Muslim community was less pronounced than in the Volga region.

After 1905, the question of Muslim community leadership would emerge differently in the provinces of Kazan and Baku. While the historiography of this era typically presents 1905 as

\textsuperscript{161} Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State,” 67-70.
the starting point of “Muslim politics” in the Russian Empire,¹⁶² the last years of the nineteenth century indicate that Volga Muslim communities were already highly politicized well before the revolution. Yet this politicization did not lead to the unproblematic solidarity of purpose that is often idealized in the historiography, but rather to a series of often acrimonious disputes among Muslims regarding not only cultural and ideological issues, but also the question of who held the right to speak in the community’s name.

¹⁶² See, for example, Hakan Katrinh, National Movements and National Identities among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916, and Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920. 1905 is also the starting point for the discussions of “modern” politics in the regional studies by Rorlich and Altstadt.
Chapter 3

Education at the End of Empire: Tsarist and Jadidist Reforms and Response

Chapter 2 of this study discussed, among other things, the subject of how the Great Reforms of the latter half of the nineteenth century affected the expansion of the state and its relations with Muslim communities. While the specific reforms (such as the creation of the zemstva) implemented at this time had a “great” impact upon the size of government, the era of reform also saw important changes in the ways the apparati of the state were used to socially engineer the population. As was the case in the Ottoman Empire, France, Japan, the United States, and elsewhere, education emerged in late imperial Russia as a particular target for change.¹

Meanwhile, many Muslims in Russia also believed strongly in reforming their schools. Muslim community activists such as İsmail Gasprinskii in the Crimea, the Siberian mullah Abdürreşid İbrahimov, and Ahmet Ağaoglu in Baku,² frequently called for the full-scale revamping of Muslim education. While many Muslim teachers in Russia and elsewhere believed that memorization and recitation were more essential to an Islamic education than literacy, jadids³ were passionate advocates for literacy. Jadids also believed in the creation of a more “orderly” or “rational” approach to education. Students would no longer study in “dirty” or “confused” surroundings, but rather would


² Along with the philanthropists who supported them, such as Ahmet Bey Huseynov of Orenburg and Zeynal Abdul Tagiev of Baku.

³ Coming from the Arabic word for “new”, jadids were advocates of Muslim cultural reform in Russia. On jadids and jadidism, see the Introduction to this study, p. 9, fn. 20.
have regular class sessions, classes which separated students by age and ability, and classrooms divided evenly into rows facing the teacher.

Some features of the state’s approach to Muslim educational reform, notably the study of Russian, overlapped with the educational projects outlined by Gasprinskii and other jadids. However, tsarist officials tended to be suspicious of jadids. Despite the efforts of jadids to teach Russian, officials in the Russian government generally viewed the actions of the jadids as harmful to the interests of the state. One reason for this was because the jadids were also committed supporters, particularly after 1905, of greater Muslim control over the Muslim institutions of administration, and over Muslim educational institutions in particular. Moreover, from 1905 onwards, jadids also dominated the leadership of the nascent Itifak movement, and as such developed a political rivalry of sorts with the Muslim spiritual assemblies, who were the preferred means of the Russian state for communicating with its Muslim populations. Indeed, during the years which followed the 1905 Revolution, jadids both famous and unknown became engaged in a number of disputes not only with the spiritual assembly leadership, but also with many people from Muslim communities more generally. Furthermore, after the 1908 Unionist (or “Young Turk”) takeover in the Ottoman Empire, jadid figures were increasingly suspected by Russian authorities of propagating “pan-Islamist” or “pan-Turkist” ideologies. This view became far more widespread in Russia after Muslim opponents of the jadids undertook a campaign to denounce jadid and Itifak leaders to the Russian authorities as “pan-Islamist” and “pan-Turkic” agitators.

4 See Chapter 4 of this study, especially pp. 143, 144, 148-149, 154, 157-158, 161.
5 See chapters 1 and 2.
Education and the state

Educational reform had been a growing concern of modernizing states across the world for several decades. In the Ottoman Empire, first the men of the tanzimat 6 and then the Hamidian government took steps to modernize, centralize and standardize public education.7 During the period of the tanzimat reforms a number of new educational institutions were created for the learning of foreign languages and training of bureaucrats. In the reign of Abdülhamid II, meanwhile, major educational reforms were implemented from 1879 onwards.8 In many schools, curricula focusing upon the study of literacy became increasingly common, and by the end of the nineteenth century Ottoman education institutions were widely admired by Muslim jadidist reformers in Russia, for whom these schools often served as an inspiration and model.9 The Russian government, meanwhile, adopted during these years a number of new regulations standardizing and centralizing schools not only for Muslims, but indeed for all subjects of the Russian Empire.10

Debates within Russian Muslim communities over education often resembled those of other confessional communities of the Russian and Ottoman empires. Christian and Jewish communities in the Ottoman Empire, for example, became increasingly polarized from the 1860s onwards over controversies concerning the question of “traditional” versus “modern” education. Indeed, the Ottoman government granted

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6 On the tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire, Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, especially 52-171.
7 Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 9-10, 12. Karpat, Politicization of Islam, 98-100.
8 The Regulation of General Education (Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi) was enacted in 1879 but not carried out until ten years later. Karpat, Politicization of Islam, 99.
9 Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 22, 36.
10 See, for example, A.M. Lipchanskii, Stanovlenie v Rossii obshcheogo massovogo shkol’nogo obrazovания v period sozial’no-ekonomicheskih preobrazovanii: 1861-1941 gg. opyt, uroki (Astrakhan, 2001), 68-131. Also see T.G. Kiseleva, Narodnoe obrazovanie i prosveshchение v Rossii: real’nost’ i nify (Moscow, 2002), 22-42.
constitutions to the Armenian and Greek Orthodox millets in the Ottoman Empire as a mechanism for deciding issues pertaining to education and leadership issues, partly because these issues had become so divisive that the Ottoman government wished to divest itself of it. In this respect, the approach of Ottoman authorities to confessional education differed from that of the Russian government, as the Russian government was determined to bring Muslim schooling more closely in line with that of the empire more generally.

Between the 1830s and 1870, there were a handful of efforts by the Russian government to establish Russian-language educational institutions for Muslims of the empire, but no comprehensive plan. Moreover, the total number of institutions throughout the empire was not high. In 1870, the same regulations which placed Muslim schools in the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly territories under the supervision of the Ministry of Education also provided for the creation of “Russian-Tatar” schools in areas of the empire where large numbers of Muslims lived. This attempt raising the level of Russian knowledge among Muslims in the empire was more systematic than previous ones had been, and resulted in the opening of a few dozen schools in the Volga region, the Crimea, and the Caucasus. The schools, however, attracted only small numbers of students. In the Volga region, the opening of these schools also generated considerable concern

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11 Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 115.
12 See Chapter 2.
13 A 1908 report by the Director of non-Russian schooling in the gubernia of Kazan wrote that there were eighteen Russian-Tatar schools in the province. See NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, l. 71. On Russian-Tatar schools, also see Krimli, National Movements, 28; Rorlich Volga Tatars, 44-45; Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 24; Geraci, Window on the East, 136-138.
14 In 1908, there was a total of eighteen Russian-Tatar schools in the gubernia of Kazan. NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, l. 71.
among Muslims, who frequently identified them with missionary schools being opened simultaneously in the region.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{The growth of jaddism}

Jaddism in Russia resembled cultural and intellectual movements taking place in Muslim communities throughout the Middle East and beyond in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Championing issues such as educational reform and the role of women in society, Muslim “modernists” in Cairo, Tehran, Bagdad, Damascus, and elsewhere discussed the unveiling of women, advancement of girls’ education, and other issues which are today generally understood through the term “Muslim modernism”.\textsuperscript{16}

The best known Muslim cultural reform figure in Russia was Ismail Gasprinskii. Gasprinskii not only wanted to change the manner of education through the teaching of literacy, but also the entire culture of Muslim education in Russia. While in traditional \textit{medreses}, children of varying ages and levels of education often worked in pairs or in groups with the teacher being assisted by various older students, in Gasprinskii’s ideal classroom children sat in rows facing a teacher who stood before them in front of a blackboard.\textsuperscript{17} Not only did Gasprinskii and other jadids advocate the regulation of space, however, they also believed in the division of the day into specific time ‘periods’, each of which would be devoted to a particular lesson according to a schedule. This was the “modern” way, argued Gasprinskii, and according to him and other jadid leaders, Muslim

\textsuperscript{15} On Nikolai Il’minskii’s missionary schools, see Chapter 2 of this study.
\textsuperscript{16} See, for example, Akram Fouad Khater’s discussion of Christian Lebanese reformist publicists in the United States, \textit{Inventing Home}, especially 93-105. Also see, for example, essays written by Muslim modernists in Indonesia, India, and elsewhere in Charles Kurzman, editor, \textit{Modernist Islam: a sourcebook, 1840-1940} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Khater (ed.), \textit{Sources in the history of the modern Middle East}, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), especially 66-111. Also see Lazzerini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii”, 144-170; Karpat, \textit{Politization of Islam}, 175, 199-205.
\textsuperscript{17} Lazzerini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii”, 188.
communities needed to either adapt to this work or lead Russian Muslims even further down the path of “ignorance”.

In the 1880s and 1890s, Gasprinskii traveled frequently across the Crimea, the Volga region, and Central Asia in his efforts to popularize new method education. Elsewhere, other jadids, such as Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Galimcan Barudi and Musa Bigi, opened schools in the Volga region, mostly in urban areas, such as Kazan, Chistopol, and Orenburg. In the Caucasus, meanwhile, a small number of new method schools were opened in the largest of cities, such as Tbilisi, Baku, and Yerevan. By 1895, Gasprinskii estimated there existed a little over 100 new method schools in all of Russia.

It was only after the October Manifesto of 1905 that the number of new method schools in Russia began to grow rapidly. In 1909, for example, the director of Tatar, Bashkir, and Kyrgyz education in the gubernia of Kazan wrote that the “fermentation” (brozhenie) of new method education in the gubernia had begun in earnest only in 1906. In the uezd of Chistopol, where several new method schools had recently been established, he wrote that new method education had started there only “recently, about 3-4 years ago.” In the south Caucasus as well, there were relatively few new method schools opened prior to 1905, and almost all of the ones which had existed were located in urban settings. In 1901, for example, the Governor of the gubernia of Baku reported to the Minister of Interior that the entire new method movement in the Caucasus consisted of “a number of Muslims in the city of Baku.” Outside of Baku, he wrote, there

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21 Which liberalized laws concerning the non-Russian language press in Russia. See Chapter 4 of this study.
22 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, ll. 68-71.
was just one new method school in the entire gubernia.\textsuperscript{23} While the number of schools teaching literacy in the Caucasus would also grow considerably after 1905, these were not all "jadid" schools per se, as they were often traditional schools which had agreed to allow a professional teacher to teach reading on a part-time basis.\textsuperscript{24}

The opening of new method schools was facilitated after 1905 by the types of community organization that became possible only in the wake of the October Manifesto. Overnight, Russian subjects of all faiths were given the right to organize committees, publish brochures and newspapers, hold public meetings, create reading rooms and libraries, and undertake other types of organized activity which previously required government permission. While Ismail Gasprinskii had appealed for more than two years during the 1880s for permission to publish a newspaper,\textsuperscript{25} after the October Manifesto such permission became, for most newspapers, a mere formality.\textsuperscript{26} Likewise, the creation of schools, reading rooms, libraries and other institutions, as well as the holding meetings in support of such endeavors, became considerably easier after 1905.\textsuperscript{27}

In the years following 1905, a number of older schools also began to adopt, at least in part, teaching methods according to new method principles. Of the thirteen new method schools reported to be operating in Astrakhan and the Kyrgyz steppe in 1913, for example, seven had opened in the first half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{28} However, even as the number of new method schools grew,\textsuperscript{29} many of these schools were considered to be

\textsuperscript{23} ADTA, f. 45, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 34-36.
\textsuperscript{24} See later in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{25} Lazzarini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii," 14-18.
\textsuperscript{26} See Chapter 5 of this study.
\textsuperscript{27} RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 473; f. 821, op. 133, d. 474.
\textsuperscript{28} RGIA, f. 821, op., 133, d. 466, l. 283.
\textsuperscript{29} This can be understood in a number of ways. Firstly, when government officials first became interested in the activities of the jadid movement in 1908-1909, provincial educational officials were asked to find out
“new method” in name only. Indeed, this was a frequent complaint of many new method figures such as Abdürrüşid İbrahimov, who wrote that many young teachers who were committed to teaching literacy through the new method were nevertheless untrained and ineffective.  

New elites

1905 not only facilitated the growth of the new method movement, but also placed a number of individuals associated with this movement in new positions of power and authority. An example of one such individual is Fatih Kerimi (1870-1937). A native of the village of Bugul, near Chistopol, Kerimi was the son of a village mullah and himself was a teacher licensed through the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. Following the completion of his education in Istanbul, Kerimi spent the first half of the 1890s in Crimea, where he worked as a teacher in a number of schools and wrote his novella, *Mirza Kizi Fatma*.  

In the latter half of the 1890s, Kerimi became increasingly associated with the philanthropic and educational activities of the Hüseyinov family of Kargali, a village close to the city of Orenburg. During the summers from 1896 to 1898, Kerimi operated a teacher training course financed by Gani bey Hüseyinov, a project designed to train new method teachers in the area. This led to Kerimi’s permanent relocation to Orenburg, where he would become involved in a number of projects sponsored by the Hüseyinov brothers and other philanthropists sympathetic to the jadidist cause. These projects

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30 Hayat, “Bize ait”, November 11, 1905. Also see Gani Bey, 48.
32 Most notably Şakir and Zakir Rəmiev. See Chapter 4 of this study.
included not only continued efforts to train new method teachers and open new method schools, but also a number of publishing ventures. In 1901, Kerimi’s father opened the Kitaphane-i Kerimi, a publishing house and bookstore opened and supported with the financial support of Gani Bey Hüseyinov. From 1906 onwards, Kerimi was editor of the Orenburg-based newspaper Vakit, perhaps the most widely read and influential of all Muslim newspapers to appear in the Volga region during this time.

Kerimi did not possess the wealth or the official position that would have ordinarily given him a position of power in pre-1905 Volga Muslim communities. Among Muslim communities in the region in the late nineteenth century, almost all of the individuals receiving an audience with the provincial governor, for example, were either senior spiritual personnel or else representatives of older families which had long held positions in the civil and spiritual administration of the region. In this respect, Kerimi was a man of the revolution. Like Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Said-Girey Alkin and others, prior to 1905 Kerimi had lived a privileged but not terribly influential life in the community. He neither held the sort of official position that would enable him to discuss issues with tsarist officials, nor did he have access to the means of communication that would allow him to address a mass Muslim audience.

After 1905, however, Kerimi became a far more powerful and influential figure. Playing an active role in the İttifak party, the political party which was created by İsmail Gasprinskii and his associates in 1906, Kerimi frequently corresponded and discussed political strategy with İttifak figures like Sadri Maksudi, İsmail Gasprinskii, Şakir

33 See Chapter 2.
34 This movement actually began in late 1904, but did not become a political party until 1906. See Chapter 4, pp. 166-167.
Tukaev, and others. Moreover, Kerimi’s close association with wealthy new method supporters such as Gani and Ahmet Hüseyinov and Zakir Râmiev also placed him in a position of influence regarding the financing of various cultural initiatives. Kerimi was not only editor of the most widely distributed Turkic-language newspaper in the Volga region, he was also in a position to dispense employment to unemployed teachers, publish or not publish articles sent into him by aspiring publicist-jadids, support the use of Hüseyinov money for various causes, and report on the pages of Vakit the stories he saw fit to print.

As was the case for most of his colleagues in İttifak and in the movement for cultural reform more generally, Kerimi’s community was that of the “millet” and was most frequently articulated to constitute “Tatars”, “Muslims”, or “All-Russian Muslims”. Petitioners appealing for assistance from Kerimi would likewise invoke the rhetoric of the “community” (millet) in making their case. Indeed, just as generations of petitioners writing to the spiritual assemblies had emphasized the “Islamic” nature of the arguments they made, individuals contacting Kerimi preferred to stress the importance of the task they were proposing to the “community”, or “millet”. In March of 1908, for example, the Kazan jadid Habib Zebiri wrote to Kerimi to discuss what he described as “both a community (milli) and a material (maddi) issue.” Zebiri wanted Kerimi to provide

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35 See, for example, Letter from Sadri Maksudov to Fatih Kerimi, November 29, 1909, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 95; Letter from Shakir Tukaev to Fatih Kerimi, February 18, 1908, NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 7-13.

36 The term ‘milli’ is almost always translated as ‘national’, while the term ‘millet’ is most usually rendered as ‘nation’. At times, it is clear, particularly among the publicists such as Akçura and Ağaoğlu, that use of the term ‘millet’ is often meant to reflect ‘nation’, and in many cases in their writing the word ‘nation’ is written in parentheses after the word ‘millet’ appears. At other times, however, translating ‘millet’ as ‘nation’ can be quite misleading, particularly in instances when the ‘millet’ being invoked bears no resemblance to what Akçura and Ağaoğlu would have called a ‘nation’. Indeed, Akçura and Ağaoğlu frequently used the term ‘millet’ to refer to various communities, including ‘Tatars’, ‘Caucasian Muslims’, ‘Russian Muslims’, and ‘Turks’. Most frequently, these publicists would use the term “milliye” to mean “nation”, and “millet” to mean “community”. See, for example, p. 189 of this study, footnotes 22, 24, and 25. Also see Chapter 5 of this study, p. 209, footnote 114.
financial support to Abdullah Tukai, a struggling poet who, after his death in 1913, would be celebrated as the “Tatar Pushkin”. Zebiri suggested Kerimi provide writing work for Tukai, so that he could support himself by publishing in Vakit or Şura, a literary journal that was also sponsored by the Hüseyinovs.  

Other types of request likewise invoked the community. In 1908, Bekir Emekdar from Yalta contacted Kerimi to ask for financial support. One of İsmail Gasprinskii’s earliest and longest-serving supporters, Emekdar had taught in new method schools in Bahçesaray and Kasimov from the 1880s onwards. Having retired from teaching, Emekdar was now destitute. Bemoaning his current financial difficulties, Emekdar wrote that when he had had the chance to earn money in his youth, he had “only thought about the community (millet) and never paid any attention to my own future.” Emekdar wanted Kerimi to run an announcement in Vakit explaining the struggles of old jadids. He then hoped that Kerimi would organize a campaign in Vakit to raise money for him and other retired new method teachers. “I have served the community (millet) for many years,” wrote Emekdar, “and I am still awaiting the community’s reply.”

In March of 1909, Kerimi received a letter from an imam in the city of Tiumen named Selim Giray bin Khayri al-din Gabidov. Gabidov was a new method teacher who had spent nearly two years on the educational front lines working as a teacher in village schools outside Penza and Tiumen. Like so many other of Kerimi’s correspondents, Gabidov articulated his hopes and plans using the metaphor of the “community” (millet), a language he and Kerimi used to refer to a broad, yet undefined, collective. In the case of Gabidov, “usefulness to the community” (milletning faydasi) was presented as a top

37 NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 21-22.  
38 On Emekdar, also see Kirmil, National Movements, 48-49, 52-53.  
39 Letter from Bekir Emekdar to Fatih Kerimi, October 4, 1908, NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 68-69.
priority, even as the community he found himself in rejected many of his offers to help. Those who rejected Gabidov were thus described in his letter as “enemies of the community” (milletke dushmanar).  

In his letter, Gabidov described his personal background at length, writing in detail about the trials he had endured in attempting to open new method schools in Penza and Tiumen. After studying at medrese, Gabidov had worked briefly alongside one Mullah Kazamcani at a new method school in Kazan. After this school closed down, Gabidov was unable to find employment in Kazan and took a job at a school in Penza sponsored by the Akçurins of Simbirsk. In Penza he had worked as a new method teacher but before long a coalition of “old rich people” (kart baylar) and “old mullahs who were trying to close the school” managed to convince enough people to withdraw their children, forcing the school to shut. From Penza Gabidov traveled to Tiumen, where some figures in the community had invited him to open a school. There, despite at least one frightening incident in which he had been descended upon by a mob of forty-fifty people demanding he leave town, Gabidov had attained some measure of success. He had developed seven groups of students and was earning a living that was sufficient for village life, earning between five and ten rubles per month. One parent, he said, had given him twenty kopecks per month to teach four children, while others paid him in cash or in kind for other lessons. Meanwhile, Gabidov’s wife also taught three classes of girls, bringing in still more money.

Once again, however, hostility from the community forced Gabidov to close his school. At this point, a man named Sabrican Efendi, a wealthy individual in the

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40 NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 21-23.  
41 Letter from Salimgirey Gabidov to Fatih Kerimi, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 21-22.  
42 This is the family of Yusuf Akçurin, later Akçura. See Chapter 2, p. 65.
community, donated the sum of 120 rubles to open a library and reading room in Tiumen, a project Gabidov was made responsible for organizing. While Gabidov seemed content with his new responsibilities, he had questions that no one in Tiumen could answer. Fatih Kerimi, he reasoned, was the right person to ask.

1) Does it make sense to open a charity, library, or reading room in a place like Tiumen, where there aren’t very many Muslims?
2) Is it appropriate to put the library and reading room in the mosque?
3) Is it necessary to have the education of a kadi in order to run a library or reading room?
4) Are mullahs allowed to operate a library and reading room?
5) Is it necessary to get a prigovor?
6) What are the ustavy for the charity, the library, and the reading room, and where can we get them?  

Other people would write Kerimi looking for work. In 1908, for example, a man in Istanbul wrote Kerimi to tell him of a recent graduate of the dar il-‘fiynun there who had married a Tatar girl and was in need of employment. The anonymous letter writer entreated Kerimi to “recommend the young man to a rich person in Russia,” who could find him employment as a teacher. Receiving such a request was hardly unusual for someone like Fatih Kerimi. Indeed, Yusuf Akçura would also shortly thereafter write Kerimi with a similar request, as did others from as far afield as Turkestan, Bukhara, and beyond in order to recommend themselves or others for teaching positions.

Kerimi’s role as a transmitter of the news also invested him with a particular kind of status and power. Much as people across Russia had been doing with Gasprinskii’s

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43 An “ustav” is a form which needed to be filled out in order to set up a charitable organization. NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 21-23.
44 NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 23-24.
46 NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 61-62; f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 63-65.
Tercüman since the 1880s, individuals frequently wrote to larger newspapers like Vakit, Kazan Mukhibiri, Beyan ul-Hak, Hayat, and Irşad in order to report the news and get their articles into print. Letters like this could, meanwhile, be combined with other requests or questions. In 1909, for example, Abdulrahman Saidev wrote to Kerimi from Turkestan. The first part of his letter describes difficulties encountered by jadids in Bukhara in opening new method schools.

Dear Fatih! No schools have opened in Bukhara. The Emir doesn’t even mention it. The Sarts are afraid. Although there is some desire for “new method” schools to be opened, people are afraid to petition the Emir for this. In other news, articles in the newspapers are having a definite impact. The ulema isn’t interested in telling the newspapers about their own faults.\(^47\)

Saidev continued in this vein for two more paragraphs before concluding that “it wouldn’t be a bad idea if articles relating to Bukhara appear on the pages of Vakit.” This, indeed, was how Vakit acquired much of its material regarding Muslim communities elsewhere in the empire. Saidev wanted Kerimi to “say everything to the whole world” about the situation in Bukhara. This, he hoped, would pressure the emir to allow new method schools to open. Finally, Saidev also needed to order books from Kerimi. “We’d asked about some books from Istanbul”, he wrote. “We’ll take them”.

Others wrote in to Kerimi to register protest, such as when a group of jadid sympathizers from Kokand wrote to express their disgust at Din ve Maişet. “At a time when we must quickly engage the most important tasks facing us, when we cannot afford to waste a single minute of these important days.” The supporters of Din ve Maişet, they wrote, were “dividing the public in two” with their “perpetuation of consciousnessless wars”

\(^47\) Letter from Abdulrahman Saidov to Fatih Kerimi, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 88-89.
against jadids and their supporters. The writers of the letter asked Kerimi to publish their letter as a "declaration of loathing" (ilan-i nefret).\textsuperscript{48}

\textit{Student protests}

While Volga Muslims did not in large part participate in anti-tsarist demonstrations during the 1905 revolution, significant protests did occur among Muslim students studying in medreses across the gubernia, but mostly in Kazan and Ufa. In late 1905 and early 1906, fifty students from the Aliye Medrese in Ufa and eighty-five students from the Hüseyiniye Medrese in Orenburg were expelled for having participated in strikes, and protests continued sporadically through 1914.\textsuperscript{49}

Quality of education was a principal concern to the protesters. In 1905, for example, a group of twenty khulfe and bez kademner\textsuperscript{50} at the prestigious Apanaev Medrese in Kazan wrote in a petition that, "while at the time of its establishment ours was the greatest and most prestigious of medreses in Kazan," educational standards had, in more recent years, slipped considerably.\textsuperscript{51} The petitioners were particularly concerned about improving the material conditions of students. The first complaint on the petition reflected this concern.

First of all—the medrese’s building is much too small for the number of students studying here. Because the building is so small, every year students come here to study, but are not accepted and then are actually forced back onto the streets in pitiful conditions. As for us, khulfe and

\textsuperscript{48} Letter from “Kokand Muslims” to Fatih Kerimi, undated, NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, l. 26.
\textsuperscript{49} Rorlich, \textit{The Volga Tatars}, 94.
\textsuperscript{50} Khulfe and bez kademner were older students who assisted in the education of the younger students.
\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, the issue of irregular and lackadaisical standards in supposedly new method schools, and of schools that were ‘new method’ in name only, was something that was often discussed in the jadidist press by a number of figures, most notably Abdürreşid İbrahimov. See “Bize ait,” \textit{Hayat} 97, June 8, 1905. Also see “Bize ait,” \textit{Hayat} 53, August 19, 1905.
beşkademner, we sleep four to a room while the others\textsuperscript{52} sleep six to a room.\textsuperscript{53}

In its discussion regarding the physical condition of the building, the petition also complained that the “air” was bad, “so bad that someone used to living elsewhere would never be able to stand it here.” This problem, combined with the fact that the rooms of the khulfe and beş kademner were used as classrooms during the day for the youngest children at the medrese, made for generally unhealthy conditions in the school.\textsuperscript{54} Topping things off, the smaller children in the school made so much noise that the petitioners found it impossible to concentrate when studying.

The khulfe and beş kademner were also unhappy with the amount of work they were expected to do in helping the younger students with their studies. Because they were obliged to work with the younger children all day, they wrote, they often had trouble finding time for their own studies. Finally, the petitioners were concerned about the reputation of their medrese in the eyes of the neighborhood and community. In recent years, they wrote, community members in the neighborhood had begun to complain about students not doing their studies and instead “hanging around unoccupied in the streets.” Arguing that a new building needed to be constructed for the school, the petitioners wrote that “şäkerts\textsuperscript{55} are forced to roam the streets in shame under the gaze of our Muslim brothers because there is no place to study in the school.” \textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{52} Younger students at the medrese.
\textsuperscript{53} KGU, Document T-1399.
\textsuperscript{54} This complaint of ‘bad air’ might be a reference to the mosquito-infested Bulaga canal, located only a few blocks away from the Apanaev medrese.
\textsuperscript{55} Medrese students.
\textsuperscript{56} The newspaper Kazan Mukhbir also published an article in 1906 in which it complained about rowdy medrese students making a bad impression on the community neighboring their medreses. See “Kazan Möselmanları và şäkertlär,” Kazan Mukhbir 63, April 5, 1906.
In the final decades of the nineteenth century, a number of new method *medreses* had been opened in Kazan and elsewhere in the Volga region. These *medreses* created graduates who could often find employment only at other “new method” schools, meaning that an ever greater number needed to be created to keep graduates employed. After 1905, opening more “new method” *medreses* became a chief concern for both the *Ittifak* party and philanthropists like Ahmet Bey Hüseyinov. Meanwhile, *medrese* students became frequently seen figures at the meetings and congresses leading up to the creation of *Ittifak* in 1904 and 1905. Often supporting socialist and social democratic parties, the students frequently outlasted their welcome at these meetings, where they were sometimes violently and repeatedly shouted down.\(^{57}\) In late 1905 and early 1906, moreover, protests flared up once again among Muslim students at a number of schools in Kazan and elsewhere. Again, these protests were prompted by student complaints regarding both their physical circumstances and the quality of education they had been receiving.\(^{58}\)

**Economics and prestige**

The growing number of *medrese* graduates looking for work as teachers exacerbated problems concerning the often miserable economic conditions of rural teachers, many of whom were spiritual personnel in the Orenburg Assembly. The village imam was often no better off financially than the rest of the community and was often dependent upon material and other types of assistance from the villagers, who did not always live up to agreements they had made with teachers to pay them in kind. In April

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\(^{57}\) Prior to the First All-Russian Muslim Congress in Nizhni Novgorod in 1905, students were told to arrive at nine o’clock in the morning in order to board the *Gustav Struve*. The ship actually embarked at eight o’clock, leaving the students out of the congress. The students managed to procure a rowboat, however, and boarded the ship on the condition they would not cause trouble. See Chapter 4 of this study.

of 1900, for example, the Orenburg authorities in Ufa received a petition from one Abdullah who was working as a licensed akhund in the uezd of Orenburg. Abdullah, who had been working in the village since 1893, wrote that as the inhabitants of his village were too poor to pay him for his teaching and other services, he had reached an agreement with them whereby he could grow crops on one-half desiatina of land. On this land, according to the agreement, he would be able to harvest forty-five pud of wheat in order to help feed himself, his wife, and seven children.

In recent months, however, a group of rowdies had begun to taunt Abdullah with words “forbidden by the Sharia.” Now, he wrote, they were sneaking into his fields and stealing his wheat, despite the fact that one of the villagers in question was harvesting nearly 500 pud per year from his own fields. Without either financial or material support from the village, Abdullah feared for how he would feed his family.59 These fears were, indeed, shared by many spiritual personnel, most of whom received no fixed salary from the assembly. In 1905, Müfti Soltanov sent out an appeal to the Orenburg Assembly in an effort to raise money for hungry imams.60 In 1909, meanwhile, Soltanov again asked for assistance from the government and received an extra 50,000 rubles in his budget in order to channel money to spiritual personnel whose families were going hungry.61

While spiritual personnel in villages often subsisted on charity or less than a few rubles per month, new method teachers frequently earned substantially higher wages. As one bureaucrat in the Department of Spiritual Affairs observed in 1910, “Unlike teachers in traditional (“old method”, or starometodnyi) schools, all of the teachers (in new

60 KGU, Document T-1623
61 KGU, Document T-1235, Also see “Imamlarin haline bir nazar”, Din ve Maiset 16, May 4, 1907, 253-254.
method schools) receive a predetermined salary, ranging from 100 to 700 rubles per year, or even more, depending on the specific qualifications and experience of the teacher.\(^{62}\)

By contrast, after the müfti, the highest paid personnel in the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly received a salary of 800 rubles in 1909, with several of the ruling officers of the Assembly earning 400 rubles or less per year.\(^{63}\)

The grandiose salaries of new method teachers were often more imagined than real, and many new method teachers lived on incomes every bit as meager as those of traditional schools.\(^{64}\) Yet many new method teachers, particularly those working at new medreses opened by wealthy philanthropists, often did earn salaries of several hundred rubles per year. Salaries among teachers at the medrese Hüseyniye in Kargali, established by Ahmet Bey Huseynov in 1903, averaged 336 rubles per year in 1903-1905, and almost 400 rubles per year in 1913-1914.\(^{65}\) A 1908 job advertisement for teachers at the new method Medrese-yi Osmaniye in Ufa offered monthly salaries ranging from 10-25 rubles, depending on the applicant’s qualifications.\(^{66}\) Philanthropists such as the Huseynov brothers also provided stipends for other types of new method activities, such as paying 500 rubles for the writing of new method textbooks.\(^{67}\) Meanwhile, Russia attracted a large number of teachers who had been educated in the Ottoman Empire. While many of these teachers were actually Russian subjects who had lived in the

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\(^{62}\) RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 626, l. 12.

\(^{63}\) RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 625, ll. 13-14. Reports on new method schools written by various branches of tsarist administration generally estimated the salaries of teachers as between 200 and 600 rubles per year. See NART, f. 160, op. 1, d. 1576, l. 3.

\(^{64}\) For descriptions of the often miserable financial conditions of new method teachers, see, for example, KSU, Document T-1600. A petition circulated by Rizaeddin Fahreddin at the April 10, 1905 Ufa meeting chaired by Mifti Soltanov envisioned pegging the salaries of teachers associated with the Orenburg Assembly at 240 rubles per year, Islahat Esasları, 76.


\(^{66}\) Mağlumat 15, August 15, 1908, p. 333.

\(^{67}\) Rakhimkulova, Medrese “Khusainitа” v Orenburge, 9-10.
Ottoman Empire during the course of their education (or longer), others were Ottoman subjects who had moved to Russia in search of better employment prospects.  

**Opposition to the reform movement**

Scholarly literature focusing upon the early twentieth century history of Volga Muslims frequently discusses opposition to the jadids mainly in terms of "kadimism". "kadimism" is usually presented in this literature as if it were the sort of coherent intellectual ideology that jadids saw "jadidism" as being. In nearly all of the historical literature discussing Muslim politics during the parliamentary period, "kadims" and "kadimism" are presented as a "camp" opposed to the "jadist" camps, with the two groups engaging in debates in the periodical press. In this context, *Din ve Maṣṣet* is presented as the emblematic journal of "kadimism".  

However, opposition to jadidism and İttifak did not always take an overtly "intellectual" form. Indeed, many Muslims opposed to jadidism resented what they saw as the jadids' tendency to monopolize the concept of "progress". Others resented the cultural intrusion of the jadids and regretted their loss of "cultural capital". Many others were threatened economically by jadids and jihadism. In 1909, many spiritual personnel and teachers in the Volga region had been in desperate straits for years, and famine occurred regularly. In this context, the appearance of new method teachers, often

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68 On more long-term stays and travels between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, see Meyer, "Immigration, return, and the politics of citizenship". Many graduates of Ottoman schools ended up teaching in Russia. For the memoirs of an Ottoman Turk who traveled to Russia to find employment as a teacher, see A. Kemal İlikul, *Türkistan ve Çin Yollarında Unutulamayan Hısrular* (Istanbul: Zərif İş Matbaası, 1955).  
69 On kadimism as an intellectual ‘camp’, see Korlich, *The Volga Tatars*, 88-90; Lazzerini, “İsmail Bey Gasprinskii”, 24-29; Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaidjan*, 30-31. İbrahim Maraş correctly points out that "kadims" did not use this name among themselves, and that rather the term was generally used as an epithet. See İbrahim Maraş, *Türk Dünyasında Dini Yenileşme (1850-1917)*, 22.  

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sponsored by local merchants and other jadid sympathizers, often represented a threat to
the very survival of teachers struggling to make ends meet.\textsuperscript{71}

Jadids dominated the periodical press, and other than \textit{Din ve Mai\c{s}et}, the Muslim
periodical press rarely provided a voice to those critical of the new method movement
and its methods. There were, however, other avenues of appeal. One of these was the
Orenburg Assembly, which continued to function as an institution to which Muslims
could bring their complaints and a search for justice. In 1906, for example, an Imam
named Mehmed Zakir Abdürrahimoğlu from the village of Bik Shikte in the \textit{guberniia} of
Simbir, wrote to the Orenburg Assembly to complain that his students had been stolen
from him. While Abdürrahimoğlu had been in Ufa on business pertaining to the
assembly, he wrote, the village \textit{muezzin}, Mehmed Arif Alimoğlu, had set up a new
method school in his absence.

On the 18\textsuperscript{th} of January I traveled to a meeting in order to
take part in discussions pertaining to the Muslim people
(the Orenburg Assembly), where Imams for all over were
taking part. When I came back from this meeting, I found
that [Alimoğlu] had spread false rumors among the
villagers, telling them that I had been removed from my
position, and that permission had been granted to build a
new school.\textsuperscript{72}

Alimoğlu, wrote Abdürrahimoğlu, then set up his own school, where he taught
according to the new method. Even though Abdürrahimoğlu had by now returned to his
village, Alimoğlu’s school continued to operate. Abdürrahimoğlu had thus turned to the
Orenburg Assembly for assistance in closing down Alimoğlu’s school.

In a similar case in 1912, a three-man committee in the Orenburg Assembly ruled
on two complaints that had been made in 1909 regarding the teaching of an Imam

\textsuperscript{71} On famine relief in the region, see KGU, documents T-1235 and T-1163.
\textsuperscript{72} TsGIA RB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 205, l. 279.
Beyazitov at a medrese in the village of Sair-Novyi. The school in the village, it was explained in the ruling, had been constructed on the specific condition that new method education would not take place there. Habibullah Hüseyinov, an imam in the village, had already driven away two teachers for teaching in the new method in 1907 and 1908, and then attempted to drive away Beyazitov as well. In 1909, both Hüseyinov and his co-plaintiff, “the wife of İmankulov” (who was the widow of the previous teacher), appealed to the Orenburg Assembly to remove Beyazitov from the school. In his defense, Beyazitov acknowledged that he had indeed originally taught according to the new method. However, he said, he had switched to traditional methods of teaching in the face of opposition from the community. The assembly concluded that, while “it is not the place for the Orenburg Assembly to determine the correct style of education for children, the complaints of Hüseyinov and the wife of İmankulov do not appear to be well founded,” and ruled that Beyazitov should be allowed to stay at the school.73

On some occasions, tensions were created within a community when jadids attempted to open a new method school in a community where a school already existed. In the Crimean city of Karasubazar, for example, an organization calling itself the “Muslim charitable organization of Karasubazar” requested permission from the Simferopol inspector for non-Russian education to open a new method mektep “with the goal of teaching Russian language.” The school, they wrote, would be located in the building where a government operated Russian-Tatar school currently existed.74 Students attending the existing school, it was envisioned, would become students at the new jadid school.

73 TsGIA RB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 523, especially ll. 152-159.
74 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, l. 87.
In response, a group of twenty-three “Tatar residents of the city of Karasubazar” petitioned the inspector in opposition to these plans, arguing that they could not afford to pay money for their children’s education, something which was required at the new method school. The fees demanded by the school, they argued, were too expensive and would “serve only a small portion (neznachitel’naia chast’) of the population.” In October, supporters of the new method school wrote again to the inspector. Pointing out that their numbers represented “all fifteen Tatar parishes (prikhod) of the city of Karasubazar,” the petitioners argued that “the complaints don’t have any basis” and that “the community is very pleased by the opening of the new method schools by the Muslim Charitable Society.”

In addition to appealing to civil and spiritual authorities, Muslims undertook denunciation campaigns in which they reported to police, either in person or anonymously, that new method teachers were secretly spreading “pan-Turkist” or “pan-Islamist” propaganda. In August of 1908, a petition signed by twelve “licensed” (ukazannyi) imams from the Orenburg Assembly was sent to the Minister of the Interior. The imams were complaining about what they described as the “revolutionary activities” of new method teachers in the area. Emphasizing the special relationship shared between the Russian government and the regional spiritual authorities in the definition and policing of “Islam”, the imams began their petition by invoking the reliability and loyalty of the Orenburg authorities.

We Muslims pray every Friday for the long life both of our great Tsar and for its excellence the Russian government to which we are subjects. How could we not pray, given the

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73 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, ll. 79-81.
76 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, ll. 83-87.
77 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 55-56.
fact that our great leader has granted us full freedom in our religious activities? He created the spiritual assembly for the appointment of imams, for the construction of mosques and medreses, and for the regulation of our religious affairs.  

"In recent years" wrote the mullahs, "a number of teachers belonging to revolutionary organizations" had appeared in their villages. "Though they are ostensibly undertaking a religious duty", they wrote, "in fact they are turning the Tatar population against the Russian government." The twelve mullahs wrote that the new Medrese-i Muhammediye of Kazan, one of the best known new method medreses in the region, "is producing teachers who teach children according to the new method, who train them by filling their blood with hatred for the government."

The complaints of the twelve licensed mullahs seem to have been designed to place the question of new method education in a context that would attract as much attention as possible among security-conscious tsarist authorities. The mullahs wrote that teachers who studied at the Medrese-i Muhammediye wanted to say the Friday prayer in Tatar, "in accordance with the plan of the Young Turks and Persian mullahs." The twelve mullahs also wrote that these teachers:

[W]ant to put the [Orenburg] Spiritual Assembly into Muslim hands (v ruki musul'man) and, having taken the Assembly out of the hands of the government, then hold elections for the position of müfti and for the kadis because they want to carry out through the assembly evil undertakings such as the publication by the assembly of newspapers and journals with the aim of creating evil in Tatar society.  

The twelve mullahs named names, giving the first and last names of ten Muhammediye graduates as well as the village and uezd in which they lived. The mullahs

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78 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, l. 45-56.
79 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, l. 55-56.
requested that the government force the Orenburg Assembly to stop allowing graduates of the Medrese-i Muhammediye to teach in schools and that the government permit the Friday prayer to be read only in Arabic “just as prayers are read for Orthodox Christians in Slavonic.”

This was the first of what would ultimately constitute a wide-scale campaign of secret denunciations about new method figures in the Volga region, most of which were organized by an imam in the village of Tiunter (in the gubernia of Viatka) named İsməhəmmət Dinməhəmmət (1849-1919). Dinməhəmmət, also known as İsmi İşan, was the author of a number of pamphlets denouncing new method teaching, and the new method Bubi medrese of Tiunter in particular. From 1909 to 1911, individual Muslims, most frequently licensed mullahs from the Orenburg Assembly working in villages across the gubernia of Kazan, wrote letters and, more frequently, visited police stations, to personally grant depositions denouncing their new method rivals. In these depositions, they claimed that new method figures, both famous and of purely local renown, were pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists plotting to territorially separate Muslim lands from the Russian Empire. Some of these denunciations (donosy), like the one submitted in 1908 by the twelve imams, incorporated the characteristics of jadidism into a broader argument concerning risks to the established order of things. Those which are associated with İsmi İşan, on the other hand, focused more closely upon jadidism. Some denunciations, in fact, focused exclusively upon the evils of jadidism for two or three paragraphs before finally

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80 İsməhəmmət Dinməhəmmət (1849-1919), better known as İsmi İşan, was a mullah who ran a school in the village of Tiunter. See “İsməhəmmət Dinməhəmmətəv,” Tatarstan Entsklopediya Süzlege, 202.
getting around to mentioning that the jadids in question were actually “pan-Turkists”, and therefore of danger to not only Muslim communities, but also the Russian state.81

Denunciations were made about both famous jadids and local new method medrese teachers. In 1911, for example, Ahmet Faiz Dautov and Mirsaid Ilunusov, both teachers in the village of Saropol, informed police rotminstr Budagoskii that among a group of people “spreading the idea of pan-Islamism” among Muslims were prominent jadid and lütfak figures such as Shakir Tukaev, Sadri Maksudi, Ali Merdan bey Topçibaşev, Yusuf Akçura, and Aliasgar Sırtlanov.82 Others denunciations implicated not only well-known jadids, but also recently graduated teachers from large jadid medreses such as the Galiev Medrese in Kazan and the Bubi Medrese of Tiunet.83

The individuals named in these denunciations were usually identified as having committed similar types of offenses. Usually, their alleged activities involved some sort of plan to entice Muslims to separate territorially from Russia. Samigulla Makhlisullin told a police officer in the guberniia of Viatka that some of the new method mullahs in Malmyszskii uezd were spreading rumors and agitation among Muslims in the region. The jadids, said, Makhlisullin, were telling people that “Muslims need to have their own ruler elected in three years by Muslims.” New method teachers, he charged, “want all Muslims to leave the subjection of the Russian Emperor and unite (soedinilis’ by) with Turkey.” 84 Meanwhile, a licensed mullah in the Orenburg Assembly named Bilal Muzafarov made a similar charge against Nazip Kamaleddinov, a new method teacher and mullah in the village of Musa Kabak. In his deposition to the police, Muzafarov

81 See, for example, NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, especially ll. 6 and 71. On complaints regarding the denunciations, see “Ulemaga garıza,” Beyan ul-hak 25 and “Mühim bir mesele,” Beyan ul-hak 32.
82 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 52; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 246; f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, l. 92; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 67.
83 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 17-18.
84 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 33-34.
implicated both his local rival, Kamaleddinov, as well as the well-known jadid Muhammadcan Galiev, who had been active in promoting new method education in Kazan since the 1880s.

Kamaleddinov had become familiar with the new method from a Mullah Galiev in Kazan, I can’t remember his first name. He says Tatars need to separate themselves from Russians. This came from the influence of the Kazan Mullah Galiev, who studied in Turkey, to which Galiev has traveled a number of times over an extended period of time.\footnote{NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 67. Other denunciations can be found in NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, l. 66; f. 199, op. 1, d. 785, ll. 98, 151, 153; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 58, 67, 69, 88, 99-101, 103, 114-115, 116-118, 251-261, 288-89, 323-324, 331-334, 336-346; f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, ll. 30, 83, 92.}

Indeed, while the denunciation campaigns were often directed against specific individuals (usually new method teachers) residing in or nearby the communities where those making the denunciations themselves lived, many of these denunciations also included the names of several figures from the İtişfak leadership. In early 1911, for example, an imam named Samigulla Mukhliśulin reported to the police that Abdullah Apanaev had been telling Muslims at the Muslim congresses that Russian Muslims “should live under the Turkish Sultan, not the Russian Tsar,” and that Abdullah Bubi advocated that Tatars elect a padişah of their own and separate from Russia.\footnote{NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 33-34.} In July of that year, İşmōhāmmāt Dinmōhāmmāt himself informed the police that “the main spreaders of pan-Islamist propaganda” were Abdürreşid İbrahimov, Sadrettin Maksudov, Galimcan Galiev, Abdullah Apanaev, Yusuf Akçura, Ali Merdan Bey Topçubaşev, the Bubi brothers, and Fatih Kerimi.\footnote{NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, l. 92.}
Jadidism and the Russian state

Having developed over the course of the nineteenth century a generally predictable working relationship with the Muslim spiritual authorities in Ufa, Tbilisi, and Simferopol, Russian bureaucrats felt little trust for jadid and Ittifak leaders who appeared to be challenging the assemblies for the right to speak in the name of Muslim communities. Various branches of the Russian state had spent the previous decades working with the assemblies on a number of issues, including emigration, the battle against heterodoxy and muridism, and the general administration of the empire’s Muslim communities. Now, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and especially in the wake of the rapid expansion of the jadid movement following the 1905 Revolution, jadidism struck many Russian bureaucrats as a threat to the established order of Russian Islam on lines similar to the threats thought to have been posed by earlier permutations of Russian Muslim “heterodoxy”.

At first glance, tsarist opposition to jadidism can appear misplaced, particularly given the fact that jadids tended to be strong supporters of Russian-language education in Muslim schools. Indeed, this was a position that the Russian government was trying to encourage among Muslims, but which in fact attracted few supporters among the Muslim communities of the empire. While the jadids could have emerged as important allies for the Russian government in encouraging Russian-language literacy among Muslims, tsarist officials distrusted the tendency of jadids to organize outside the control of the state. After 1905, moreover, the emergence of the Ittifak movement as a rival of sorts to the leadership of the Muslim spiritual assemblies (and the Orenburg Assembly in particular), further implicated the jadids in the eyes of tsarist officials. Indeed, what

88 See Chapter 1, pp. 42-46.
mattered more for tsarist officials than jadid support for the Muslim study of Russian was the shared history of cooperation between the state and the spiritual assemblies that had existed since the late eighteenth century. Moreover, many tsarist bureaucrats were of the (not entirely accurate) opinion that the leadership of the spiritual assemblies were “representatives of the old ways,” and therefore opposed to jadidism.

Denunciations concerning the alleged “pan-Turkist” and “pan-Islamist” activities of jadids thus corresponded perfectly to the fears of tsarist officials, who had grown to trust only the spiritual assemblies in their dealings with Muslim communities. Not surprisingly, these denunciations resulted in far-reaching police investigations and the arrest of many of the individuals they implicated. In 1911, the Bubi Medrese was shut down on suspicions that it had become a “pan-Islamist” breeding ground. Meanwhile, figures such as Galiev, Akçura, Fatih Kerimi, and many of the village medrese teachers named in the denunciations came under increased surveillance and investigation.

In the Caucasus, where no similar denunciation campaign took place, forwarded reports on “pan-Turkism” and ‘pan-Islamism’, and of cooperation between local jadids and the “Young Turks” in Istanbul, led local officials to begin looking for “pan-Turkists” and “pan-Islamists” of their own. Before long, they began to find them. This was the case even though jadidism in the Caucasus was far less pronounced than in the Volga region. In 1905, for example, the governor of the gubernia of Baku had been able to report that the entire reform movement in the province consisted of just “a number of Muslims

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89 “Prestavitel’ starodumov”.
90 ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 11, L. 22.
91 For investigations into Bubi, see NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 26-33; RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 84-94.
92 See, especially, NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 34, 37, 43, 55, 69, 76, 83, 175; f. 199, op. 1, d. 785, l. 109; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 44; f. 199, op. 1, d. 857, ll. 19, 39; f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, l. 67; f. 199, op. 1, d. 948, ll. 103, 263.
living in the city of Baku”, including Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev, and a handful of others.\(^93\) Within just a few years, however, tsarist bureaucrats in Baku were no less fearful of “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Islamism” than their colleagues in Kazan, the Crimea, Central Asia, and St. Petersburg, and were likewise taking measures to close down new method schools and limit the activities of their supporters.\(^94\)

Having paid relatively little attention to the question of “pan-Turkism” prior to 1908,\(^95\) the Russian Interior Ministry began requesting in earnest information about new method schools from officials working in the provinces. Initially, estimates of new method schools were often contradictory. In 1909, for example, officials in Orenburg indicated that there were no new method schools operating in their gubernia.\(^96\) In fact, the gubernia of Orenburg was one of the major centers of new method activity, and the Hüseyinov Medrese in the village of Kargalı, just outside of the city of Orenburg, had been one of the best known new method schools in the Volga region since it opened in 1905.\(^97\) Another report, written in 1909, stated that in the gubernia of Kazan there were only one hundred ninety-one new method schools out of a total of nine hundred and thirteen Muslim schools altogether.\(^98\) This contradicted the opinion of another report, also written in 1909, which stated that “up to 90% of all Muslim confessional schools [in the gubernia of Kazan] are currently run according to the new method.”\(^99\)

\(^{93}\) ADTA, f. 45, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 34-36.
\(^{94}\) See, for example, ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 28, ll. 127-128. On “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Islamism”, also see chapters 5 and 6 of this study.
\(^{95}\) While the term “pan-Turkism” had been used occasionally by European and Russian journalists and Orientalists, the use of these terms increased exponentially after the 1908 Unionist takeover in the Ottoman Empire and the denunciation campaign of 1909-1911.
\(^{96}\) See this report in RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 472, l. 49.
\(^{97}\) A 1912 report published in the Jadid journal Ang in 1913 reported that “there are more new method schools in the gubernia of Orenburg than anywhere else”. See Borhan Sherif, “Orenburg gubernasında müselmanın,” Ang, June 2, 1913, pp. 29-31.
\(^{98}\) RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 472, l. 49.
\(^{99}\) RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, l. 85.
Bureaucratic confusion regarding the number of new method schools operating in Russia was facilitated by the fact that a great number of Muslim schools, both new method and traditional, had been opened without official permission. In 1908, tsarist officials in the Crimea—working with the Crimean Mûfti—undertook a survey of schools in the *guberniiia* and found that in one of its *uezds* “only eight out of one hundred and twenty-six *mekteps* were operating with the permission of the Muslim spiritual assembly.” In August of 1910, meanwhile, the Crimean journal *Sotrudnik* wrote that there were “more than six hundred” unlicensed Muslim schools in the region. In 1912, a study on new method education in the *guberniiia* of Kazan found that the great majority of new method schools opened since the placement of Muslim schools under the authority of the Ministry of Education in 1870 had been opened illegally.

In order to counter the illegal opening of new method schools, Russian bureaucrats began placing special emphasis upon bringing Muslim education, and new method schools in particular, under increased government control. From 1909 onwards, the Russian government began closing down schools on the grounds that they had opened without official permission. At this time the Russian Interior Ministry and other branches of the security services also began stepping up efforts to identify teachers from the Ottoman Empire working in Muslim schools in Russia.

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100 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2360, ll. 190-192, 230-231. In the Crimea, unlike the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, schools were under the direct supervision of the Muslim spiritual assembly leadership.


102 NART, f. 160, op. 1, d. 1576, ll. 203-253.

103 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, ll. 7-9. For Muslim reactions to these closings, see RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 625; f. 821, op. 133, d. 469.

104 See, for example, *Sura* “Bugûnû mezelemiz,” 1909, No. 8, pp. 236-237.

105 See NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, ll. 1, 10, 67; ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 24-29, 61-62; RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 458; f. 821, op. 133, d. 463; f. 821, op. 133, d. 472; f. 821, op. 133, d. 625; f. 821, op. 133, d. 626; f. 821, op. 133, d. 629; f. 821, op. 133, d. 826. Also see GAARK, f. 706, op. 1, d. 329, dd. 6, 11, 29, 73.
In 1910 and 1911, the Foreign Ministry collected data on Muslim education from various European states. Foreign Ministry officials working in Paris, Calcutta, Romania, and elsewhere sent out questionnaires to British and French colonial officials, as well as to Austrian officials working in Bosnia. These questionnaires asked questions about the degree to which these governments supervised Muslim schools and how these governments fought against the influence of “pan-Islamism”. Meanwhile, the Russian Embassy in Istanbul filed two long reports on Christian and Jewish education in the Ottoman Empire.

The Russian Interior Ministry was particularly interested in the issue of unlicensed schools in the Ottoman Empire, and had one of the Orientalists in its Department of Spiritual Affairs translate an article on the July 1911 decision by the Ottoman government to put unlicensed Christian and Jewish schools under direct state control. Russian bureaucrats understood the similarities between their own multiconfessional state and that of other imperial powers at the time, and were particularly interested in exploring similarities regarding issues concerning Muslim communities in the Russian Empire and elsewhere. Two years later, the decision to launch a new Orientalist journal, *Mir Islama*, would be based upon a similar understanding of Russia’s relative position alongside other imperial powers and multiconfessional empires.

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106 Austria had administered Bosnia since 1879. After the Unionist takeover in 1908, the Austrian government annexed Bosnia outright.

107 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 468, l. 1-36. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 463, l. 98. Also see this delo for more on Austrian (ll. 55-62) and French (55-73) responses to the Russian survey. For more on the French, also see RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 471.

108 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 468, l. 18. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 468, l. 132.

109 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 468, l. 132. The article can be found in *Vakit* 749, July 13, 1911.

110 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 450, l. 72.
Muslim educational reform in the Volga region and southern Caucasus

While the historiography of Muslim communities in Russia during the years 1905-1917 can sometimes generalize the experiences of the jadidist movement in Russia onto Muslim communities throughout Russia more generally, there were important regional differences across the empire in the ways in which the jadid movement developed and was perceived by Muslim communities. In the guberniia of Baku, there were far fewer new method schools prior to 1905 than there were in the Volga region.111 After 1905, philanthropists such as Zeynal Adibin Tagiev opened a number of new method schools in Baku, but in the southern Caucasus there was no equivalent to the widespread opening of new method schools in the countryside of the sort that occurred in the Volga region from 1905 onwards.

As was the case in the Volga region, in the southern Caucasus there was initially considerable activity among Muslim communities to organize in the immediate aftermath of the October Manifesto of 1905. A number of Muslim language newspapers were opened, a branch of the Muslim Fraction, later the İtifak party, was opened, and a large number of committees and associations were created. But while Volga and Crimean Muslims had spent the summer of 1905 organizing what would later become the Muslim İtifak party, Muslims in the southern Caucasus were in the throes of a struggle for the very survival of Muslims in some parts of the region, particularly Nagorno-Karabakh. Fighting took place from February to December of 1905, after which time peace talks

111 In a report written in 1901, an official in the governor's office in the province of Baku wrote that he knew of only one new method school in the entire guberniia. ADTA, f. 45, op. 1, d. 35, l. 34-36-ob.
preceded a general truce that lasted until 1917. Estimates at lives lost range between 3000 and 10,000, and all sides suffered extensive material damage.\textsuperscript{112}

Circumstances concerning Muslim education were quite different in the two regions. There was a much smaller number of new method schools in the province of Baku at the turn of the century than there was in the Volga region. After 1905, when more new schools, libraries, and reading rooms were created in the southern Caucasus, these tended to be built in cities, particularly Baku and Tbilisi, but also Shekki, Genje, Yerevan, and Shushe. This differed from circumstances in the Volga region, where growth in new method education after 1905 was characterized by rapid expansion into the countryside.

Moreover, as there had been few new method schools in Baku prior to 1905, there was not a large number of unemployed and politically active shākerts and newly-minted (and unemployed) teachers constituting a political faction as they did in the Volga region. While many new method schools in the Volga region had been opened after 1905 at least in part to find employment for recent medrese graduates, in the Caucasus there was little effort to open new schools in places where they were not wanted or where there was a teacher already operating. Consequently, in the southern Caucasus new schools were generally constructed in communities where they were actually wanted.\textsuperscript{113} Unlike the Volga region, where even very poor villages usually had a teacher of their own, in the Caucasus there were villages, even in the guberniia of Baku, with no school or teacher of

\textsuperscript{112} See Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{113} See, for example, ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 2 for a copy of a petition sent by a village to the organization Negr-i Maarif asking that they construct a school in their locale.
at all. While jadids in the Volga region often upset existing teachers and communities alike by moving into communities where teachers were already working, in the southern Caucasus communities were often grateful to have any teacher at all.  

Another reason why jadidist education was a less controversial issue in the Caucasus than in the Volga region was that new method organizations made an effort to reach out to traditional teachers in village medreses across the guberniia of Baku, Elizavetpol, and elsewhere in the region. According to a report on the new method movement written by an official working in the Baku branch of the Interior Ministry, supporters of new method education in Baku had been in contact with more traditionally-minded teachers in the hinterland with offers of support. These were made in exchange for a promise from the teachers to allow new method teachers to work part time at the schools, where they would teach literacy and, if possible, Russian language.

Without doubt there has been enmity between the reformers and the mullahs. However, the reformers are trying to gradually bring the spiritual personnel and kadis over to their side and with their financial support reform the religious schools a little bit, disseminate their program, carry out education through the oral method and, in this way, slowly but surely realize their goals.

One of the best known organizations promoting literacy in Baku was Neşr-i Maarif, which was established in 1908 by the Baku millionaire Abdul Zeynal Tagiev. The director of Neşr-i Maarif was Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was also active in İttifak and was

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114 See, for example, Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s travelogue “Menim Seyahatimi”, published in the newspaper İrşad from mid-December 1906 until mid-January 1907, especially “Menim Seyahatimi” 7, Jan 10, 1907. Also see İrşad 3, January 4, 1907.
115 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 1-7; f. 312, op. 1, d. 63, l. 6a; f. 312, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 1, 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 1.
116 ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 11, 22.
117 For a report on Neşrı Maarif’s activities, also see Baku Müslüman “Neşrı Maarif” cemiyetinin 1907-1911 yıllara mahsus dahil-haricin hesabnamesi. (Baku: Kaspii Matbaası, 1912).
a well-known publicist whose articles appeared in Kaspii, Hayat, and İrşad.¹¹⁸ In some ways, the efforts of this organization to promote literacy among Muslims in the southern Caucasus is comparable to the activities of jadids like Fatih Kerimi in the Volga region, and in the historiography of Azerbaijan Neşr-i Maarif is generally celebrated for its reformist activities and as an Azeri variant of “jaddism”.¹¹⁹ Yet there were also many differences between Neşr-i Maarif ‘s activities and those of the jadids in the Volga region. Neşr-i Maarif operated a relatively small number of schools. In 1908 the organization operated a teachers’ school, a temporary literacy course for adults, and three other schools in Baku. In 1911, Neşr-i Maarif opened another 11 schools, including three more in Baku and another eight in villages elsewhere in the guberniia.¹²⁰ These schools were all opened officially, and all paperwork regarding the teachers working there and the types of classes taught at the school was passed on to the inspector for Muslim schools in the guberniia.¹²¹ Unlike petitioners writing to Fatih Kerimi, prospective teachers sending in lists of references and teaching experience did not invoke national slogans in appealing for work, but rather emphasized their teaching qualifications and need for employment.¹²² Salaries were good, but not as high as in the Volga region. Whereas the higher paying jobs in the Volga region paid 700-800 rubles per year, teachers working for Neşr-i Maarif earned between 400 and 500 rubles per year.¹²³

More importantly, community reformers in the southern Caucasus did not emphasize the expansion of jadidism per se, but rather literacy in both Russian and Azeri

¹¹⁸ For more on Ağaoğlu, see chapters 4-6 of this study.
¹¹⁹ Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, 33, 56-57.
¹²⁰ ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 1-5; f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l.1.
¹²¹ ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 1-5.
¹²² ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 5, l. 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 10, 12; f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 1; f. 312, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 1, 3.
¹²³ ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 2, 4, 6 ; f. 312, op. 2, d. 1, l. 2; f. 312, op. 2, d. 12, l. 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 16, l. 9.
Turkish. Tsarist bureaucrats working in the Caucasus considered the schools opened by *Neşr-i Maarif* to be “Russian-Tatar schools”, rather than “new method schools”, thus facilitating their official approval. Moreover, due to the greater powers afforded to the vice-regency of the Caucasus in the aftermath of the labor unrest and armed Armenian-Muslim conflict which occurred during the years 1902-1906, far more controls were placed upon organized activity than in the Volga region. Thus, while in the Volga region jadids were able to open hundreds of schools without official permission, supporters of new method education and community reform in the Caucasus were more closely monitored and circumscribed in their actions. Largely because of this, *Neşr-i Maarif* tended to work through official channels in acquiring formal permission to open its schools and send its teachers to existing schools.

Conclusions

As was the case for many other states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, education was an important preoccupation for the Russian government, which sought to reform and gain greater control of not only Russian Orthodox education in the empire, but also the educational institutions of the empire’s non-Russian populations. Meanwhile, a number of Muslim community reformers, most famously Ismail Gasprinskii, also championed the cause of educational reform, though in ways which differed from those of the state. While the state’s attempts at reforming Muslim education resembled some of the proposals of Muslim reformers (such as with regard to the

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124 *Neşr-i Maarif* officials referred to Azeri Turkish as “the Turkish language” (“Türk dili”), while tsarist officials tended to refer to it as “Tatar”. For examples of how teachers and Muslim school administrators referred to the language they spoke, see ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 10, l. 10; f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 3-6; f. 312, op. 1, d. 63, l. 8. For examples of how these schools were described to tsarist officials in the region, see ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1; f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 3; f. 312, op. 8, l. 2; f. 312, op. 1, d. 30, l. 1.
125 ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1.
126 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 3; f. 312, op. 8, d. 2; f. 312, op. 1, d. 30, l. 1.
teaching of Russian), tsarist bureaucrats tended to distrust jadids. This was principally
due to the desire of tsarist bureaucrats in the Volga region to gain greater control over
Muslim schools, while jadidism represented an educational movement that was generally
free of state supervision. After 1905, attempts by the jadid leaders of the İtihad
movement to gain control of Muslim schools and of the spiritual assemblies would cause
even greater concern in bureaucratic circles. After the Unionist takeover in 1908,
moreover, and particularly in the wake of the denunciation campaign undertaken against
individuals associated with jadidism and İtihad, fears of “pan-Turkism” and “pan-
Islamism” became increasingly dominant modes of defining Muslim community activism
in the minds of tsarist bureaucrats and policymakers.

While most historiographical accounts of the new method movement conceive of
“jadidism” and “kadimism” in largely intellectual terms,¹²⁷ both jadidism and the
opposition it engendered had wide-ranging social, cultural, economic, and political
components. The tendency to view the new method movement and its opponents as
largely engaged in intellectual and cultural—as opposed to political or economic—debate
has also resulted in an almost complete focus upon the journal Din ve Maişet as the locus
of opposition to jadidism. But Din ve Maişet, while often publishing articles that were

¹²⁷ This is also the case even among those scholars, such as Stephane Dudoignon, who challenge the
presentation of “jadids” and “kadims” as polar opposites. See, for example, Dudoignon’s “Djadidisme,
mirasisme, islamisme” Cahiers du Monde Russe No. 2, (April-June, 1996), 13-40; and Dudoignon,
“Kadimizm: element sotsiologii musl’manskogo traditionalizma v tatarskom mire i v Maverrannakhre
(kontests SVIII-nach. XX vv.)”, from Islam v Tatarskom mire: istoriya i sovremennost’ (Kazan: Institut
Istorii Akademii Nauk Tatarstana, 1997), 57-69; also see Dudoignon, “Status, Strategies and Discourses of
a Muslim Clergy under a Christian Law: Polemics about the Collection of the Zakat in Late Imperial
Russia”, in Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia, 43-76. In these articles, Dudoignon skilfully
outlines the rhetorical and conceptual similarity of “jadids” and “kadims” in the periodical press of the
Volga region in the early twentieth century. However, the concept of “opposition” to jadidism manifesting
itself in a mainly intellectual manner is largely incorporated into these studies as well, and in this respect
they are similar to earlier approaches to the question.
critical of jadids, was nevertheless generally supportive of the İtifak party.\textsuperscript{128} Moreover, Muslims writing in Din ve Maışet sometimes resembled jadids through the types of rhetoric they employed in their writing, even if their arguments usually differed from those of the jadids.\textsuperscript{129} Indeed, the most dangerous and powerful opponents of jadidism and İtifak were not contributors to Din ve Maışet, but rather rival teachers whose “capital” (both cultural and otherwise) was threatened by the spread of new method education.

Jadidism involved a far more controversial set of issues in the Volga region than in the Caucasus due to a number of factors. These included the relative circumstances concerning Muslim education in the two regions, as well as the different political circumstances in the two regions and the different ways in which new method education was disseminated. In the Volga region, opposition to the manner and scale of the spread of new method schools contributed to the largest wave of Muslim protest in the region since 1897.

Meanwhile, in the Caucasus, community reformers worked more closely with both tsarist authorities and Muslim communities in planning the opening of their schools. Although these developments in the Caucasus contributed to a greater degree of consensus and cooperation among Muslims regarding the types of education they could support, it also meant that the spread of literacy among Muslims in the Caucasus took place at a much slower pace than in the Volga region, as Neşr-i Maarif supported schools even if they offered only a few hours of reading classes per week. Similarly, Neşr-i Maarif cooperated with tsarist authorities in their activities, and all of their schools were

\textsuperscript{128} See Chapter 4 of this study, p. 174, fn. 125.
\textsuperscript{129} See Chapter 5 of this study, p. 179, fn. 69.

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opened legally. While this led to a greater degree of approval for Neṣr-i Maarif's activities among tsarist administrators responsible for policing Muslim education, this cooperation with the authorities also contributed to the opening of far fewer schools in the southern Caucasus than was the case in the Volga region.
Chapter 4

Mass Politics and Community Leadership after 1905

The years 1905-1917 have traditionally received a great deal of attention from scholars working on the Muslim regions of the Russian and Soviet “borderlands”. “Muslim politics,”¹ in the scholarship of the region, is typically discussed as an extension of jadidism, and the İttifak party² is often presented as the sole representative of Muslim political views in the empire.³ Yet Muslims in Russia looked to a number of different locations of political leadership and subscribed to a variety of political ideologies. While the leadership of İttifak was made up almost entirely of jadids and their sympathizers, the movement attracted a large number of Muslims who were less enthusiastic about, or even hostile towards, the cultural and educational views of İttifak’s leadership.⁴ Nevertheless, in the early months of the 1905 Revolution, İttifak constituted a broad-based coalition of Muslims from regions across the empire who held a variety of views on political and cultural issues. Over time, however, many Muslims came to oppose İttifak altogether, particularly in the wake of the party’s third congress, held in Nizhnii Novgorod in August of 1906.

¹ On Adeeb Khalid’s use of this term, see the Introduction to this study, fn. 29.
² The first meetings of what would become the İttifak party were held in the last months of 1904. From April 1905 onwards, politically active Muslims had begun to refer to the movement as İttifak. In the first Duma (April-July 1906), İttifak was known officially as the “Muslim fraction” and sat in parliament as a bloc within the Constitutional Democratic Party (or “Kadets”). Prior to the elections to the second Duma in the fall of 1906, İttifak became a formal political party. It is thus referred to as both a “movement” and a “party” in this chapter.
³ Rorlich, for example, describes the İttifak party as an expression of “political jadidism”. See The Volga Tatars.
⁴ The early organizers of İttifak included Abdürreşid İbrahimov, Ismail Gasprinskii, Yusuf Akçura, Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev, Rizaeddin Fahreddin, and a number of other figures. By late 1906, however, Yusuf Akçura had become the most dominant figure in the party congresses. Even though Akçura did not run as a candidate for İttifak and did not sit in parliament, he was responsible for almost all of the major communications made in the party’s name. These duties included writing frequent newspaper articles to explain and defend İttifak’s policies and activities. Akçura was also the party secretary, and chaired most of the sessions at the Muslim congresses. Other sessions were chaired by Ismail Gasprinskii and Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev.
While the role of \textit{Ittifak} in the political lives of Muslims after 1905 is considerable, this movement did not represent the entirety of "Muslim politics". Towards the end of 1904 and in the first half of 1905, tsarist officials continued to view the Muslim spiritual assemblies as the primary locations for articulating the political demands of the empire's Muslim communities. This was a view that was shared by many Muslims as well, including many of the Muslims attending \textit{Ittifak} meetings and congresses. Indeed, spiritual assembly leaders such as Müfti Soltanov of the Orenburg Assembly and Müfti Adil Mirza Karashaikii of the Crimean Assembly\footnote{The official name of this assembly was actually the "Tavrida Muslim Spiritual Assembly", named after the \textit{guberniya} in which the Crimea was located. Among Muslims, however, the institution was generally referred to as the "Crimean Assembly," a convention that I follow in this and other chapters in this dissertation.} also participated in the \textit{Ittifak} meetings and at times cooperated with the \textit{Ittifak} leadership in their negotiations with the Russian government and other matters.

Particularly after the Third All-Russian Muslim Congress\footnote{Held in Nizhni Novgorod. This is not, however, to be confused with the First All-Russian Muslim Congress, also held in Nizhni Novgorod, in August of 1905. The second congress was held in St. Petersburg in January of 1906.} in August of 1906, \textit{Ittifak} became a much narrower organization. Not only did the party leadership become increasingly dominated by Muslims from Kazan and Ufa, but also began to endeavor increasingly to transform the party into a vehicle for the advancement of jadidist ("new method") cultural reforms more particularly. These developments contributed to the emergence of increased Muslim opposition to the party. Many Muslims who had earlier attended \textit{Ittifak} meetings and who had supported the movement politically now looked elsewhere for political leadership or else became disillusioned with politics altogether, a trend that was further exacerbated by the shrinking political relevance of the Duma from
1907 onwards. Meanwhile, the formal establishment of Ittifak as a political party likewise alienated many Social Democrat and Social Revolutionary Muslims, who rejected the idea of Muslims forming a party defined by religious affiliation.

Having lived under a system of largely confessional administration for most of their lives, most politically aware Muslims in Russia continued even after 1905 to articulate their political interests in terms that were more confessional than ideological. This, indeed, was for many Muslims the initial attraction to Ittifak, whose very name underscored the movement’s seeming commitment to attracting the support of a diverse community of Muslims from across the empire. However, while Muslims were generally supportive of a movement which strove to gain more freedoms for them, the emergence of mass politics in Russia soon led to divisions among Muslims over a number of cultural, ideological, and political issues.

The Revolution of 1905

On the heels of widespread protests across Russia in late 1904 and early 1905, Tsar Nicholas II signed the Bulygin Rescript, which called for the establishment of a “consultative assembly”, to be known as the Duma. This and other concessions failed, however, to quell disturbances breaking out across Russia during these months, and in September of 1905 an All-Russian Zemstvo Congress was held where demands were made to make the Duma the primary legislative body in the country. This meeting was

\[7\] After the dissolution of the second Duma, Prime Minister Petr Stolypin unconstitutionally pushed through new election laws severely limiting the number of non-Muslims eligible to sit in the Duma. The representation of Central Asia was entirely eliminated, while Poland, the Caucasus, and other areas of the empire lost deputies. Moreover, in districts where non-Russians constituted more than half of the electorate, Russians were allowed to hold their own elections from a guaranteed number of seats available to them.


\[9\] Initially, this body was envisioned to play only an advisory role.
followed by continued strikes and protests across the empire, and on October 19, 1905 the Tsar reluctantly signed the October Manifesto. Written by Minister of the Interior Sergei Witte, the manifesto allowed for the formation of political parties, the holding of public meetings, universal male suffrage, and the creation of the Duma as a legislative parliament. The manifesto also greatly simplified the process of opening newspapers and journals, including those written in languages other than Russian. The proclamation of the October Manifesto thus marked the creation of mass politics in the Russian Empire, with Russians of all faiths and nationalities now largely free to organize, meet, and write about politics in the periodical press. The Duma was scheduled to open in the middle of 1906, with elections to the body taking place in the early months of the year.\(^{10}\)

While the October Manifesto affected all Russian subjects, Russian Muslims in particular stood to gain from the new political conditions. Numbering between fifteen and twenty million out of a total population of approximately 150 million, Muslims held the potential to form an important voting bloc in the empire's new parliament. Although Russian Muslims had not, for the most part, actively taken part in anti-government demonstrations prior to the October Manifesto,\(^{11}\) there was considerable determination among Muslims of many political persuasions to use the opportunities granted by the October Manifesto to improve their conditions in the empire.

In late 1904 and early 1905, Russian subjects of nearly all faiths and nationalities had begun to set up "unions" through which they would articulate demands to press the Russian government for reform. These were not necessarily trade unions, but rather


\(^{11}\) In the Caucasus, many Muslims participated in labor movements taking place in the Baku oilfields in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, the great majority of these Muslims were not, in fact, Russian subjects but rather from Iran.
associations of like-minded individuals seeking to advance a program related to their national, religious, professional, or other interests, and in this regard Muslims were likewise active participants. Many of the organizations set up by Muslims at this time were mainly charitable in nature, such as the “Muslim Charitable Society of Troitsk” and the “Cultural-Economic and Charitable Society of Perm Muslims.” Other groups, such as the “Society of Imams of Kazan Guberniiia” (Kazan vilayeti imamları cemiyeti), brought together Muslims of a common vocation. Other organizations were created by Muslim students, who, like Russian students during these days, were active in setting up meetings in the interest of writing petitions to state their demands and desires for the new era Russia appeared to be entering. Thus, by the end of 1904 and the early months of 1905, medrese students at a number of schools, especially in the Volga region, began to use their newly granted rights to press for reforms in their schools.

In this context, a number of Muslims from different regions of Russia felt that Muslims likewise required a “union” to articulate the interests of the empire’s Muslims as a whole. In December of 1904 and January of 1905, the Siberian-born mullah and publicist Abdürreşid İbrahimov traveled to cities across the Volga-Ural region,

12 Including, for example, the “Union of Unions”. Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 143. On other “unions” founded by Russians during this time (such as the Union of Academicians, the Union of Teachers, and the Union for the Equality of Women, see Ascher, 140-143.
13 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 473, ll. 137, 448. For lists of other societies founded in the months and years after the October Manifesto, see RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 464; f. 821, op. 133, d. 474; f. 821, op. 133, d. 511.
14 KGU, Document T-510. On student protests during this period, see later in this chapter.
15 KGU, Document T-1399.
16 İbrahimov (1857-1944) was one of the most well-traveled Tatar jadids of his day. Born in the gubernia of Tobolsk in western Siberia, İbrahimov had been a licensed imam in the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly prior to leaving Russia in 1879 for what would amount to the beginning of a lifetime of travel. From 1879 to 1885 İbrahimov traveled to Medine and back, via Istanbul, spending three years in Medine and more than one year in Istanbul en route. In 1885 İbrahimov returned to his Siberian village of Tara, where he worked as a teacher until 1890. From this time until 1904 İbrahimov spent most of his time outside of Russia, traveling as far as Japan, where he resided in 1902-1903. Despite his lengthy absence from
including Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, and Chistopol. There, he held meetings in the houses of wealthy Muslims such as Ahmed Saidashev of Kazan and Ahmet Bey Hüseyinov\textsuperscript{17} of Orenburg. During the course of these meetings, it was decided to hold a larger gathering in St. Petersburg, which would be attended by Muslim delegates from various regions of the empire.\textsuperscript{18} While in Kazan, İbrahimov met with Yusuf Akçura, who was then working as a teacher of history and geography at the new method \textit{Muhammadiye medrese} in Kazan. İbrahimov and Akçura discussed the idea of holding a meeting in St. Petersburg and Akçura, who was related to İsmail Gasprinskii by marriage, then wrote Gasprinskii to inform him about their plans. İbrahimov, meanwhile, contacted Ali Merdan Bey Topçıbaşév, editor of the Russian-language newspaper \textit{Kaspii} in Baku, to give him the news of their activities and request that Topçıbaşév organize a delegation of Caucasian Muslims to attend.\textsuperscript{19}

There was not just one meeting taking place in St. Petersburg, but many. Beginning in late March of 1905, Muslims "from every province"\textsuperscript{20} began filing in to St. Petersburg to meet with Interior Minister Witte in an effort to express to him the interests and demands of Muslims in the parliamentary era. Witte met with nearly everyone who

\begin{flushright}
Russia, İbrahimov was well known in jadid circles. On İbrahimov, see İsmail Türkoğlu, \textit{Sibiryalı Meşhur Seyyah Abdürraşid İbrahim} (Ankara: Türkiye Dİyanet Vakfı, 1997). Also see Gabderâhisit İbrahimov, \textit{Türkçeməli khâlem} (Kazan: İman, 2001).

\textsuperscript{17} Ahmet Bey Hüseyinov (1837-1906) was one of the most famous philanthropists of his time. Having grown up poor, Hüseyinov, along with his two brothers Mahmut (1839-1910) and Gani (1839-1902), established a commercial empire worth millions of rubles by the end of the nineteenth century. Ahmet Hüseyinov sponsored a number of new method schools and were also early supporters of the \textit{İtifak} party. In 1889, Hüseyinov opened the Medrese "Hüseyiniye" in Kargalı, outside Orenburg. This school became a well known new method center of education. On the Medrese Hüseyiniye, see Rakhimkulova, \textit{Medrese "Khusainiia" v Orenburge}.

\textsuperscript{18} As all of this was taking place before the October Manifesto, these meetings were technically illegal and needed to remain relatively small.

\textsuperscript{19} This newspaper, subsidized by the Baku millionaire Tagiev, contained news pertaining mostly to the Muslim communities of the Caucasus. See Bennigsen,

\textsuperscript{20} "At this point, Muslim representatives arrived from every province. One by one they visited with Count Witte". Bigi, \textit{İslahat Esasları}, 7.

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petitioned his office, a far cry from previous years, when representatives from Muslim communities first needed to request permission from their provincial governor in order to meet with him. Meanwhile, several groupings\textsuperscript{21} of Muslim delegates took part in the meetings, many of which took place in İbrahimov’s apartment. These were attended by delegates from Moscow, the Crimea, the Caucasus\textsuperscript{22}, and the Volga-Ural region.\textsuperscript{23} The delegates decided overwhelmingly to hold a larger congress later in the year, to which Muslims from all across Russia would be invited. It was decided that they would meet in Nizhnii Novgorod in August, which coincided with the annual holding of a trade fair in nearby Makariia.\textsuperscript{24}

While Interior Minister Witte impressed the Muslim delegates gathered in St. Petersburg with his willingness to talk with them, the Russian government’s preferred Muslim interlocutors remained the leaders of the empire’s Muslim spiritual assemblies. Indeed, this fact was recognized by many of the Muslim delegates meeting with Abdüreşid İbrahimov, who visited Orenburg Müfti Soltanov at his St. Petersburg residence in an effort to gain his support for their endeavors. One group of delegates, representatives of Moscow’s Muslim community,\textsuperscript{25} wanted to enlist the müfti’s assistance in receiving an audience with tsar. The müfti refused, however, telling them that “the tsar isn’t meeting with anybody;” and recommending they try to see Witte instead. When the delegates informed the müfti that the tsar had just recently met with a

\textsuperscript{21}In all there appear to have been 2-3 dozen people taking part in the meetings at İbrahimov’s apartment.
\textsuperscript{22}The three delegates from the Caucasus mentioned by Bigi are Topçibaşev, Ahmet Bey Ağaoğlu, and Ali Bey Hüseyinzade.
\textsuperscript{23}Bigi, \textit{İlahat Esaslari} (Petrograd: Tipografia Maksutova, 1915), 2-12.
\textsuperscript{24}This was a fair that large numbers of Muslim merchants from across Russia would be attending anyway, bolstering chances of a large turnout. Also see Bigi, \textit{İlahat Esaslari}, 169-178.
\textsuperscript{25}Cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Vilnius also had populations of several thousand Muslims, mostly Tatars from the Volga region. On the Tatars of St. Petersburg, see Il’dus Zagidullin, \textit{Musul’manskaia obschchina v Sankt-Peterburge} (Kazan: Izdatel’stvo Kazanskogo universiteta, 2003).
delegation of workers, the müfti exploded in anger, shouting “Well I’m no worker! Get out of here, you peasant!” before sending the Muscovite Muslims away from his rooms.  

After Soltanov’s meeting with the Moscow delegation, the müfti went to see Witte on his own. At this meeting, Witte asked the müfti to return to Ufa, where he would “assemble a number of suitable men from the ulema, and write a petition regarding your needs.” From April 10-15, Müfti Soltanov hosted a meeting of Orenburg spiritual personnel to discuss which “needs” they would elucidate in their petition. The site of the meeting was the meeting room at the Orenburg Assembly’s chambers in Ufa. Thirty-nine were present at this meeting, of whom just “twenty to twenty-five” had actually been invited.

The müfti, who had served since 1886, appears to have been taken by surprise by Witte’s request. While Soltanov had long served as a mediator between the civil administration and the Muslim populations of the Orenburg territories, he had rarely been called upon to take such a proactive role in community leadership. Moreover, Soltanov was not a figure usually given to conceiving the communities of Russian Muslims in terms other than administrative ones. Indeed, in this respect, Soltanov’s approach to the events taking place in 1904-1905 was markedly different from those of community

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26 According to Bigi, Soltanov called him a “Muzhik” (“Çik monnan! Muzhik!”).  
27 Bigi later writes that a peace conference between Soltanov and the Muscovite delegation, headed by one Zahidullah Effendi Shefih, was held in the restaurant of the Nikolaevskii train station (Bigi, 8). Musa Bigi (or ‘Bigiev’1875-1949) was a well known jadid imam who participated in most of the earliest activities of İttifak. This account is from his memoirs chronicling the early years of the İttifak party. It was published in 1915, one year after the death of Ismail Gasprinskii, who is not always portrayed handsomely in the book. On Bigi, see A.G. Khairutdinov, Musa Djarullakh Bigiev (Kazan: Izd-vo “Finn, 2005). Also see Gadbulla Battal-Taimas (Abdullah Battal-Taymas), Musa Iarulla Bigi: Tormyshy, eschänlege và āsārläre (Kazan: Iman, 1997).  
28 Bigi, Islahat Esasları, 8-9.  
29 Bigi, Islahat Esasları, 13-14. A number of people attending the Ufa meeting were simply already at the Assembly on business and were allowed to sit in on the meetings.
reformers such as Akçura, Gasprinskii, Hüseyinzade, or Ağaoğlu, who tended to be more comfortable invoking the “community” (millet) in their public speeches and writings.

Instead, Soltanov’s understanding of Muslim communities in the Russian Empire was largely administrative in nature. For almost twenty years, the müfti had steered the administration of Muslims in the Orenburg territories. His term as müfti had coincided with one of heightened politicization in the region, and Soltanov had often appeared to be caught between two masters. A liminal figure between the Russian government and Muslim communities, Soltanov had endured a series of difficult events in which the Russian government’s policies on education and the status of the Russian language had continually undermined the standing of the müfti and the assembly in the eyes of Muslim populations, leading even to the circulation of rumors that he had secretly converted to Orthodox Christianity and was to be a secret agent of conversion for Muslims more generally.30

Nevertheless, Soltanov made an effort to adapt to the new vernacular of reform and public politics. In his opening remarks to the spiritual personnel gathered at the Ufa meeting,31 the müfti signaled his desire for change and his recognition of the importance of mass sentiment, without distancing himself too much from his position as a representative of the tsarist administration.

> Just as we ourselves desire to repair our conditions, so too do the state and the government. Everybody knows very well that the road leading to these repairs is that of reform. If the public shows that they believe the undertaking reform

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30 See chapters 1 and 2 of this study.
31 A complete list of those in attendance is provided in Bigi, 13-14. Among those in attendance were a number of spiritual personnel sympathetic to jadidism, including Abdullah Apanaev, Galimcan Barudt, future İtifak deputy Hairullah Usmanov, and Mehmed Veli Hüseyinov (future publisher of Din ve Maşet).
is necessary, then of course the government will accept it, to the extent that this is possible.32

Asked by Witte to find a mechanism for articulating the wishes of Muslims in the empire, however, Soltanov retreated to what he knew best—the statutes and regulations of the empire’s four Muslim spiritual assemblies. Remarking that “reform must begin with issues pertaining to religion,” Soltanov indicated that his conception of reform revolved not so much around “religion” itself, but rather the question of religious administration and the empire’s Muslim spiritual assemblies. The müfti announced to the spiritual personnel present that he had provided them with copies of the laws and regulations pertaining to all four of the Muslim assemblies. Their task, he told them, was to read along with him the four sets of regulations, and then they would decide together what reforms to the four bodies they would recommend to Witte. Beginning with the book of regulations concerning the Sunni assembly of the Caucasus, the müfti and the collected spiritual personnel read out loud, one-by-one, all of this book’s 1436 articles. This constituted nearly the entirety of the activity taking place on the first day of the meeting.33

News of the Ufa meeting spread rapidly among Muslims in the region. On the second day of the meeting, a petition arrived from Yusuf Akçura. Dated the previous day, the petition contained forty-six articles. The first three of these reflected the fears of Akçura and others planning the Muslim congress in Makariia that decisions made at the Ufa meeting would be forwarded to Witte without the broader consultation of Muslim populations. Akçura’s first three recommendations were:

32 Bigi, İslahat Esasları, 15.
33 Bigi, İslahat Esasları, 16-17, 39. There is no record in Bigi’s account of the spiritual personnel in attendance ever getting around to reading the regulations concerning the other Muslim spiritual assemblies.
1. The topics discussed at the [Ufa] meeting only pertain to general circumstances. For the detailed discussion of these issues, a joint committee (made up of both the ulema and intellectuals) should be formed.

2. All of the decisions made at the meeting be made public to all Muslims.

3. All of the discussions and all of the decisions made at the meeting be recorded in full detail. The records should be dated, signed by those involved in making the decision, and saved.

At the Ufa meeting, two issues in particular were at the forefront of discussion. One of these was the idea of consolidating the four Muslim spiritual assemblies into a single body. Indeed, this proposal had also been discussed among the Muslim delegations attending the St. Petersburg meetings the previous month, where many of the delegates from the Volga and Ural regions supported the unification of the empire’s Muslim assemblies. In St. Petersburg, however, delegates from the Caucasus had opposed this idea, objecting to the incorporation of Shiites into what would undoubtedly be a largely Sunni administrative body based more than a thousand miles away from them. At Müfti Soltanov’s April meeting of the ulema in Ufa, however, the idea of merging the assemblies was one of the few proposals upon which both Müfti Soltanov and community reformers (such as Yusuf Akçura and Rızaeddin Fahreddin, who attended the later sessions of the Ufa meeting) could agree.

The second major issue of discussion involved the idea of turning the position of müfti into an elected one. This was first proposed by Akçura, who envisioned an electoral

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34 “Ruhaniler ile ziyahlardan mürekkep.”
35 Bigi, Islahat Esaslari, 42.
36 Bigi, Islahat Esaslari, 162. Most people discussing this issue saw either St. Petersburg or Ufa as the site for a potential united spiritual assembly. Others, such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, questioned the wisdom of keeping the Muslim spiritual assemblies at all. Islahat Esaslari, p. 11.
37 Bigi, Islahat Esaslari, 39-42. Later in the year, Crimean Müfti Karashaskii would likewise propose a reform plan in which Muslim spiritual administration in the empire would be centralized into just two principle offices of administration, one in Ufa and one in Simferopol. See KGU, Document T-1209.
system in which there would be between one and three electors (sailauct) in every district (mahalle) where Muslims lived in the empire. The electors from every fifty districts would then assemble to choose a second level of elector known as a “mukhtar”. “The mukhtars”, wrote Akçura, “would then meet in a city, and would nominate three candidates.” According to Akçura’s plan, the names of these three candidates would be forwarded to the Emperor, who would appoint one of them for a fixed (though not yet determined) period of time.\(^{38}\)

Perhaps not surprisingly, these ideas were met with little enthusiasm by Müfti Soltanov, who spoke out against the innovations at the Ufa conference. However, Soltanov distanced himself personally from the issue, and instead discussed the repercussions of this move on the status and influence of the position more generally. Forswearing any self-interest in the matter, Soltanov argued that he opposed limiting the term of the müfti in the interests of maintaining this position’s authority in the eyes of the Russian government.

I don’t think it will be useful for Muslims if the person who becomes müfti is elected to fixed term. For me it makes no difference, but for the person who becomes müfti it will be important to appear important in the eyes of the government. The government isn’t going to pay attention to someone who is elected for only a fixed period of time.\(^{39}\)

Soltanov showed, however, a willingness to compromise on this issue. Despite the müfti’s objections, the group of thirty-nine individuals assembled at Ufa adopted the recommendation that the position of müfti be an elected one, and that the terms of service should be nine years.\(^{40}\) These suggestions were included in the final version of the

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\(^{38}\) Ibid, 43.
\(^{39}\) Ibid, 78.
\(^{40}\) Ibid, 119.
petition that Müfti Soltanov sent to Witte, although Soltanov added into this version a memorandum stating that he personally disagreed with the idea. Soltanov also recommended that if the position of müfti were to be an elected one, then “rather than adopt the complicated electoral system specified in the petition” (i.e., Akçura’s electoral system), the müfti should instead “be elected by all of the people” directly. This would be done by holding elections not simply in a handful of large cities and behind closed doors, but rather through votes held at gatherings of Muslims to take place in or near their mosques.  

Soltanov’s actions may have been shaped by the clearly high level of interest among Muslims in the discussions that were taking place. Indeed, Akçura was not the only non-invitee to send a petition to the Ufa meeting. Individuals such as Abdürreşid İbrahimov and Rizaeddin Fahreddin also sent their petitions to the assembly, as did other groupings representing “the village of Tan”, “the city of Ufa”, “Ufa medrese students”, and others. These petitions discussed a variety of issues, but almost all of them stressed the need for Muslims to maintain and strengthen the administrative autonomy of the Orenburg Assembly. Furthermore, placing Muslim schools back into the hands of the Orenburg Assembly and strengthening the assembly’s role in administering pious foundations and arbitrating cases in the Sharia courts featured prominently in nearly all of the petitions sent to the Ufa meeting.  

The müfti appeared sympathetic to the idea of bringing more people into the discussions taking place regarding the administrative future of Muslims in the empire. Stating that he was “happy that we’ve started to talk about these important issues,”

\[41\] Ibid, 140.
\[42\] Ibid, 78-84.
Soltanov acknowledged the need for Muslims to meet in larger numbers in regard to these matters.

A great wrong would be committed if only a few men were involved in the discussion of issues of great importance to all Russian Muslims. It is therefore necessary for a large number of individuals to meet.\textsuperscript{43}

On May 20, Muslims met in the Volga city of Chistopol in order to plan what would become the first “All-Russian Muslim Congress,” which delegates to the April meetings in St. Petersburg had decided would take place in August in Nizhnii Novgorod. This congress, it was envisioned, would bring together Muslims from across the empire.\textsuperscript{44} Planning for the congress, meanwhile, would take place at a series of meetings to be held in Chistopol. Unable to gain official permission to hold these meetings, organizers were obliged to employ subterfuge in disguising their intentions. In order to avoid the attention of the police, the preparatory meetings in Chistopol were held in the midst of a wedding taking place for the daughter of one Zakir Hazret, who lived there. The Chistopol meetings attracted a diverse group of participants, including “a large number of imams, young people, rich folks, intellectuals, and publicists.”\textsuperscript{45}

Beginning on August 15, the First All-Russian Muslim Congress was attended by hundreds of Muslims from cities across European Russia, Siberia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. This meeting produced a five-point declaration which focused primarily upon concerns that all Muslims in attendance could easily agree upon. These included an affirmation of the importance for Muslims to organize on an “All-

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 78
\textsuperscript{44} The first meetings in St. Petersburg had been dominated by Muslims from the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, although Ismail Gasprinskii (from the Crimea) and a few representatives from the Caucasus (Ali Merdan Bey Topçubayev, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Ali Hüseyinçade) were also there. The Ufa meetings, was made up of only people from the Volga-Ural region.
\textsuperscript{45} Bigi, İstahat Esasları, 168-169.
Russian” basis in the interest of carrying out reform; the establishment of a parliamentary regime in Russia; legal equality between Muslims and Russians; an end to Russian government supervision of Muslim schools; the liberalization of laws concerning book and newspaper publishing; and a commitment to reconvene the congress on a periodic basis.46

*Community leadership and Muslim spiritual assemblies*

The years 1904-1906 mark a period of both coalition and division in the efforts of Muslims in Russia to organize politically. While there was often distrust and impatience among the various factions which emerged during this time, there was also a consistent desire among most of the participants in these meetings to work together in the interest of presenting a united front vis-à-vis the Russian government.47 In general, Muslims participating in the meetings taking place in late 1904 and 1905 supported the idea of “All-Russian” Muslim political action. However, there was also considerable division over the question of where the locus of this action should be.

Even at some of the earlist of these meetings, divisions regarding this issue were noticeable. At a meeting held in the Kazan merchant Ahmedcan Saidashev’s house, for instance, a number of members of the spiritual assembly attending the meeting objected when, in response to a call from a peasant48 in the audience that Saidashev chair the meeting, Saidashev stepped to the podium. This, in turn, prompted “shouts and cries”

47 Focusing especially upon the principle of Russian-Muslim equality, the lifting of restrictions on Muslims in the military and civil service, and the return of schools in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly to Assembly administration.
48 Those in attendance thought that Saidashev had packed the meeting with supporters in the form of the peasants from his lands. Bigi, *Islahat Esaslari*, 5-6.
from “all sides.” Sadik efendi Aligayef, a member of the Orenburg Assembly, then spoke up to challenge Saidashev’s right to chair the meeting.

A peasant calls out for you to be chairman and, shamelessly, and in front of the entire ulama, you step to the podium. What kind of chairman can you be? Step down from the podium! For shame!  

At this point cries came out from among those assembled to hold a vote in order to determine the chairman. Amid cries of “Vote! Vote! Vote!” Saidashev hastily surrendered the podium, and the noise died down.  

While the historiography of the region tends to describe “Muslim politics” almost exclusively in terms of the activities of the İttifak party during this period, it is important to remember that the Muslim spiritual assemblies continued to play an important role in the events of the revolutionary period. Throughout 1904 and 1905, the leaders of the spiritual communities were frequently in contact with both tsarist officials and community reformers. Far from disappearing after the emergence of the İttifak party, the spiritual assemblies and their respective leaderships continued to exert influence both in Muslim communities and government circles. Indeed, for most tsarist officials, the Muslim spiritual assemblies represented the preferred option in their communications with Muslim populations. Unlike İttifak and its leadership, the spiritual assemblies were

49 Bigi, İslahat Esaslari, 6.
50 Ibid.
51 Most discussions of this era, such as those by Rorlich, Kirimli, Noack, Swietochowski, and others, barely mention the continued activities of the leadership of the four Muslim assemblies.
52 See, for example, the petition to the Müfti published in Din ve Maşer, “Kazan ulumasi ve ahalisi din tarafiından müfti hazretke garizhal,” Din ve Maşer 21, June 8, 1907, 335-337. Also see the letters sent to the Orenburg Assembly’s newspaper, Maşlar, in Chapter 2 of this study, pp. 76-77.
53 Indeed, two of the most important figures in İttifak, Yusuf Akçura and Abdürreşid İbrahimov, had both only recently returned to Russia after extended stays abroad, including several years in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, a fact which could not have generated much trust from tsarist bureaucrats and policymakers.
to tsarist officials a relatively known quantity with whom they shared both a working relationship and an institutional history of over one hundred years.

Of the four Muslim spiritual assembly leaders, Müfti Sultanov was perhaps the most actively involved in the new political era. On December 12, 1904, the müfti delivered a petition to the Council of Ministers in St. Petersburg in which he made several demands of the government on behalf of "the holders of the Muslim faith" of Russia. These included requests that Muslims be allowed to work as science teachers, that all barriers to Muslims receiving higher education (and educational stipends) be lifted, that the armed forces employ more spiritual personnel, and that the Orthodox Church no longer be given a say in determining whether or not permission be granted to construct a mosque.54 The müfti’s petition also included a passage written in response to an incident, occurring on August 16, 1904, in which the provincial administration (gubernskoe upravlenie) of the gubernia of Ufa had dismissed from the Orenburg Assembly a number of spiritual personnel (mullahs), an event which had caused considerable outcry among their communities. "As Muslim mullahs are not appointed, but rather chosen by their communities," wrote the müfti, "the arbitrary dismissal of mullahs from their positions is keenly felt by the populace."

It would therefore be desired that the administration of Muslim spiritual personnel be undertaken in general in a manner which corresponds to the high status which is accorded spiritual personnel in the eyes of the Muslim population. With regard to the dismissal of Muslim spiritual personnel in particular, all exigencies of the law should be followed, as neither the governor nor the provincial administration possesses the right to arbitrarily

54 This portion of the petition was made on behalf of the Crimean Assembly in addition to the Orenburg Assembly.
dismiss spiritual personnel according to their own discretion.\textsuperscript{55}

Having served as Orenburg Müfti for nearly two decades, Soltanov was well known in government circles. Since the late eighteenth century, the tsarist authorities had most frequently turned to the spiritual assemblies during periods of unrest among Muslim communities.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, when Interior Minister Witte had called upon the müfti to assemble a collection of capable spiritual personnel in Ufa to discuss the question of reform, the Interior Minister was tapping into a well established means of communication between the state and the empire’s Muslim populations.

Nevertheless, Soltanov’s Ufa meeting immediately came under fire from Muslims for what was considered its secretive and exclusive nature. During the course of the meeting and in the months which followed, dozens of telegrams were sent to the Assembly and to \textit{Ittifak} figures, complaining about the small number of people involved in the discussions. In one telegram it was observed that:

Articulating the religious and social needs of all Russian Muslims is a very serious and important task. It was necessary to have people elect representatives to undertake it. Why were only thirty-six people invited?\textsuperscript{57}

Writing in \textit{Tercüman} two weeks after the conclusion of the meeting, meanwhile, İsmail Gasprinskii likewise drew attention to the lack of publicity surrounding what had transpired in Ufa. Publishing the names of those who had attended the meeting, Gasprinskii concluded by remarking, “It would be nice to know what they talked about

\textsuperscript{55} “Petitsiia Orenburgskago müftiia v komitet ministrov,” \textit{Tercüman} 28, April 12, 1905.
\textsuperscript{56} See chapters 1 and 2 of this study.
\textsuperscript{57} Bigi, \textit{Islahat Esasları}, 144-145. The “thirty-six” here is apparently a reference to the number of people who attended, rather than those who were actually invited.
and what decisions were made.”  

Abdüreşid İbrahimov and others, moreover, not only criticized the mütfi for having called this meeting under the seemingly innocuous (and, he argued, deceptive) pretext of “attending to official business” (po delam služby), but also criticized fellow community reformers, like Rizaeddin Fahreddin, for having participated in the meeting at all.  

The Muslim spiritual assemblies, and the Orenburg Assembly in particular, also loomed large in the minds of not only tsarist officials, but also Muslim community reformers. Indeed, individuals most involved in the establishment of İtifak, particularly those from the Kazan-Ufa-Orenburg region, placed the spiritual assemblies at the very center of their reform proposals. While the individuals participating in the nascent İtifak leadership were often critical of the leadership of the four Muslim assemblies, almost all of İtifak’s leaders were strong supporters of maintaining the assemblies. Indeed, among Volga Muslims, only a small number of social democrats favored abolishing the spiritual assemblies. For liberal Muslims such as Gasprinskii, Akçura, İbrahimov, Fahreddin, and others, the spiritual assemblies remained an integral component of their vision of Muslim life in Russia. However, these individuals—who appeared convinced of the popularity of their positions among Muslims more generally—were insistent upon making the leadership of the assemblies accountable to the ballot box. This, they felt, would place the assemblies in the hands of their political allies, thus granting them the

58 See “Ufa”, Tercüman 33, April 29, 1905. Musa Bigi later would charge that the meeting had been described in a deceptively innocuous manner, claiming that the invitation letters sent out to Orenburg spiritual personnel had said nothing about the congress other than that its purpose was the “explanation of some professional matters” (“ob’asnenii po delam služby”). See Bigi, İslahat Esasları, 13.

59 See “Bize ait”, Abdüreşid İbrahimov, Hayat 74, September 29, 1905. Fahreddin had not been invited but, like Akçura and others, had submitted a petition to be read at the meeting. It is unclear whether he read this petition in person, or if it was read for him.

60 See later in this chapter.
opportunity to undertake the cultural reforms they felt were required for Russian Muslims, particularly with regard to education.

While there were often tensions between the İttifak leadership and Müfti Soltanov, both sides recognized the importance of working together. This occurred not only in connection to the holding of public meetings, but also with regard to carrying on negotiations with the tsarist government. On March 31, 1906, for example, the Ministry of Education released a new set of regulations concerning Muslim education in Russia. Among these regulations was a ban on using books published outside of Russia in Muslim schools. The new regulations also foresaw instituting a Cyrillic-based transcription alphabet in Muslim schools. In response to these proposals, İttifak wrote a petition arguing against the regulations, which it then passed on to Müfti Soltanov. Soltanov, along with İttifak figures such as Akçura and Topçibaşev, then held negotiations with the education ministry for much of the year.⁶¹ These negotiations ultimately produced compromise, with most of the articles from the March regulations that Muslims had found the most objectionable—particularly the proposal to create a Cyrillic-based alphabet for Muslim languages—overturned.⁶²

The Crimean and Caucasian assemblies

In the Crimea, Müfti Adil Mirza Karashaiskii was also involved in early negotiations with the government. As was the case in Ufa, negotiations among Muslims regarding who would take part in the delegation that would be meeting with Witte generated controversy. In April of 1905—at the same time that Orenburg Müfti Soltanov was presiding over the meeting of invited spiritual personnel in Ufa—Müfti Karashaiskii

⁶¹ Bigi, Islahat Esasları, 242-251.
⁶² The list of articles that were changed as a result of these negotiations is published in “31 mart pravilasi”, Ural 5. January 21, 1907. On the March 31 Regulations, also see Bigi, 236-238.
held a meeting at his house in Simferopol regarding the issue of how to proceed with the
question of reform. The purpose of this meeting was to coordinate a list of demands to
be included in the petition they were planning on sending to Interior Minister Witte. Unlike Müfti Soltanov, who had invited only spiritual personnel to the meeting in Ufa,
Müfti Karashaiskii had originally included a number of people from outside the spiritual
assembly in this project. According to İsmail Gasprinskii, when the Muslims assembled
at this meeting decided to send a delegation to St. Petersburg to speak to Witte on behalf
of Crimean Muslims, both spiritual personnel and non-spiritual personnel were chosen.
Thus, alongside spiritual assembly figures like Müfti Karashaiskii, Simferopol kadi Ömer
Efendi from Simferopol, and Imam Haci Amir Efendi from Bahçesaray, non-assembly
figures would also take part, including Mustafa Mirza Kipchaksii (a member of the
zemstvo of the uezd of Simferopol), Mustafa Mirza Davidovich (a member of the city
Duma of Simferopol), İsmail Mirza Müftizade (an officer), İsmail Gasprinskii, and “three
students”.

By June, however, serious divisions had emerged between Müfti Karashaiskii and
İsmail Gasprinskii. In an open letter to Karashaiskii published by Gasprinskii in
Tercüman, Gasprinskii accused the müfti of failing to live up to their earlier agreement.
The müfti, Gasprinskii charged, had assembled a new delegation of representatives
consisting entirely of members of the spiritual assembly, which than traveled to St.
Petersburg without Gasprinskii or any of his supporters. Gasprinskii wrote that he had
only learned of the creation of the new Crimean delegation while he was traveling by

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63 This meeting had likely been arranged in response to a request from Witte, who is on record as having asked both Soltanov and Sheyh ul-Islam Akhundzade of the Caucasus to schedule such meetings with their assemblies.
64 “Postanovlenie sobrania musul'man krymskago poluostrova.” Tercüman 31, April 22, 1905.
65 “Postanovlenie sobrania musul'man krymskago poluostrova.”
train from Orenburg to Tashkent, where he had planned to meet with Muslim community representatives from Central Asia. In his letter to Karashaiskii, written from the train, Gasprinskii accused the müfti of ignoring the interests of the community ('millet') and betraying his word to the representatives who had collected at the müfti’s residence the previous April.66

In another article, Gasprinskii similarly accused both the müfti and Ömer Efendi of turning their backs on the interests of the community.

The müfti and the kadis initially had worked together with the people (cemaat), and even invited them to his house for discussions. The müfti and Akmescit67 kadi Ömer Efendi agreed to electing a deputation and sending it to St. Petersburg. However after that.....after that I don’t know what kind of mischief they got themselves into. They turned their backs on the promises they had made and began working against a community project (millet proyekti).68

While this incident caused a permanent rift between Gasprinskii and Karashaiskii, Karashaiskii continued to be involved in the activities of non-spiritual personnel in their efforts to organize politically. In January of 1906, Karashaiskii visited St. Petersburg just before the Second All-Russian Muslim Congress was due to begin. Indeed, İttifak leaders such as Yusuf Akçura and Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev understood the value of the müfti, and sought to employ him in discussions with the tsarist authorities. Just like the Muscovite Zahidullah Effendi Shefiğ had attempted to convince Müfti Soltanov to intervene on behalf of İttifak in order to arrange an audience with the Emperor, Müfti Karashaiskii was enlisted in January of 1906 to speak to Interior Minister Witte in an

66 “Kırım Müftisine (açık mektup),” Tercüman 43, June 3, 1905.
67 “Akmescit” is the Tatar name for “Simferopol”.
(ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to get formal permission for the organization to hold a party congress in St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{69}

In the Caucasus, issues pertaining to Muslim political activity and representation were dominated by events related to the Muslim-Armenian fighting which broke out in 1905. While representatives from the Caucasus such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Hüseyinzade Ali, and Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev attended the first İtîfak meeting in St. Petersburg in early 1905, they had returned early from the meeting in order to attend to events unfolding in Baku, which had been the site of particularly bloody skirmishes. As was discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, the response of the regional tsarist authorities in the Caucasus to this fighting was to rely heavily upon the spiritual assemblies to both end the fighting and bring relief to the communities affected by it. Indeed, both Sheyh ul-Islam Akhundzade and the Armenian Patriarch were charged by the vice-regency with the task of assembling delegations to take part in three-way talks arbitrated by the Russian authorities in Tbilisi.\textsuperscript{70} After the fighting had subsided, moreover, the vice-regency established a system of indemnification through which material losses suffered by Muslims as a result of the fighting would be compensated by money obtained through vakif revenues. Shiite spiritual authorities were made responsible for compiling and assessing the worthiness and accuracy of the claims of Muslims, while the Armenian Spiritual Assembly was likewise responsible for undertaking these tasks in the Armenian community.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{69} Yet the held the congress anyway. Bigi, İlahat Esaslari, 208-210.
\textsuperscript{70} In a letter sent on March 29, 1905, the office of the governor of the province of Elizavetpol credits the Armenian and Muslim spiritual authorities in putting an end to the violence, writing “Thanks to the intervention of the Armenian and Tatar spiritual assemblies and gentry, Armenians and Tatars have made peace.” ADTA, f. 290, op. 2, d. 2639, l. 3.
\textsuperscript{71} ADTA, f. 290, op. 2, d. 2634, l. 12. Hundreds of claims for compensation submitted to the sheyh ul-Islam’s office can be found in ADTA, f. 290, op. 2, d. 2725. One of these claims was written by Ali
Like müftis Soltanov and Karashaiskii, spiritual assembly figures in the Caucasus were also approached in early 1905 by tsarist officials seeking to enter into discussions with Muslim community leaders over the issue of reform. As was the case with Interior Minister Witte’s request to Müfti Soltanov that he convene a meeting of the ulema in Ufa, tsarist authorities in the Caucasus also asked the Sunni and Shiite assemblies of the Caucasus to hold meetings of spiritual personnel in the interest of formulating a list of needs for the region’s Muslims. These meetings were indeed convened but, as Ahmet Ağaoğlu and others would later charge, the meetings had ultimately broken up before any of the issues before it had been resolved and without sending a single petition to the government.  

While community reform figures from the Volga region active in İtifak tended to view the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly as an essential (if poorly led) component of Muslim administration, in the Caucasus there were far more direct attacks on the spiritual leadership and on the assemblies themselves as institutions. Ahmet Ağaoğlu in particular frequently offered scathing attacks on the leadership of Sheyh ul-Islam Akhundzade, and when the suggestion was made at the St. Petersburg meetings to unite the four Muslim spiritual assemblies, Ağaoğlu sharply criticized the idea.

There is no clergy in Islam. Anyone who is respected enough to be granted the title can become an imam, even a kadi if necessary. It makes no sense to abandon this

Hüseyinzade on behalf of an acquaintance of his. L. 8. Compensation paid to Armenian victims of the fighting was likewise paid out of the coffers of the Armenian Assembly.


73 Like the tsarist government, some of the scholars studying Muslim institutions in Russia employ Christian concepts of “clergy” and “laity” in describing Muslim communities. While this was indeed one of the models employed by the tsarist government in creating the spiritual assemblies, the use of these terms in ways other than to specifically draw attention to tsarist categories is inappropriate. See especially Campbell, “The Autocracy and the Muslim Clergy,” and Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State.” Also see Kelly O’Neill, “Mosque and State.”
Although Ağaoğlu was personally critical of the idea of having spiritual assemblies at all, in his writings appearing in Hayat and İrşad, Ağaoğlu instead called for the direct election of individuals to the positions of müfti and sheyh ul-Islam. While this suggestion was similar to those being made elsewhere in Russia at the time, Ağaoğlu’s attacks on the spiritual assembly leadership were made in a far sharper tone than that being used by community reformers elsewhere in Russia. Ağaoğlu characterized the spiritual leadership as primarily a group of “government civil servants (nachalniklar), totally ignorant of religious rules and customs,”75 prompting both Sheyh ul-Islam Akhundzade and other spiritual personnel to write to Taze Hayat in order to complain about their treatment in Ağaoğlu’s columns.76 Ağaoğlu also charged the spiritual leadership with incompetence and wrote that they were “ready to sell out Muslims for the next thousand years,” even as they dared to “speak in the name of the community.” 77 Ağaoğlu also complained that the spiritual personnel of Baku were discouraging Muslims from reading Hayat, supposedly telling their flocks that “it was practically a sin” to read the newspaper during the month of Ramadan.78

74 Bigi, Islahat Esasları, 11.
75 “Rusya’nın hal-i hazıri,” Hayat, June 12, 1905. This view has, indeed, been a prevalent one in the historiography. See, for example, Rizaeddin’s Fahreddin’s Asrār, which presents a view of the Orenburg Assembly which has influenced a number of historians in their approach to the assemblies, most recently Robert Crews.
76 See, for example, Sheyh ul-Islam Akhundzade’s letter to Taze Hayat, “Sheyh ul-İslam’ın cevabı,” Taze Hayat, April 22, 1907. Also see Hayat 118, December 13, 1905; “Hürriyet-i diyanete” cevap”, Hayat 116, May 30, 1906.
77 “Sebep gene özmüzün,” İrşad 76, May 25, 1907.
78 “Baku ulemanının gazete barsında mevzeleri,” İrşad 255, November 1, 1906.
İtifak and the Duma

Elections to the first Duma were held across Russia over the first four months of 1906. In Kazan, Muslims lived in large numbers in two electoral districts of the city, the second and fifth uchasty. In these districts, there were numerous Muslim candidates to choose from, and even among candidates affiliated with İtifak there was competition for seats. Prior to the elections, newspapers such as Vakit, Yoldiz, Kazan Mukhbirı, and Beyan ul-Hak published the names of the electors they recommended Muslims vote for. While all of these newspapers recommended only Muslims running as Kadets, the specific individuals recommended by these papers often differed greatly.

Of the twenty-five Muslims elected to the first Duma, twelve were from the Volga-Ural region. Three were from the guberniia of Kazan, six from the guberniia of Ufa, two from Orenburg and one from the guberniia of Viatka. Of these, four had received university education and were employed as civil servants, publicists, or lawyers. Another four deputies were mullahs, and four were landowners or merchants. All twelve of the Muslim deputies from the Volga-Ural region were affiliated with İtifak and sat in the Duma as Muslim Fraction members within the Kadet party. In the Caucasus, meanwhile, a total of seven Muslims were elected to the Duma. One was from Kars, two were from the guberniia of Elizavetpol, three were from the guberniia of Baku, and one

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79 In Kazan, votes were cast in early April, 1906.
80 In these and other Duma elections, voters would elect a number of electors (vyborshchiki) in each district. Based upon the total number of votes a party received in the guberniia, each party would have the right to a proportional number of candidates to be placed in the Duma. The electors chosen from each party would then choose who would go to the Duma. Usually, but not always, those men selected to become Duma representatives were themselves electors.
81 For a comparison of these electoral lists, see Yoldiz 25, March 25, 1906 and Kazan Mukhbirı 57, March 26, 1906.
82 For information on the Muslim deputies of all four Dumas, see Diliara Usmanova, Musul'manskaiia fraktiia i problemy "svobody sovestii" v Gosudarstvennoi Dume Rossii (1906-1917) (Kazan: Master Lain,1999), 128-146. Also see M.F. Usal, Birinci, ikinci, ve üçüncü Duma'da müslüman deputatlar [hân alarning kilgan eshlerе] (Kazan: Tipografiia I. N. Khartitonova, 1909).
was from Yerevan. All seven sat in parliament as part of the Muslim Fraction (İtifak), but only two as members of the Kadet party.

In the historiography of this period, İtifak is remembered primarily as the party of Gasprinskii, Akçura, Rizaeddin Fahreddin, and other well known jadids. However, a large number of individuals who were active in İtifak in 1905 and 1906 did not easily fit into this template. Indeed, in late 1905 and early 1906, İtifak represented a coalition of Muslim interests, even while its leadership tended to be drawn from the ranks of jadids and their supporters. Among Muslims in the Volga region in particular, an effort was made to include among İtifak’s Duma representatives a number of individuals from outside the publicist-jadidist circle that dominated its leadership. For example, Fazıl Mingilibaev, who finished last out of sixteen electors chosen in Kazan’s second district, was one of three Muslims from the guberniia of Kazan to be chosen by İtifak to sit in parliament. Mingilibaev was able to go to the Duma as the result of an informal agreement among İtifak leaders in Kazan (who did not expect to win more than three or four seats) to divide their electoral spoils equally by choosing “one intellectual, one merchant, and one mullah.” Thus Mingilibaev, who was a mullah, went to St. Petersburg alongside Said-Girey Alkin, a lawyer and editor of the newspaper Kazan Mukhibiri, and the merchant Gafir Bademshin.83

Another example of an İtifak representative who was not part of the reformist-jadidist leadership circle was Hayrullah Usmanov. Mullah Usmanov was a well known teacher from Orenburg who was close to Müfti Soltanov and active in the politics of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. An akhund, Usmanov was one of the few dozen spiritual

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83 Usal, Müslüman deputalar, 94. Draft materials of İtifak fundraising letters from 1906 also reveal an intention to include a reference to such a coalition among the intelligentsia, spiritual personnel, and merchants. See KGU document T-907, l. 1.
personnel invited to Müfti Soltanov's meeting in Ufa in April of 1905. In June of 1906, Usmanov was appointed to the open position of kadi, a move which angered a number of jadids writing in the periodical press, as they had been lobbying for Rizaeddin Fahreddin's appointment to the position.

At the same time, however, Mullah Usmanov was also deeply involved in İttifak's activities. In the elections to the second Duma held in December of 1906, Usmanov was first elected as a wyborschik and then selected outright to be one of İttifak's two representatives from Orenburg. In parliament, he became the secretary of the İttifak party, and throughout 1907 worked closely with jadidist-İttifak figures like Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Abdüreşid İbrahimov and Fatih Kerimi in organizing party activities. During this time, Usmanov also contributed articles to the jadidist press, including Kerimi's Vakit.

Yet Usmanov was also an individual to whom Muslims, and especially minor spiritual personnel, would appeal with complaints regarding the İttifak party. Writing in the conservative (or “kadimist”) journal Din ve Maşıet in 1907, Usmanov reported that he had recently received two petitions complaining about “the educational program and policies concerning the Sharia court undertaken at the Muslim congresses.” One of these petitions had been signed by eighteen imams in the uezd of Orsk, while the other had been sent to Usmanov by twenty-five “imams and other people” in the uezd of Chelabi. Usmanov's tone in the article was neither critical of the imams nor of the İttifak

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84 This list is provided in İslahat Esasları, 13-14.
86 Ual, 161-162.
87 See, for example, letter from Rizaeddin Fahreddin to Fatih Kerimi, September 1907, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 30, l. 27 and letter from Rizaeddin Fahreddin to Fatih Kerimi, October 15, 1907, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 30, ll. 37-40.
88 “Duma azalarından mektup,” Vakit 156, May 7, 1907.
leadership, and he treated the disagreement largely as a misunderstanding which could be reconciled.  

The presence of individuals like Usmanov in Ītipak during the years 1904-1906 was not an aberration. Indeed, in the early months of Ītipak’s existence, the movement was successful largely because of its ability to attract to the party people like Usmanov, Minglibaev, and others who supported the principle of improving conditions for Muslims in the empire without embracing the educational reforms advocated by much of the Ītipak leadership. By working with the leaders of the spiritual assemblies and opening the doors of the party to individuals both on the left and right who did not always agree with their positions, the leaders of Ītipak created a movement that held substantial appeal for Muslims of a variety of ideological, professional, class, and regional backgrounds. This spirit of coalition and consensus, however, would not last beyond the Third Muslim Congress, which would be held (like the First Congress) in Nizhnii Novgorod in August of 1906.

**Muslim opposition to Ītipak**

Even in 1905 and early 1906, when enthusiasm for the Duma and for Ītipak was at its height, it was widely believed that large numbers of Muslims had chosen to not vote for the Muslim Fraction. After the elections to the first Duma in 1906, for example, a number of articles appeared in the jadist press criticizing supposed “false friends” (*nadan dustlar*), Muslims who had allegedly not turned out to vote for Ītipak. Abdürreşid

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89 See “Musulman fraksiyası”, *Din ve Maqzet* 15, pp. 257-258, 1907. Usmanov also published “question and answer” articles in *Din ve Maqzet* in which he would occasionally answer questions from spiritual personnel regarding the activities of the Muslim Fraction in parliament. See, for example, “Orenburg Haberleri,” *Din ve Maqzet* 12, 195-197.
İbrahimov, for example, wrote in his newspaper Ülvet that Muslims did not try hard enough to get Muslim representatives elected.

A lot of words have been said about the elections of representatives to the Duma. In very many guberniias, no Muslim representatives were elected. Certainly, this is the reason: among Muslims there was no striving (ictihad), no solidarity (ittişak). And when there isn't enough striving, then mischief can take place. A place like the Crimea, a true land of Islam, has two hundred thousand ağas but couldn't get one Mirza through the gates. Nobody made it from a pure Nogay city like Haci Terhan. From the illustrious Muslim guberniias of Samara and Simbirsk, from the nezd of Bugulma, not one person chosen. Even though the guberniia of Perm is filled with Muslims, just two men were chosen.

Yoldız, meanwhile, carried a story in which the author blamed imams in the district of Bishbalta for İttifak's failure to win any seats there. In another article appearing in Din ve Maşet prior to the elections to the third Duma, meanwhile, the writer likewise observed that more İttifak deputies could have been elected to the first Duma if Muslims had participated in greater numbers.

Genuine resistance to the İttifak movement among Muslims only began in significant numbers after the conclusion of the Third All-Russian Muslim Congress, which was held in Nizhnii Novgorod during the period August 16-21, 1906. This was, in fact, the congress at which İttifak formally became a political party, a move which was strongly opposed by many socialist and left-wing Muslims like Hadi Atlasi and Fuad

90 Astrahan.
91 “Duma saylau”, Ülvet 24, May 18, 1906.
92 “Nadan Dustur”, Yoldız, 13, April 1, 1906.
93 Dünya ve Maşet 1 “Dumaga vekil sailau hakinda”, pp. 17-18, 1906. Also see “Sailaular hakinda”, Din ve Maşet 1907, 366-367. Din ve Maşet was called Dünya ve Maşet until 1907.
94 Hadi Atlasi (“Atlazov,” 1876-1938) was an imam-hatip in the village of Elmet, near Bogulma, in the guberniiia of Samara. He was also, during the years 1903-1909, a teacher in the medrese of this village. He was elected to the second Duma, where he sat in the Trudovaia gruppa bloc. After the October Revolution,
Tuktarov. Rather than create a political party, Atlasi, Tuktarov, and others argued that İtifak should focus on improving the cultural and educational conditions of Muslims. “Let’s educate our children in a more contemporary way,” argued Atlasi. “After that we can begin talking about political issues. I’ll repeat myself: let this congress be about facilitating the expansion of education!”

In fact, Muslim socialists were often opposed to the creation of a Muslim political party on ideological grounds. Believing that İtifak was dominated by wealthy Muslims like the Hüseyinovs, Akçurins, Saidashevs, Aitovs, and others, Russian Muslim socialists were reluctant to support a “bourgeois” political party, even if it was one that nominally supported the interests of “All-Russian Muslims.” Arguing that class, rather than religion, was the most pertinent category of social organization for Muslim peasants and laborers, Muslim socialists publishing in organs such as Ural, Duma, and Tang Yoldızı accused İtifak of being an instrument for rich Muslims to continue to exercise their economic monopoly over the poor. İtifak’s use of religion as a category for political organization, they argued, was simply a means of exploiting religion for the sake of politics.

They don’t want to just call themselves the Kadet party, but instead decide “Let’s call ourselves the Muslim İtifak.” Because if they call themselves Muslim, then Muslims will think that İtifak is looking out for their interests. But this party calling itself the Muslim İtifak is instead harmful to the interests of workers and villagers.

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Atlasi taught in both Bogulma and Kazan. He was executed in 1938. “Hadi Atlasov,” Tatarstan Entsiklopedii Sızleze, 50.
95 Fuad Tuktarov (1880-1938) was a well known publicist who published a number of articles in Tang Yoldızı, Kazan Mükbi, Mektep, and other newspapers and journals. After the October Revolution, Tuktarov briefly worked Kazan city administration before immigrating in 1919, living in Turkey from the mid-1920s onward. “Fuad Tuktarov,” Tatarstan Entsiklopedii Sızleze, 670.
96 1906 sene 16-21 August’ta icima etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi (Kazan: Brät‘ia Karimovy, 1906), 32.
97 “Müslüman İticağ,” Ural 1, January 12, 1907.
The creation of İttifak, argued Muslims on the left, was undertaken in order to “prevent Muslim peasants and workers from understanding which class they belong to and therefore not struggling against” the wealthy interests controlling İttifak. Arguing that religious or national metaphors of collective identity treated Russian Muslims “as if they were a single person,” Muslim socialists advocated prior to the elections to the third Duma against voting for İttifak. Instead, they called upon Muslims to support Russian parties which would defend the class interests of all workers and peasants.

The tension between creating a political party and simultaneously speaking in the name of “All-Russian” Muslims was not lost on Yusuf Akçura. In an article published in Kazan Mukhbiri the day before the Third Congress was due to start, Akçura defended İttifak’s decision to adopt a political platform, even one which might not be supported by many Muslims.

Even if the ‘union’ (ittifak) that Muslims are attempting to create is called the “Union of Russian Muslims”, it is impossible to bring together all Russian Muslims at the same time. Therefore, the first article in the party’s platform reads that its goal is to “unite (birleştirmek) all Russian Muslims of the same ideas politically”. After it was decided to accept the platform in its entirety, it is natural that this would become the party’s aim. Thus, “İttifak” is the party only of those Russian Muslims who are working towards a specifically defined goal.

The Third Muslim Congress represented a narrowing of İttifak from an initially broad movement into one of relatively narrow interests “working towards a specifically

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98 Ibid.
99 Ural 21, March 18, 1907.
100 “Müşlimlara başka dindeki kişilerni Dümaga sailarga yarimi?” Ural 5, January 21, 1907. Also see “Kadetler”, Ural 3, January 12, 1907.
defined goal.” Indeed, criticism of the meeting and of the İttifak leadership’s party program came from all sides during and after the congress. Both delegates to the congress and individuals who had not gone to Nizhnii criticized what they described as the lack of publicity surrounding the meeting and the party program that would be discussed there. Hadi Atlasi and Fuad Tuktarov complained that such a small sample of Russian Muslims could not possibly accept the responsibility of debating measures in the name of “all Russian Muslims,” while Muslims in the Caucasus complained that they had not been informed that a Muslim Congress was going to be taking place at all.

Troubling to many others, meanwhile, and compounding anger over the lack of prior publicity regarding the congress program, were signs that the Third Muslim Congress was being used as an opportunity to transform İttifak into a vehicle for advancing jadidism within Muslim communities across the empire. The party program endorsed at the Third Congress included, for example, an ambitious project regarding the establishment of a standardized (umumi) program of education for Muslim schools in every region of Russia. This program envisioned the creation of a standardized curriculum for Muslim medreses, something which had been long a feature of the idealized versions of jadidist education described in the writings of Gasprinskii and others. The establishment of teacher training schools was also planned, and teachers

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102 İttifak was now primarily in the hands of Yusuf Akçura and Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev. İsmail Gasprinskii still loomed as the powerful, though ailing, doyen of the movement.

103 And, in this respect, this episode resembles Müfti Soltanov’s 1905 Ufa meeting.

104 1906 sene 16-21 Avgust’ta icıma etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 144.

105 “Üçüncü umum Rusya müslüman içtimaina dair”, İısad 197, August 21, 1906. Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev was one of the chairmen with this congress, but Topçibaşev has spent most of his time since 1905 in St. Petersburg. Muslims who had stayed in Baku throughout the Armenian-Muslim fighting and its aftermath included Ahmet Bey Ağaoğlu and Ali Bey Hüseynzade. Ağaoğlu, in particular, was involved in a number of activities devoted to community welfare, and was appointed to the Muslim side of the peace talks sponsored by the regional vice-regency.

106 1906 sene 16-21 Avgust’ta icıma etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 60-61.
would have to take examinations in order to become licensed. Licensing would be the responsibility of the Orenburg Assembly, which would become a unified body consolidating all of Russian Muslims into a single institution.\textsuperscript{107}

In addition to creating teacher training schools and establishing examinations, the standardized educational program that was accepted at the Third Muslim Congress also called for Muslim schools to teach, “to the extent possible,” in the “common language” (\textit{umumi lisan}), or “Türki”,\textsuperscript{108} a proposal that was clearly influenced by İsmail Gasprinskii, who had been campaigning for the adoption of a “common literary language” on the pages of \textit{Tercüman} for most of 1906.\textsuperscript{109} The 1906 meeting also called for increasing Russian language courses in Muslim schools,\textsuperscript{110} a position that had long been supported by jadids as well even as thousands of Muslims in the Volga region had been protesting against mandatory Russian-language education for much of the previous twenty-five years.\textsuperscript{111} Even more galling to non-jadid followers of \textit{İttişak}, however, was the proposal, also accepted at this congress, that “all Russian Muslims will be educated according to the new method.” \textsuperscript{112} Indeed, for many people in attendance, the Third Muslim Congress represented the final victory of jadidism. Very few people spoke up in

\textsuperscript{107} 1906 seni 16-21 Avgust’ta icitma etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 60-61.
\textsuperscript{108} 1906 seni 16-21 Avgust’ta icitma etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 76-77.
\textsuperscript{109} See, for example, “Can yani dil meselesi,” \textit{Tercüman} 6, January 25, 1908. Also see Lazzerini, “İsmail Bey Gasprinskii,” 211-213. Gasprinskii had been the most prominent Muslim reformer calling for the establishment of a “common literary language” (known as Türkî) since early 1906. For more on the so-called “language issue”, see Chapter 5 of this study.
\textsuperscript{110} Indeed, İsmail Gasprinskii and Abdüresseid Ibrâîmov had advocated the study of Russian among Muslims for decades.
\textsuperscript{111} See chapters 1 and 2.
\textsuperscript{112} 1906 seni 16-21 Avgust’ta icitma etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 84-85.
defense of the existing system of education. “We’re all fed up with our schools,” declared İsmail Gasprinskii during the course of the discussions. Nobody contradicted him.\textsuperscript{113}

In the words of one delegate to the congress, the new method teacher Ahmedcan Mustafa, “the battle over usul-i cedid is over.”

No fear remains. The fantasy that usul-i cedid would harm religion did frighten people, but now they understand that it is harmless. So, we must now try as hard as possible to reform our schools, and if we so endeavor we will accomplish these reforms.\textsuperscript{114}

According to the program of the Third Congress, the Muslim spiritual assemblies were also slated to undergo major changes. The four assemblies would continue to exist, but would be subsumed within a single body, which would be concerned with the affairs of both Shiite and Sunni Muslims across the empire. The head of this body would be called the sheyh ul-Islam, who would be elected to a five year term.\textsuperscript{115} Muslim judges, or kadis, would also be elected to five year terms. Moreover, both the sheyh ul-Islam and the kadis would be assisted in their duties by a lawyer trained in Russian civil law.\textsuperscript{116}

According to a proposal made by İsmail Gasprinskii, affairs concerning Muslims would be divided into separate “political” and “religious” realms. The newly consolidated spiritual assembly would be responsible for “religious” matters, while İttifak would be responsible for “political” matters facing the Muslim community. The only people to speak out at length against this resolution at the congress were the leftists in attendance, headed by Fuad Tuktaroff and Hadi Atlasi, who both favored abolishing the spiritual

\textsuperscript{113} 1906 sene 16-21 Avgust’ta ictima etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 76-77. While some, such as Çarullah Akçurin, spoke out against this, the most influential members of the İttifak leadership—Abdullah Apanaev in particular—harshly criticized Akçurin, and the resolution was easily passed.
\textsuperscript{114} 1906 sene 16-21 Avgust’ta ictima etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 70.
\textsuperscript{115} 1906 sene 16-21 Avgust’ta ictima etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 108-109.
\textsuperscript{116} 1906 sene 16-21 Avgust’ta ictima etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 124-125.
institutions altogether. As was the case with the debates at the Third Congress over the question of school reform, no one spoke out in favor of maintaining the existing structure of the assemblies.

**Malaise and opposition**

From 1907 onwards, the optimism and expressions of community solidarity which had been a feature of the İttifak movement for most of 1905 and 1906 began to disintegrate into malaise, indifference, and public criticism of the İttifak party. There were several reasons for this. One of the most important of these reasons was the adoption by the Russian government, on June 3, 1906, of a new election law which sharply limited the number of seats available to non-Russian communities of the empire. While the changes to the election law were not the only reason for the decline in Muslim representation in the third and fourth Dumas, they certainly contributed to it. To the third Duma, a total of just ten Muslims were elected. In the fourth Duma, there were only seven.

Although changes in the election law certainly had an impact on the number of Muslims elected to the third and fourth Dumas, part of the reason for this decline also stemmed from increased dissatisfaction among Muslims with the activities of İttifak. In part, this was due to the inability of İttifak to produce the types of changes in the legal

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117 1906 sene 16-21 Avgust’ta icimda etmeğ Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi, 104-108.

118 This law limited the representation of the Caucasus from twenty-nine Duma representatives to ten, and it gave Russian Orthodox Christians the right, wherever they were in the minority, to elect their representatives separately from the rest of the population. E. A. Goldenweiser, “The Russian Duma”, *Political Science Quarterly* 29, No. 3, (Sep., 1914), 413.

119 Tables showing the total number of İttifak deputies sitting in the four Dumas can be found in Usmanova, *Musul’manskaia Fraktsiia*, 128-146. On the Muslim deputies, also see *Musul’manskie deputaty Gosudarstvennoi dumi Rossii 1906-1917 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Ufa: Kitap, 1998). Also see L. A. Iamashova, *Musul’manskii liberalizm nachala XX veka kak obschestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie* (Ufa: “Gilem”, 2002).
position of Muslims in Russia that had been envisioned in 1905 and 1906.\textsuperscript{120} While the October Manifesto of 1905 had promised legal equality to subjects of all religions in the empire, attempts by İtifak deputies within the Kadet party and, after Nizhnii, through their own party to codify their new status by means of legislation were unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{121} With regard to the supervision of Muslim schools, which had been an issue of keen importance to Muslims in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, not only was no progress made but conditions seemed to be worsening. Supervision over Muslim schools in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly remained in the hands of the Ministry of Education. Meanwhile, the government had proposed even more restrictive regulations on schools (the March 31 Regulations), underscoring the continued vulnerability of Muslim communities in this respect even after 1905.\textsuperscript{122}

Moreover, the more aggressive stance on jadidism adopted by the İtifak leadership in at the Third Congress in Nizhnii Novgorod invited considerable criticism from Muslims of a variety of backgrounds. Indeed, even during the congress itself news reached the floor that Müfti Soltanov had personally gone to Witte in order to disassociate himself from the party’s program. It was rumored, moreover, that the great majority of mullahs in the assembly would support Soltanov, rather than İtifak, in the event of a split between the two.\textsuperscript{123} Meanwhile, İtifak leaders became the object of a popular rebellion of sorts during the years 1909-1911. Just as jadids, both local and well known, had been targeted in the denunciations of this period in Kazan province, so too

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\textsuperscript{120} Indeed, while İtifak figures such as Akçura and Gasprinskii had written and spoken extensively on a variety of issues concerning Russian Muslims in 1905-1906, their proposals concerning Muslim schools, the Muslim spiritual assemblies, and most other issues were never implemented.
\textsuperscript{121} Usmanova, \textit{Musul'manskaiia fraktsiia}, 89-93.
\textsuperscript{122} For more on discussions concerning Muslim opposition to İtifak, see “Möselmannarga”, \textit{Vakit} 156, June 7, 1907.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{1906 seni 16-21 Avgust 'ta ictimi etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi}, 126-127.
\end{flushright}
were the leaders of İttifak, all of whom were identified in various ways with jadidism. In the years following the Third Congress at Nizhnii, İttifak figures such as Yusuf Akçura, Fatih Kerimi, and Ali Merdan Bey Topçubaşev would regularly appear in the denunciations Muslims were making regarding the supposedly “pan-Turkist” activities of jadids in the Volga region. This led to police investigations into a number of prominent Muslim figures, including Yusuf Akçura.124

From 1907 onwards, articles began to appear in the Muslim periodical press on the subject of Muslims supporting parties other than İttifak. In the “kadimist” journal Din ve Maiset it was reported in late 1907 that “a very strong movement” against İttifak had started up among Muslims in and around the city of Orenburg. Kargali, the village outside Orenburg where Ahmed Bey Hüseynov’s Medrese-i Hüseyiniye was located, was reportedly the center of this anti-İttifak agitation. Indeed, Kargali was generally viewed as a center of jadidism, due to the presence of the medrese and other undertakings associated with the Hüseynov family.

Din ve Maiset, which carried the announcements of İttifak whenever they were released,125 just like all of the jadist newspapers and journals in the region, was supportive of İttifak and the principle of “All-Russian Muslim” political organization even if it tended to publish a large number of opinion pieces railing against jadidism and

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124 See Chapter 3 of this study. This led to police investigations into a number of prominent Muslim figures, including Yusuf Akçura. Akçura, who had already been jailed once in Russia (immediately prior to the elections to the first Duma), later cited his fear of arrest as a principle reason behind his move to Istanbul. Nevertheless, he continued to return to Russia frequently. On investigations into the “pan-Turkist” activities of Yusuf Akçura, Fatih Kerimi, and Gayaz Ishaki, see NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 948, ll. 178-179. On special investigation into Yusuf Akçura’s activities, see NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 369.


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jads. In bemoaning the loss of Muslim support for İtifak in the months after Nizhnni, the editors\textsuperscript{126} of Din ve Maïset found little to celebrate.

Unfortunately, among some people in our community (millet) there are very many people who have come out in opposition to İtifak. This opposition is coming from both the right and the left.\textsuperscript{127}

Alarmed by İtifak's vision of Muslim Russia, some Muslims appealed to the tsarist administration in the name of defending Islam. According to Din ve Maïset, a group of imams from villages in the vicinity of Orenburg had sent a telegram to the Interior Ministry complaining about İtifak, and arguing that its policies concerning Muslim education and turning the müftüate into an elected position were contrary to Islam.\textsuperscript{128}

During this time, the pro-İtifak Muslim periodical press also occasionally reported stories that various spiritual personnel were supporting right-wing monarchist parties, such as the Union of Russian People (Soïuz Russkogo naroda). These reports first circulated in the Volga region in the months immediately following the Muslim congress in Nizhnni Novgorod in August of 1906.\textsuperscript{129} While the Union of Russian People apparently had little success in its efforts to recruit Muslims in the Volga region, it did succeed in finding some Muslim supporters in St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{126} The publisher of Din ve Maïset was Mökhâmđâvalî Hüseyinov (Khösîlenov), the son of Gani Hüseyinov, and nephew of renowned philanthropist Ahmet Hüseyinov. The journal's first editor was Zahirulla muezzîn Khâirullin, and later mullah Fäezkhân Dautov. Röstâm Mökhâmätshin, "Din və Müstäfət" zhurnalining bibliografiası (1906-1918) (Kazan: Iman, 2002), 3.

\textsuperscript{127} Din ve Maïset 19, 297-299.

\textsuperscript{128} A similar article was published in Din ve Maïset 1907. See “Zamanlar üzgäre bit efendilăr!” Din ve Maïset 19, May 25, 1907, 299-300.

\textsuperscript{129} See "Protest", Beyan al-Hâk 66, September 12, 1906.

\textsuperscript{130} See “Asl Ruslar ve Islam,” İrşad 95, May 23, 1907 and “Acip tedbirlerdir!!”, İrşad 25, February 28, 1908. In 1912, when another Monarchist Muslim organization, Sirat al-Mustakîm, was opened, the limited success of the Soïuz Russkogo Naroda in attracting Muslims in St. Petersburg was again discussed. See “İkinci bir tecrübe,” Yakût 1414, February 12, 1914. For information on the efforts of the Soïuz Russkogo Naroda to recruit Muslims in the Volga region, see NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 315, l. 38.
After the dissolution of the second Duma, Muslim support for İtifik continued to decline. İtifik managed to elect just eight deputies to the third Duma (November 1 1907-June 9 1912), while another two Muslims were elected as a Social Democrat and an Octobrist. To the fourth Duma—for which the electoral rules concerning Muslim candidates were no more severe than they had been for the third Duma—İtifik’s number of deputies continued to drop, with only six candidates being elected (along with another Muslim candidate elected as part of the Progressive Bloc).\textsuperscript{131} Indeed, even among İtifik activists, spirits began to flag regarding the movement’s ability to retain the loyalty of Volga Muslims. In particular, İtifik leaders feared what appeared to be the growing support among Muslims in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly for right-wing parties. In June of 1912, for example, Hasan Gabishev, an İtifik activist and close associate to Fatih Kerimi, wrote the following to Kerimi about his ideas concerning the political mood among Kazan Muslims for the upcoming elections, anticipated for fall of that year.

With regard to the elections, I felt little personal interest. Perhaps because our chances are so small in Kazan. I think that among Muslims there will be very little consensus. I understood that it’s possible that they will support the Russians. Right-wing and Octobrist circles in Kazan just take me for a Russophobe. It’s impossible to explain to them that they’re wrong. They don’t understand Russian enmity for our nation (milliyet). They don’t want to understand that by cooperating with them they’ll just be inviting more missionaries into their lives. Also, people who say they’re supporting rightist parties were not hostile to me. At the same time, they made no effort to hide their views.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131} Usmanova, Musul’manskaia franktsiia, 144-146. In the third Duma, İtifik won only seven seats in the Volga-Ural region, and for the fourth Duma only five were elected from these regions.

\textsuperscript{132} Letter from Kazan Gabishev to Fatih Kerimi, June 3 1912. NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 6-7.

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In 1914, a number of prominent Muslims in St. Petersburg established “Sirat al-Mustakim,” also known as the “All Russian Muslim Peoples’ Union” (Vserossiskii musul’manskii narodnoi soiuz). Among the founders of this organization were a number of spiritual personnel from the St. Petersburg area, including Mukhamet Safa Beyazitov, the editor of the Turkic-language St. Petersburg newspaper Nur. Strat al-Mustakim was generally understood by both the pro-Itifak Muslim periodical press and the Russian Department of Spiritual Affairs (which got most of its information from these very newspapers) as a right-wing and anti-jadidist challenge to Itifak.

These efforts did not represent a serious challenge in terms of electoral figures, but they did succeed in contesting Itifak’s claim to the exclusive political representation of Russian Muslims. The reaction of Itifak leaders and their supporters in the periodical press to the creation of alternative locations of particularly “Muslim” political activity—including both left and right wing variants—was frequently bitter. Ismail Gasprinskii denounced the six Muslim deputies who joined the Labor Bloc in 1906, calling it a betrayal of the Muslim cause.

Ahmet Ağaoğlu and others also frequently denounced the efforts of Muslims to form alternative political groupings, calling instead for Muslims to stay united behind Itifak. Writing in response to rumors that several mullahs from among the newly elected

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133 Beyazitov would succeed Soltanov as Orenburg Mufi upon the latter’s death in 1915. He would serve until May of 1917, at which point Galimcan Barudi was elected by 830 delegates as the first Mufi of the post-imperial period. Barudi would serve until his death in 1921, at which point he would be replaced by Rizaeddin Fahreddin. Iakupov, Obscherossiiiskii mufiitat, 34-35.

134 Ahmet Ağaoğlu estimated that there were 30,000 Muslims living in St. Petersburg in 1907. Beyazitov would become the Mufi of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly after the death of Mufi Soltanov in 1914. He held this position from 1915 to 1917, from which point forward he became imam of St. Petersburg.

135 For a report on Strat al Mustakim by the Department of Spiritual Affairs, see RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 474, esp. ll. 290, 320-325, 346, 377. Also see Vakit 1414, February 12, 1914; It 15, February 5, 1914 and It February 22, 1914; Beyan al-Hak 1296 and 1297, February 12 and 14, 1914.

136 Rorich, The Volga Tatars, 240 fn. 55.
deputies to the second Duma were planning on splitting off from İttifak and forming their own party. Ağaoğlu implored them to reconsider for the sake of “community interests.” In 1914, meanwhile, an article in the newspaper İl accused the founders of Sirat al-Mustakim of having “sold out the community’s honor.”

Conclusions

It has become axiomatic in the historiography of the Russian Muslim borderlands to comment upon the “lack of interest” among the Muslim populations of the empire “in the events of the revolution.” However, such a statement only makes sense if the “events of the revolution” are understood to mean nothing other than participation in the mass protests taking place against the tsarist government. Indeed, the Muslims of the Russian Empire—both elites and non-elites—did not protest in large numbers against the tsar, but they nevertheless did participate fully in the 1905 Revolution. They were, in fact, particularly active in the writing of petitions and the organization of professional and political groupings. Yet their concerns focused less upon the administration of the empire as a whole than the administration of Muslim communities in particular. For most Muslims of the empire, the 1905 Revolution did not constitute simply the “Russian” revolution taking place throughout the empire more generally and in St. Petersburg in particular, but rather primarily involved the transformative events taking place within their own communities, and the communities of the four spiritual assemblies in particular. While none of this would have happened without the October Manifesto or other such similar liberalization of speech, press, and political activity, the effects which counted the

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137 “Piterburg’da Müslüman fraksiasının ihtilafi,” İsgad 52, March 25, 1907.
139 Kirmili, National Movements and National Identity, 59.
most for the majority of Muslims were those involving specifically Muslim administration.

While most historiography of the İttifak movement has taken at face value the claims of its leadership to represent “All-Russian Muslims,” there was in fact considerable factionalism within İttifak, and opposition to the movement’s leadership increased considerably among Muslims after the Third Muslim Congress in Nizhnii Novgorod. In 1905 and 1906, İttifak represented a coalition of interests which, while frequently at odds with one another over various cultural issues and the location of Muslim political representation, managed to work together and find success in parliamentary elections.

From late 1906 onwards, however, İttifak’s leadership alienated a number of Muslim partners with whom it had largely cooperated over the previous two years. Many Muslims from the Crimea and the Caucasus were upset that they had not been invited to the 1906 meeting in Nizhnii Novgorod, and as a result ceased participating in İttifak activities altogether. Left-wing Muslims from the Volga-Ural region, who had attended the 1906 meeting, left Nizhnii Novgorod feeling ignored and embittered, and from that point forward began focusing upon their own political organizations outside of İttifak. Meanwhile, the Orenburg Müfti, who had had a contentious yet frequently cooperative relationship with the İttifak leadership for much of the previous two years, became a target of İttifak reforms aimed at curbing his authority and tenure and ceased working activity with the İttifak leadership.¹⁴⁰ Perhaps most importantly, İttifak’s proposals to make itself (rather than the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly) responsible for Muslim

¹⁴⁰ Adeeb Khallid writes of a similar competition over political authority among Muslims in Turkestan in 1917. See “Tashkent: 1917.”
education in Russia and its proposals to make *usul-i cedid* the curriculum for all Muslim schools aroused the intense indignation of a number of the movement’s erstwhile supporters and partners.

In the years after 1906 the Muslim political movement, already severely weakened by an election law designed to restrict the participation of non-Russian populations of the empire, became increasingly divided, and was marked by indifference and malaise. All of the major factions of politically active Muslims—the spiritual leadership, *Itifak*, the right, and the left—maintained alliances with non-Muslim political parties and institutions that at times put them in direct competition with one another.

Indeed, Muslim political figures from across the political spectrum were at times closely allied with non-Muslim organizations. *Itifak*, for example, partnered with the Kadets, the party of which they were officially a part in the first Duma and with which they cooperated in later Dumas as well. While *Itifak* worked with the Kadets, left-wing and socialist Muslims joined the Labor Bloc and advocated voting for Russian left-wing parties instead of *Itifak*. Meanwhile, right-wing Muslims voted for the Octobrists\(^\text{141}\) and were affiliated with other right-wing organizations that maintained close ties to Russian parties. Finally, the leadership of the various spiritual assemblies also maintained their contacts within the Russian government and bureaucracy, where they were generally held in higher esteem and were trusted more than representatives of *Itifak*.

Divisions and factionalism among Muslims involved in community politics led to a number of arguments over where the authority rested to represent the “community”. While *Itifak* claimed to represent “twenty million Muslims” in Russia, others argued that such as narrow group of individuals had no right to “speak in the name” of this broad and

\(^{141}\) A conservative Russian political party.
diverse population. *Ittifak* leaders and their sympathizers in the periodical press often responded to criticism by placing their rivals outside of the community, denouncing them as "traitors" who had "sold out" the community, or who were out of touch with the community more generally. When others attempted to appropriate the "all-Russian" Muslim mantle for themselves, *Ittifak* and its publicist supporters responded in kind, deriding their claim to such a broad representative mandate.

Such disputes over who represented the community raise the question of what the shape and scope of this community was. Whereas chapters 3 and 4 of this study have investigated changes in the locations of representative authority and local prestige at the turn of the twentieth century, chapters 5 and 6 turn to a closer study of collective identity. In the two chapters that follow, the relationship between struggles over the right to speak for the community and the ways in which the community was publicly identified will be examined.
Chapter 5
New Categories, New Horizons: the Politics of Naming

Speaking in the name of the community is an act which often involves a process of community definition, one which outlines the parameters of the community whose name is being invoked. This was the case, for example, when Muslim protesters in the Volga region petitioned tsarist officials in the late nineteenth century in the name of “Muslims” and “Islam”.¹ On other occasions, Kazan kuptsy also contacted tsarist officials in the name of Tatar “society” (obshchestvo),² a term which connotes the lower urban estates to which these individuals (along with meshchanin) belonged and which, prior to the establishment of the Orenburg Assembly, had been their basis of administration.³

After 1905, Muslims in Russia—like subjects of other faiths in the empire—established new societies and organizations, including many with political, educational, social, or charitable purposes, and holding names like the “Organization of Kazan imams”,⁴ the “Orenburg foundation for poor Tatars”,⁵ the “Tobol’sk society of Muslim progressives,” the “Muslim society of Orenburg,” and the “Bashkir society of Murmansk.”⁶

Sometimes, however, this sort of naming could have a divisive impact upon the community, such as when Muslims in the Crimea opposed to Müfti Karashaiskii identified themselves as representatives of “Crimean Muslims.”⁷ Moreover, the issue of

¹ See Chapter 2 of this study.
² In 1893, for example, a delegation of Kazan kuptsy petitioning the governor for permission to see the Interior Minister identified themselves as representatives of “the Muslim community of Kazan” (Kazanskoe magometianskoe obshchestvo). NART, f. 1, op. 3, d. 9126, l. 5.
³ On the Kazan Tatar ratusha, see Chapter 2, 50-51.
⁴ KGU, Document T-510
⁵ RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 464, ll. 151-152.
⁶ RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 473; f. 821, op. 133, d. 474.
⁷ See the Introduction to this study, pp. 1-2. Also see GAARK, f. 27, op. 3, d. 766, ll. 4-17-ob.
who had the right to speak in the name of the community was also closely linked to the question of how the “community” itself should be defined. As Muslims from a variety of backgrounds and viewpoints began to present themselves as community spokespersons to both tsarist authorities and Muslim communities alike, the question of how the “community” needed to be defined became increasingly important. While a number of new types of collective identity which were invoked during these years, these forms of identity were juxtaposed alongside existing notions of collective identity, particularly the communities of the Muslim spiritual assemblies. In the months and years following the 1905 Revolution, “identity” and “politics” became more closely connected than ever as a new generation of community activists not only challenged the positions of the assemblies in representing the interests of the community, but also the very bases upon which the community was understood to exist.

Without question, there was a strong intellectual component to the discussions regarding the community taking place in the Muslim periodical press of these years. Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali Hüseyinzade, İsmail Gasprinskii, Fatih Kerimi, Muhammad Ağa Shahtakhtinskii, and other Muslim intellectuals from this period had studied in the Ottoman Empire and Europe, and were familiar with contemporary discussions regarding Darwin, Marx, Abdullah Cevdet, Ernest Renan, Lev Tolstoy, and

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8 On speaking in the community’s name, see Rogers Brubaker, “In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and Patriotism,” *Citizenship Studies* Vol. 8, No. 2 (June, 2004), 115-127. Brubaker asks, among other things, what it means to speak “in the name of the nation,” and argues that doing so is tantamount to “assert[ing] ownership of the policy on behalf of a ‘core’ ethnocultural ‘nation,’” 117. While Brubaker appreciates the political context in which this “ownership” can be asserted, the milieu in which he is imagining these assertions to be undertaken is one in which there is consensus regarding how the community ought to be defined. What made the political and identity politics of Russian Muslim community activists so intense was the multiplicity of identity conceptions open to them, including “Muslim”, “Russian Muslim”, “Caucasian Muslim”, “Turk”, as well as the regional-sectarian and administrative communities of the four Muslim spiritual assemblies.
other intellectual and scholarly figures of the age. Yet the public expression of community identity was not a purely intellectual activity, isolated from politics. Other contexts were also important, including political, discursive, and cultural ones.

The condition of Muslims across the world was of particular importance to many Muslims writing in the periodical press. Muslim communities worldwide were viewed by both Muslims in Russia and elsewhere as increasingly on the defensive, having been occupied and colonized by European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Elsewhere, Muslim discussions in 1905-1906 over the creation of a Muslim political party were overshadowed by the specter of Bulgarian Muslims, whose plight served as an object lesson to Muslims on the dangers of not organizing politically to defend the rights of the Muslim community. Moreover, even without war or colonization, Russian Muslim activists frequently viewed the material, cultural, and educational conditions of Muslims (both in Russia and elsewhere) as terribly inferior to those of other communities. These problems, they believed, placed the future of Muslim communities in jeopardy. In this context, the principle of "unity" was seen as essential for the attainment of "progress", without which the "community" (millet) might not survive.

Another important context of the times was that of Muslim leadership politics. For years, Muslims had been administered according to the rules governing the four Muslim spiritual assemblies of the empire. Calls for Muslims to unite according to an "All-Russian Muslim" basis thus challenged existing conceptions of Muslim administrative-bureaucratic communities based in Ufa, Simferopol, and Tbilisi. Meanwhile, calls among Muslim activists in the Caucasus for Muslims to think of

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9 On the intellectual influences of the Turkist writers, see Shissler, Between two Empires, 64-81, 103-115. Georgeon, Aux origines du Nationalisme Turc, 16-22.
10 Including, in the late nineteenth century, the Russian conquest of Central Asia.
themselves as "Caucasian Muslims", and not according to sect, likewise undermined the community authority of the leadership of the Shiite and Sunni spiritual assemblies of the region, whose authority was based largely upon the maintenance of this sectarian division.

Populism, and the willingness of Muslim community activists to speak out regarding the "community," is also important to the discussion of this era. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the approach of Orenburg Müfti Soltanov and other spiritual assembly leaders to the question of reform was to treat it mainly as an administrative question, involving primarily the changing of the regulations governing the assemblies themselves.¹¹ As leaders of spiritual communities whose geographic and sectarian borders had existed since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, spiritual assembly figures such as Müfti Soltanov and Müfti Karashaiskii had relatively little to gain in publicly articulating and associating themselves with new forms of community identity. Meanwhile, Muslim community activists such as Akçura, İbrahimov, Gasprinskii, Kerimi, and Ağaoğlu frequently invoked the "community" (millet) and defined it in a variety of ways.

The "public" nature of discussions of community identity is also important. Scholarly literature focusing upon the region tends to portray the identity-related "ideas" of Gasprinskii, Akçura, Ağaoğlu and others as if they existed outside of a highly contested political environment. However, the writings of these and other individuals did not simply represent personal sentiment or intellectual interest, but rather were written in order to persuade large numbers of people. This was done partly because writing was

¹¹ See Chapter 4 of this study, p. 146.
Akçura’s (and Ağaoller’s) vocation, but also because these individuals wanted to change the conditions of Russian Muslims. Like many liberal elites of the time, they felt they knew best for their communities, and they were comfortable speaking in its name.

In this context, the frequent tendency among Muslims community reformers to speak in the name of the “community” (millet) represented not simply a “revival” or “awakening” of “national” discourses, but also signaled the emergence of a new means of imagining the community which was facilitated, in part, through the opening of mass politics in the empire.

**Yusuf Akçura and Üç Tarz-t Siyaset**

One of the best known “national” figures from this era was Yusuf Akçura. A prolific publicist and key figure within the Ittifak movement, Akçura is perhaps best known for his involvement in the Istanbul-based Turkist (or “pan-Turkist”) movement from 1911 onwards. Studies of Akçura and the Turkist movement, moreover, frequently discuss the importance of Akçura’s treatise “Three types of policy” (Üç Tarz-t Siyaset). Published in the Cairo journal Türk in April of 1904, Üç Tarz-t Siyaset is often viewed as a “manifesto” of “pan-Turkism.”

Written shortly after Akçura’s return to Russia in late 1903, Üç Tarz-t Siyaset is a discussion of what form of identity (“Ottomanism”, “pan-Islamism”, or “pan-Turkism”)

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12 And they wrote a lot. Both Akçura and Ağaoller were capable of producing columns which would run over several issues, appearing daily or near-daily for a week or more.
14 Born outside the city of Simbirsk Akçura moved with his mother to Istanbul when he was still a boy after the death of his father. After studying at the war academy, Akçura moved to Paris and then returned to Russia in 1903.
15 See Chapter 6 of this study.
the Ottoman state should adopt for itself. The tone of the articles is largely detached, even scholarly. Akçura declares at the introduction to the piece, which ran on the front page of three successive issues of Türk in April of 1904, that “there are three separate political paths which have been roughly conceived in the interest of gaining strength and awakening the desire for progress in the Ottoman Empire.” The emergence of these three types of collective identity, which are explored by Akçura largely from the point of view of the potential benefits to the Ottoman state, is presented as a modern phenomenon, one which had been “disseminated from the West” to the Ottoman lands. These included “Ottomanism”, “pan-Islamism”, and “pan-Turkism”.17

“Ottomanism,” wrote Akçura, had been the goal of the Ottoman government during the Tanzimat era, when Ottoman policymakers sought—“like in America”—the creation of “a new nation brought together by a common homeland,” in which religious and ethnic background would be of less significance to the state and its subjects. This view of the state’s identity, wrote Akçura, fell into disfavor after France’s loss to Germany in 1870, both because the men most associated with the Tanzimat era—Ali and Fuat pashas—had lost their biggest backer in Napoleon III, and because Germany’s victory represented the victory of a new understanding of nationalism as something fundamentally based upon race.18

Akçura then proceeds to discuss the adoption by many Ottoman intellectuals (such as the “Young Ottomans”)19 and, eventually, by Sultan Abdülhamid II himself, of the policy of “pan-Islamism”. This ideology, wrote Akçura, not only held the power to

divide non-Muslim Ottoman subjects from Muslim Ottoman subjects more deeply, but also could connect the Muslim-majority empire more fully with Muslims from across the globe. The “pan-Islamism” of Abdülhamid II, argued Akçura, constituted policies undertaken both domestically and internationally.

The current ruler (Abdülhamid II) tried to spread the use of the term “caliph” in place of words like “sultan” or “padişah.” In his general politics, religion and Islam take an important place. The amount of time dedicated to studying religious subjects in the education offered in state schools has been increased. It was desired that the fundamentals of education be made religious. Religiosity—even if it was external and hypocritical—became the surest way of attracting the favor of the Caliph. Yıldız palace was filled with hocas, imams, seids, sheyhs, and şerifs. Some positions in the civil bureaucracy were filled by people wearing turbans...Before long, they were sending ambassadors to inner Africa, where there are many Muslims, and China. Work began on the construction of the Hejaz railway, the greatest example of this policy’s undertaking.20

Finally, wrote Akçura, a small number of individuals in the Ottoman Empire had recently begun discussing “the idea of bringing about a policy of Turkish nationalism based upon race (ırk).” The ideas of individuals like Necip Asım, Veled Çelebi, Hasan Tahsin and the newspaper İkdam, wrote Akçura, constituted the lion’s share of Turkist sentiment in the Ottoman Empire. Because the Ottoman government did not support their activities, wrote Akçura, the Turkists’ numbers were not large.21

For Akçura, the embrace of a more Turkist-oriented domestic and foreign policy was desirable because it would bring with it practical benefits to the Ottoman state. Even if, wrote Akçura, a “pan-Turkist” approach by the Ottoman state would alienate non-Turkish populations in the empire, the empire stood to gain from the allegiance of Turks

21 Ibid.
from outside the empire, particularly Russia. Akçura wrote that “the great benefit” of a pan-Turkist policy in the Ottoman Empire would be that:

The unification of the Turks, whose languages, races, traditions, and—for most of them—even their religions are one; who in most cases migrated from Asia to the east of Europe; will be a service to efforts to form a great political nation which will be capable of defending the existence of Turks alongside the other great nations.

While Akçura argued that “racial” forms of collective identity, such as Turkism, were more contemporary than religious-based forms, he also believed that Islam was essential to the development of Turkism as a form of collective identity that could be embraced by the state and the public alike. Yet Islam needed to change, he argued, in order to accommodate the concept of separate forms of nationalism within Islam.

We must remember, however, that the majority of Turks who would be in a position to unite are Muslim. For this reason, the Muslim religion could become an important component in the formation of a greater Turkish nation. Some of those who wish to articulate (tarif etmek) the nation (milliyet) continue to look upon religion as one such location (mevki). Islam must change in order to accept that nations would come into being within it, just as Christianity has done in recent years. Indeed, this change is a practical necessity because the races are also part of the general trend of our time.

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22 “Azım bir milliyet-i siyasiye.” As is usually the case when Akçura (and Ağaoğlu) discuss the “nation”, the term “milliyet” is used, rather than “millet.”
24 One of Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s best-known series of columns was dedicated to this very issue. See Ahmet Ağaoğlu, “İslamîyette dava-yi milliyet” (I-II), Türk Yurdu, Vol. 6, No. 10, 2320-2329, 1914/1330; Vol. 6, No. 11, 2381-2390, 1914/1330.
25 “Din-i Islam, büyük Türk milliyetinin teşekküründe mühim bir unsur olabilir.”
26 In the original published in Türk, this says ‘mevki’, but in the reprint published in Istanbul in 1913, this word has been replaced by ‘amil’. Most English translations of Üç Tarz-i Siyaset are based upon the 1913 edition, which is slightly different from the original.
27 “Zamanımız tarihinde görülen ceyayan-i umumi ırklarındadır.” In the 1913, edition, this apparent typographical error has been changed to “ırklarındadır.”
Most of the historiography of Akçura, which is usually based only upon his writings appearing in the Ottoman Empire, draws a straight trajectory between Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset and the Turkism that Akçura and others would advocate from 1911 onwards through their association with the journal Türk Yurdu. However, between the 1904 publication of Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset and the founding of Türk Yurdu in 1911, Akçura embraced a variety of identity forms. Indeed, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset was not at all well known among either Russian Muslims or the tsarist state, and during the years 1904-1908, Akçura was not viewed by either as a “pan-Turkist”. Akçura made little attempt to present himself as a “pan-Turkist” during the years 1904-1908, and concentrated instead upon the principle of Muslim political organization upon an “All-Russian” basis. It was only after his return to Istanbul in late 1908 that Akçura began to write more frequently on Turkism and the “Turkic World”, and even then these writings only began in earnest after the establishment of Türk Yurdu in 1911.

Newspaper culture after 1905

Muslim community reformers often used newspapers as a means of both organizing politically and articulating various forms of collective identity. Indeed, the liberalization of laws concerning the publication of books, political pamphlets, newspapers, and journals in languages other than Russian led to an exponential increase in the Muslim periodical press of the empire. Prior to 1905, there had been only a handful of newspapers published in the languages of Muslim communities in Russia. The most famous of these was Ismail Gasprinskii’s Terciiman, but others included Muhammad

28 See Georgeon, Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc, 23-34; Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey, 14.
29 See Chapter 6 of this study.
30 On Terciiman, see Chapter 2 of this study.
Ağa Shahtakhtinskii’s Şark-i Rus and the Turkistan Vilayetinin Gazeti. Between 1905 and 1917, however, a total of sixty-two Tatar-language newspapers were published legally in the Volga-Ural region, including twenty-three in Kazan. In Baku, meanwhile, sixty-three newspapers were published during these years, while elsewhere in Russia—in cities and regions such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Crimea, the northern Caucasus, Siberia, and Central Asia—Muslims established newspapers as well as places in which to read them, including numerous libraries and reading rooms.

Estimates of the circulations of these newspapers vary. Alexandre Bennigsen writes that Vakit had a circulation of 2500. Meanwhile, a 1907 report by the Press Censor of the guberniia of Kazan reported that Kazan Mukhibir’s circulation was thought by the authorities to be between 2000 and 2200 copies. According to the same report, Yoldız was thought to be producing between 1600 and 2000 copies for each issue, while Beyan ul-Hak was estimated at between 2200 and 2800. Regarding the Caucasus, Bennigsen writes that Hayat reached a circulation of 2500 and İrşad’s circulation was more than 3000. At the time of İrşad’s closing, however, articles appeared in the Muslim periodical press stating that its circulation had never exceeded 500.

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31 On Shahtakhtinskii, also see Chapter 6 of this study, especially pages 242, 248-251.
32 See Chapter 2 of this study, p. 72 (fn. 56). On the Muslim periodical press in Russia before 1905, see Bennigsen, La Presse, 21-46.
33 Bennigsen, La Presse, 53-54.
34 Bennigsen, La Presse, 133.
35 On the creation of these organizations, see RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 464; f. 821, op. 133, d. 473; f. 821, op. 133, d. 474.
36 Bennigsen, La Presse, 73.
37 NART, f. 420, op. 1, d. 88, II. 2, 67, 108-109. Russian-language newspapers were estimated at having slightly higher circulations. Kazanskii Telegram was listed as having a circulation of 4600, Volzhskii Listok was listed at 2900, and Kazanskii Vecher at 3000. On the Muslim periodical press, also see R.U. Amirkhanov, Tatarskaia demokraticheskaia pechati (1905-1907 gg.) (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).
38 Bennigsen, La Presse, 107-108.
39 Ağaoğlu himself wrote that İrşad’s circulation had previously been “up to 500,” but had dropped to 230 during the month of Ramadan, which Ağaoğlu blamed upon efforts by the ulema to discourage Muslims from reading newspapers. “Baku ulemasının gazette barasında muvazeleri,” İrşad 255, November 1, 1906.
Most of the newspapers established during these years were very short-lived. Those which managed to survive for more than a few months were usually bankrolled by wealthy patrons. Often, the patrons of these newspapers were also closely connected with the İttifak party leadership. The best-known Muslim newspaper from the Volga region was the Orenburg-based Vakit, which began publication in 1906. This newspaper, which was published at first twice-weekly and then three times weekly before becoming a daily newspaper in 1913, was owned by Şakir and Zakir Râmiev, wealthy industrialists who had made much of their money in gold mining in the Ural mountains.\textsuperscript{40}

The public articulation and of various forms of community identity in the Muslim periodical media did not simply constitute the formulation of “ideas” regarding nationalism, but rather was closely bound up with the cultural and leadership politics of the time. Indeed, most of the well-circulated Muslim newspapers of the time were owned, edited, and written by individuals with close connections to both the jadid movement and the İttifak party. Zakir Râmiev, who published the journal Şura in addition to Vakit, was an important supporter of jadid causes and the İttifak movement, and sat as an İttifak deputy\textsuperscript{41} in the first Duma. Vakit’s editor was the well-known jadid Fatih Kerimi, while Şura was edited by Rizaeddin Fahreddin. Like Kerimi, Fahreddin was an active member of the İttifak leadership and was closely associated with the party in the eyes of most politically active Muslims.\textsuperscript{42} Kazan-Mukhbiri, which was Yusuf Akçura’s first newspaper before Akçura jumped to Vakit in 1907, was owned and operated by Said Giray Alkin, a

\textsuperscript{40} Bennigsen, La Presse, 72. On the Râmiev, see “Râmievler”, Tatar Entsiklopedii Sizlegen, 516.
\textsuperscript{41} As İttifak was not yet a political party at this time, the organization’s status was officially that of the “Muslim Fraction” within the Kadet party. See Chapter 4 of this study.
\textsuperscript{42} On Kerimi and Fahreddin, see chapters 3 and 4 of this study.
lawyer educated at Kazan University. Like Rămiev, Alkin was one of the early leaders of İttifak and was elected to the first Duma. Yoldız, which was also published in Kazan, was edited by Hadi Maksudi, a long-time associate of İsmail Gasprinskii who sat on the Central Committee of the İttifak party and was one of the party’s founders. Another Kazan publication, the newspaper Beyan ul-Hak, was published by Ahmedcan and Muhammadcan Saidashev, well-known merchants who were involved in both numerous new method projects as well as the İttifak party. In the Caucasus, meanwhile, the best-known newspaper to appear in 1905 was Hayat, which was bankrolled by the Baku millionaire Zeynel Tagiev and edited by Ahmet Ağaoğlu, both of whom were strongly identified with both reform and İttifak. İrşad, the other Turkic-language newspaper with which Ağaoğlu is most closely associated, was published by Isa Bey Aşurbeyli, who was also a supporter of these undertakings, though less well-known than Tagiev.

While the circulation numbers for these newspapers were not particularly large, the newspaper constituted an important institution in Muslim communities and in the eyes of the tsarist administration in the years following the October Manifesto. Dispersed widely in the many reading rooms and libraries established by Muslims in the years after 1905, the actual number of readers of newspapers far exceeded their circulation numbers. Editors of these newspapers, such as Fatih Kerimi, received a large amount of

43 Alkin’s father was an official in the Kazan city police force and the family owned considerable amount of land in the uezd of Zoya. See “Saitgerei Alkin,” Tatar entsiklopediiä sözlege, 32.
44 Usul. Müslüman deputatlar, 90-92.
45 “Hadi Maksudi,” Tatar entsiklopediiä sözlege, 402.
46 Including the medrese “Muhammadiyeh” in Kazan. On this school, which employed Yusuf Akçura as a history and geography teacher upon his return to Russia in 1904, see “Mokhâmmâdiâ” Mâdrîsâsә: Üкәне хәм килекегә (Kazan: Izd-vo Iman, 2003).
47 Bennigsen, La Presse, 107. Tagiev had also financed the publication of the Russian-language Baku daily Kaspiii, whose editor was Ali Merdan Bey Topçubağev, since 1881. See Bennigsen, La Presse, 31-32.
48 Bennigsen, La Presse, 107.
49 See the establishment papers of such organizations in, among other places, RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 464; f. 821, op. 133, d. 473; f. 821, op. 133, d. 474.
mail from Muslims across Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and elsewhere, and letters to the editor printed in these newspapers often reflected non-elitist views on a variety of matters. Meanwhile, other letters combined politics with business and the asking of favors.\(^{50}\)

Moreover, the newspaper was also an important instrument of political organization, with newspaper editors regularly publishing lists of which candidates to vote for, as well as providing information on the time and place in which voting would take place. At the very least among those readers who already supported the political stance of these newspapers, the Muslim periodical press provided a highly effective means of campaign mobilization.\(^{51}\) Finally, Muslim newspapers in the Volga region were also influential beyond their circulation numbers in influencing Russian government attitudes regarding issues affecting Muslim populations. Like many present-day historians of this era, tsarist officials dealing with issues pertaining to Muslim communities relied upon translations of newspaper articles\(^{52}\) appearing in *Kazan Mukhbiri, Vakit, Yoldiz, Hayat, Irşad*, and elsewhere to explain to them the activities and ambitions of Muslim communities in the empire.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{50}\) See Chapter 3 of this study.

\(^{51}\) *Kazan Mukhbiri, Yoldiz, Vakit, Hayat, Irşad*, and other newspapers published full lists of candidates, explaining which candidates to vote for, giving their candidate identification number, and explaining where the polling will occur.

\(^{52}\) Provided by the ever-expanding number of Russian civil servants with a background in Oriental Studies. On the expansion of Oriental Studies in the Russian Empire, see Geraci, *Window on the East*, 294-295. Also see RGIA, f. 821, op. 131, d. 511.

Union and progress

In both the periodical press of the day and in the speeches made at the Muslim congresses, the term “Unity” (ittifak) was used by Muslim community activists such as Gasprinskii, Akçura, Ağaoğlu, Hüseyinzade, and others in a variety of contexts. Most famously, “İttifak” was the name of the Muslim political party in Russia, a fact which has often been used as evidence to argue the “pan-Turkist” or “pan-Islamist” character of the party. Meanwhile, the term was also used in a number of other contexts. During the revolutionary months of 1904-1905, Muslim petitioners frequently used the term “ittifak” to demonstrate the level of consensus they had reached. When, for example, protesting students at the Apanaev medrese in Kazan submitted a petition to school officials complaining about the school’s conditions, they wrote in the petition’s preface that they were acting “on a unified basis” (ittifak ve ittihad üzere). In a petition submitted later in 1905, imams in the city of Kazan also used the term, announcing that their newly created group, “The organization of Kazan imams,” had been created in accordance with a spirit of “unity” (ittifak).

On other occasions, the term was used to imply a sort of reconciliation or cooperation among previously divided parties. In 1906, the Kazan newspaper Yoldız described the reforms undertaken at the Apanaev medrese in such terms, pointing out that

54 On the uses of the rhetoric of unity in the Ottoman Empire, Russia, India, and elsewhere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Adeeb Khalid, “Pan-Islamism in Practice: The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and its Uses.” In Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 203-225.
55 This name, which was no different from the other “unions” then being established by Russian subjects of all faiths during the revolutionary months of 1904-1905, has been interpreted by scholars working on the region as evidence of the party’s “pan-Turkic” aspirations. See, for example, Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey, 11-12. In fact, this term was used as a means of acknowledging the diversity of interests held by Muslims across the empire. See my discussion of this in Chapter 4 of this study.
56 KGU, Document T-1399
57 KGU, Document T-510
58 Indeed, it was primarily in this context that the name İttifak was given to the Muslim political movement in Russia. See Chapter 4.
the school, whose students had been feuding with the neighborhood community for several years, had "undertaken all reforms in full solidarity (iitifak) with the community of the neighborhood." This was also the case with a young jadid who wrote Fatih Kerimi from Tiumen to report on his experiences and ask advice. After undergoing initial difficulties, wrote the teacher, he had succeed in persuading the village's population to accept a new method school. "It warmed my heart", he wrote, "to see people who had been so opposed to us come together (iitifakka kulp) and work towards renewal (tecdid) and progress (terakki)."

Meanwhile, perceived failures in Muslim communities were viewed as deriving principally from a lack of "iitifak". In 1905, for example, Abdürreşid İbrahimov blamed the inability of the İttifak party to elect a representative from the Crimea to the Duma upon the lack of unity among Muslims living there. Elsewhere, jadids writing in the periodical press routinely complained about what they saw as the "divided" (iitifaksız) and "careless" (ıg'tibarsız) nature of Muslim communities, both in Russia and the world more generally.

"Unity" was important because it could lead to "progress" (terakki). "Progress" was understood primarily in terms of material and cultural progress, which Muslim community reformers felt was lacking to a dangerous degree in Muslim communities. Through "progress," Muslims could reach a higher level of "civilization" (medeniyet),

59 KGU, Document T-1399. Also see Chapter 3 of this study.
60 "Kul boyu medresesi", Yoldız 34, August 26, 1906.
61 See Chapter 3 of this study, pp. 107-109.
62 NART f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 21-22, letter from Selim Giray bin Khairesetdin Gabidov to Fatih Kerimi, January 24, 1909.
63 Duma sallaflu", İlfat 24, May 18, 1906.
64 While "tibar" means "esteemed" in Ottoman Turkish, in Tatar this word means "care" or "consideration."
65 See, for example, "İg'tibarsızlık," Kazan Muhbirli 230, April 20, 1907.
and would therefore be able to compete more effectively with European and other communities, whose levels of material and cultural development were admired even as the policies of European governments and the racist attitudes of European statesmen and thinkers were frequently criticized.\textsuperscript{66}

"Unity", "progress", and "civilization" were discourses that could be seen across the landscape of the Muslim periodical press in the early twentieth century. These discourses, moreover, frequently elided with discussions regarding the "community" (millet). This is because improving the "community" and making "progress" were tasks which were imperative to the building of "civilization." "Everyone among us who loves the community," opined one contributor to Beyan ul-Hak, "desires for our community to make progress in knowledge and sciences, and to join the ranks of civilized peoples."

At present, the level of knowledge in our community is lacking. A people without a civilization is a body without a soul. Today, a people without a civilization cannot defend the rights of the community. This is why we Russian Muslims appear as nothing in the eyes of the Europeans.\textsuperscript{67}

This valorization of "civilization," and of the "progress" that was necessary for its attainment, occurred not only in the jadidist periodical press, but also on the pages of the "kadimist" journal Din ve Maişet.\textsuperscript{68} While writers appearing in Din ve Maişet are generally considered "conservative" (or "kadimist") due to their frequent opposition to innovations like new method education, reading the Friday khutbe in Tatar (rather than Arabic), and the public roles of women, many of the "conservatives" writing for Din ve Maişet participated in discourses, like those relating to "progress", which they shared.

\textsuperscript{66} See, for example, Akçura’s discussions on Lord Kromer. “Darulhilafetten kaitkanda,” Vakit 509, August 20, 1909.
\textsuperscript{67} “Nichek terakki kirek?”, Beyan ul-Hak 36, July 3, 1906.
\textsuperscript{68} On Din ve Maişet, also see Chapter 3 of this study, pp. 110, 116-117, 134-135.
with their “rivals” at jadidist newspapers. In an article appearing in *Din ve Maṣṣet* in 1907, for example, Abdurrahim Eminî wrote that “everybody wants to see progress in civilization in accordance with progress in ideas.” “Whatever the period”, wrote Eminî, “when one studies the reasons behind a people’s progress, one sees that they involve industry and trade, and the knowledge which facilitates their development”.

The stakes concerning these issues were understood to be high. Indeed, protecting the community and ensuring its future were themes and concerns which appeared frequently on the pages of the Muslim periodical press, both jadidist and otherwise. In an article appearing in *Beyan ul-Hak*, for example, the fate of Native Americans is invoked as an object lesson to Russian Muslims. In the face of European colonization, it is argued, Indians had failed to adapt, and as a result they “have all but disappeared from the North American continent.” The author of this article then writes that “even if we might be a few degrees higher” than Native Americans with regard to their general level of civilization, a similar fate awaits Muslims who don’t heed the call of progress.

These days, knowledge and science are undoubtedly necessary in order to live as human beings. Otherwise, it will not be possible for primitive peoples who live alongside civilized populations to develop. There are events happening right before our eyes which prove these facts. Years ago in America, there lived the red-skinned peoples who, while primitive, lived well among themselves. However, with the beginning of the age of exploration, their world changed.

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70 “Medeniyette terakki ve teatr,” In *Dünya ve Maṣṣet* (later *Din ve Maṣṣet*) No. 4, 1907, 57-59.
71 “Ahal-i İslamga muracaat,” *Beyan ul-Hak* 6, April 12, 1906.
Muslims needed to unify, it was argued, because other communities\textsuperscript{72} were themselves uniting. Other populations (kavimlar, or akvam), were viewed as "competitors" (rakipler),\textsuperscript{73} while matters such as economics and politics were often discussed in the Muslim press principally in terms of their meaning to the welfare, even survival, of Muslims. In an article on trade which also appeared in Beyan ul-Hak, for example, it was observed that:

For the protection of a community's sovereignty and the continuation of its life, there is no greater undertaking than commerce. When we look at the reasons behind the progress of the greatest and most powerful of communities, it becomes clear that all they have managed to protect their ability to engage in commerce. No community can survive without commerce.\textsuperscript{74}

Very frequently, the trials of Muslim populations elsewhere in the world, either due to colonialism or wars of nationalist secession from the Ottoman Empire, were the focus of detailed attention in the Muslim periodical press. This was also the case at the Muslim congresses, where the plight of these populations was presented as an example that must not be followed. At the 1906 Muslim Congress in Nizhnii Novgorod, for example, Yusuf Akçura spoke at length on the need for Russian Muslims to avoid the fate of Muslims in Bulgaria, who had immigrated in large numbers to the Ottoman Empire in the wake of Bulgaria's independence in 1878.

Our goal is to unite most Russian Muslims and form a political party, and by so doing increase our strength, our influence, and the attention we draw from the government and from Russian parties. Our goal is to not do what Bulgarian Muslims did by dividing themselves and losing

\textsuperscript{72} Ahmet Ağaoğlu, for example, wrote frequently on the efforts of the Armenians. See later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{73} See, for example, Ali Bey Hüseyinzade's well known series of articles, "Türkler kimdir ve kimlerden ibaret," Hayat 4, June 10, 1905.

\textsuperscript{74} "Ticaret," Beyan ul-Hak 8, April 21, 1906.
their community and political rights. Bulgarian Muslims came out in opposition against one another. When they needed to create their own party, Bulgarian Muslims joined up with the parties of Stoylov, Pinkov, and others. Because they were divided, Bulgarian Muslims were powerless, held no influence with the government, and were unable to defend their national and political interests.\footnote{1906 sene 16-21 Avgust’ta ic timai etmis Rusya Musulmanlarının nedvesi, 52-53.}

These sentiments were repeated in the writings of Akçura and others in the Muslim periodical press on a frequent basis. Shortly after the conclusion of the Third Muslim Congress in Nizhnii Novgorod, for example, Akçura wrote in the newspaper 
_Kazan Mukhbirî_ that “one of the most important desires of the Russian Muslim İttifak is to prevent the division of Russian Muslims into different factions.” This, he argued, was necessary “in order to save them from losing all of their political power by dividing themselves politically and falling into the fate of Bulgarian Muslims.”\footnote{Yusuf Akçura, “Rusya musulmanları ittifagının uchunchê zheune”, Kazan Mukhbiri 132, August 13, 1906.}

Like Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu also emphasized the theme of “unity” in his writings. Indeed, Ağaoğlu frequently complained that the lack of “unity” among Muslims was primarily responsible for their “ignorant and primitive”\footnote{İrşad 18, February 5, 1907.} state. In an article published in _İrşad_ in November of 1907, Ağaoğlu wrote that “Nine hundred and ninety-nine of us out of a thousand consider the homeland (vatan) only in terms of ourselves, our homes, our districts (mahalle), and at most our cities.”

Thinking of ourselves in these ways, we describe ourselves with terms such as “from within the city” or “from the outskirts of the city,” this district, that district, or else we say we are “from Gence” (Genceli), “from Baku”, “from Shemahî”, or use other such terms and expressions. It’s obvious that, with such an understanding, the idea of “serving the homeland” will consist of only serving
ourselves, our homes, our neighborhoods, and at most, our cities.\textsuperscript{78}

Ajaoğlu contrasts the conceptions of “community” (millet) held by Muslims with those of Europeans, whose national conceptions of identity were credited by Ajaoğlu as contributing to the development of European countries and peoples.

Unlike us, Europeans—for example, Englishmen—think about their homeland in other ways. For them, the homeland consists of a people (kavim), a people’s language, and its history. Every type of Frenchman is nonetheless a Frenchman, not someone from such-and-such district or city. No matter where this Frenchman is from, upon meeting a Frenchman from somewhere else who is involved in activities of his own, this Frenchman will necessarily be supportive and helpful.\textsuperscript{79}

In the minds and rhetoric of both Akçura and Ajaoğlu, as well as for many more Muslims in Russia and elsewhere, the exact basis for “unity” was of considerably less importance than the principle of “unity” itself. For Akçura, the Muslims about whom he wrote were by turns “Russian Muslims”,\textsuperscript{80} “Tatars”,\textsuperscript{81} “Turk-Tatars”,\textsuperscript{82} “Northern Turks”,\textsuperscript{83} and “Turks”, while Ajaoğlu likewise described the community to which he belonged (and for which he spoke) as that of “Russian Muslims”, “Caucasian Muslims”,\textsuperscript{84} and “Turks”. These different concepts of identity, despite their variety, were by no means mutually exclusive. Rather, any and all of these identity forms could co-exist simultaneously with one another, and “unity” of any sort was felt to be preferable to

\textsuperscript{78} Ahmet Ajaoğlu, “Alem-i İslama bir nazăr”, \textit{İşad} 116, November 17, 1907.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Almost all of Akçura’s articles pertaining to the \textit{İntıfak} party were made in the name of “Russian Muslims”, as were his speeches at the Muslim congresses.
\textsuperscript{81} This was a term which Akçura, used less than others. However, he did use it occasionally. See, for example, “Nichek işlərəq?”, \textit{Vakit} 274, January 28, 1908.
\textsuperscript{82} This was one of the most frequent expressions Akçura used to describe Volga Muslims. See, for example, “İsmail Bey Encümeni,” \textit{Vakit} 289, March 14, 1908.
\textsuperscript{83} “Şimali Türkler”. This is a term Akçura used frequently after 1911. See, for example, “Suriye’den V,” \textit{Vakit} 1196, May 9, 1913.
\textsuperscript{84} See, for example, “Mühim bir mesele,” \textit{İşad} 23, February 12, 1907.
mere identification with one’s immediate community in their village or district (mahalle).  

Comparing communities

Although Muslim community reformers generally considered Muslims to be “behind” Europeans with regard to “knowledge” and “progress”, this situation was not thought to be irremediable. “Progress”, wrote a contributor to Beyan ul-Hak, “is the striving to come into harmony with life’s new conditions.” By so doing, he argued, Muslims could take their place alongside other civilized communities of the world. Japan and Iran, for example, were both celebrated as examples of countries which had been no less backwards than Russian Muslims prior to making great strides in their development. While the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 was never celebrated in the Muslim press, the ability of the country to compete with European powers was nevertheless presented as a model of rapid cultural and material modernization.

Iran, where there had been a constitutional revolution in 1905, was frequently viewed as a particular inspiration to Muslims writing in the southern Caucasus. In 1908, for example, Ahmet Ağaoğlu wrote “Just five years ago, Iran was totally ignorant. There was no country in the world more backward, more ignorant than Iran.” Ağaoğlu then contrasted this with Iran’s current condition and the “progress” it had made since the constitutional revolution. Moreover, this enthusiasm for the ability of Muslim (and other non-Western) states to embrace constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy is

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85 The mahalle constituted a district within a spiritual assembly and would contain at least one mosque and spiritual personnel.
86 See, for example, “Yaponlar hakkında,” Kazan Mukhibiri 280, May 19, 1908.
also clear in many of the writings which discuss the re-introduction of the Ottoman constitution and the opening of parliament in the wake of the Unionist takeover in 1908.

While the modernization of Japan and the constitutional reforms taking place in Iran and the Ottoman Empire were frequently a source of inspiration to Muslim community reformers in the Russian Empire, other communities within Russia were also presented as models (or rivals) who had attained material and cultural “progress” through “unity”. Ahmet Ağaoğlu frequently compared, for example, the Muslims of the Caucasus to their Armenian neighbors, arguing that Armenians were stronger than Muslims because they acted with a greater degree of solidarity.

The Armenian population, when compared in numbers to all of the other populations of the Caucasus, is a small one. Compared to us Muslims, they are not even one fourth our size. Nevertheless, they are a clever, rational, and far-sighted people who understand the value of schools, science, education, knowledge, and unity. Through such qualities they have achieved incredible progress in a short period of time, despite their small numbers. 88

In another article, Ağaoğlu makes a more direct comparison between Muslims and Armenians. “I have seen their schools, their factories, and their workshops,” he writes, contrasting them with the “pitiful” state of Muslim communities in the same region. “Muslims”, writes Ağaoğlu, “have mosques that are closed, schools that are empty, shops with no products.” “With respect to every issue”, Armenians display “complete unity, solidarity, and deliberation.” Muslims, on the other hand, “work in complete disorder, disunity, and with a lack of solidarity.” 89 The difference, argues Ağaoğlu, lies in the leadership of the two communities. While the leaders of the Armenian spiritual community were devoted to advancing education, encouraging

88 Hayat 15, 1905, June 24, 1905.
89 “Göç Meselesi,” İrşad 26, Feb 15, 1907.
literacy, overseeing the growth of charitable organizations, and representing the interests of Armenians to the tsarist authorities, “our leaders only fight one another, and do nothing for the people.” Muslim community leaders, he charged, were “only interested in their own pockets and personal affairs.”

The language issue

Language, and its potential for realizing “unity” among Muslims, also constituted a frequent topic of discussion in the Muslim periodical press. Some publicists, like İsmail Gasprinskii, argued in favor of adopting a common Turkic “literary language” called “Türki”, which they hoped would become commonly used by Muslims across the empire. In 1906, Gasprinskii placed on the masthead of Tercüman the slogan “unity in language, in thought, in action,” and throughout these years Gasprinskii’s articles in Tercüman frequently called for “language unification” (lisân birleştirmesi or tevhîd-i lisân). Abdullah Tukai and others, meanwhile, emphasized the necessity of developing Tatar, rather than “Türki”, as an independent literary language.

Like Gasprinskii, advocates of developing Tatar made their arguments based upon a discourse of unity and progress. In an article appearing in the newspaper Kazan Mukhbirî, for example, an author wrote:

When the sons of Adam entered the human condition, they inhabited separate regions and existed as separate peoples (kavîms). Later they established villages, even cities, and

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90 “Bizim azime-yi hilalimiz”, İrşad 18, February 5, 1907.
91 “Garibe İşler”, İrşad 28, Feb 17, 1907.
92 On Gasprinskii’s views of the language issue, see Lazzerini, “İsmail Bey Gasprinskii,” 209-213. “Türki” would, in fact, be adopted at the Third Muslim Congress in Nizhnii Novgorod as the standardized language of Muslim education in the empire. See Chapter 4 of this study.
93 See, for example, “Can yani dil meselesi,” Tercüman 6, January 25, 1908.
94 For a discussion of both Gasprinskii’s and Tukai’s views on the “language issue”, see Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 114-117.
although they began to trade with their neighbors, there were of course obstacles.\textsuperscript{95}

Through the advance of technological progress, writes the author, these obstacles had been overcome, leading to ever greater communication and borrowing among different communities (millets). This development, it is argued, had led to a situation in which “advanced civilizations” had come to resemble one another “to the degree that they can hardly be distinguished from one another.”

At this point, however, a tension emerges between what at first appeared to have been a simple linear development toward ever-closer integration among peoples, and the author’s belief that this period of integration had come to an end and that it was now necessary for “less-developed” peoples, such as the Tatars, to become a more cohesive community.

It is wrong to neglect our language simply because it is weak. We must try to develop our language, and use our own words as much as possible. Certainly, we will need to borrow words from other languages at times, but from which languages and in what manner will we borrow these words?

This focus upon language as a force for unity and renewal can also be seen in an article in the Orenburg journal Şura, which adopts a similar metaphor of embeddedness through language. In this case, the article is on the development of Esperanto, described here as “the common language” (\textit{umumi lisan}).

It is known that, as people across the world join together, the single greatest obstacle to the improvement of science and literature, and to the progress of commerce and trade, is the fact that people speak different languages.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{95} “Medeniyyet hem dix meselisi”, \textit{Kazan Mukhiri} 275, 1907.
\textsuperscript{96} Şura, vol. 16 (1908), 531-532. On Şura, see Raif Mårdanov, “Şura” \textit{zurnali} (1908-1917): \textit{Adabiyyat mıs'üllâlîre} (Kazan: “Rukhiyat”, 2001).
The creation of Esperanto is viewed in this article as a hopeful development due to its potential to allow communities to overcome the problem of language. Thus, concludes the article, through Esperanto “the idea for a common language for the whole world would be established, with the aim of opening up trade and relations between peoples.”

Geography and identity

Muslims in Russia also frequently discussed the community in terms of the geographical territories of its inhabitants. On the most basic level, this occurred through the public pronouncements of Ittifak leaders speaking in the name of “All-Russian Muslims.” Meanwhile, in the Caucasus, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and others emphasized a “Caucasian Muslim” identity, in which sectarian differences between Shiites and Sunnis would be made obsolete—an argument made by publicists who described the question as the “sectarian issue” (mezhep meselesti). Indeed, in the context of debates then taking place over where the “center” of authority should be in Muslim communities, this redrawing of the Muslim map of Russia was hardly a politically neutral act. For, wherever the center of “All-Russian Muslims” was, it was not likely to be in Ufa, Tbilisi, or Simferopol, just as the community of “Caucasian Muslims” was one which transcended both sectarian differences and sectarian identity.

The spatial metaphors of “centers” and “worlds” pervaded the lexicon of the published articles, personal correspondence, and public speeches of Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and other community reformers of this era. This occurred in a number of

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97 On the conflation of geography and collective identity, see the collection of essays in Patricia Yeager’s The Geography of Identity (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996). Also see, for example, Scott Spector’s discussion of these issues in Prague Territories: National Conflict and Cultural Innovation in Franz Kafka’s Fin De Siècle.

98 See, for example, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, “Bunun akını ne olacak?,” İrşad 90, June 18, 1908.
different contexts, such as in Akçura’s frequently published references to “centers”, like the İttifak party “center of administration” (idare-i merkeziyye) in St. Petersburg.99 Another of Akçura’s “centers” was the “religious center” (dini bir merkez), which Akçura and others envisioned as a unified spiritual assembly for Russian Muslims.100 After 1908, moreover, Istanbul would frequently emerge in Akçura’s writings as “the center of Turkist activity.”101 As he had done in Russia, Akçura would set up in Istanbul a “central committee for administration” (merkez-i heyet idaresi),102 which would be used for a group he helped found103 in the Ottoman capital called the “Turkish Association” (Türk derneği).104

“Centers” appeared alongside “worlds” as spatial metaphors used to re-imagine the parameters of communities. Russian Muslim community reformers writing both in Russia and in Istanbul commented frequently upon their place within the broader “Islamic World” or “Turkic World”. Ahmet Ağaoğлу in particular used this imagery quite often, and while writing for Hayat and İrşad in Baku wrote a frequently appearing column entitled “the Islamic world” (İslam alemi). Once, however, Ağaoğлу began contributing columns regularly to Türk Yurdu—the Istanbul journal whose editor was

100 See Chapter 4.
102 Akçura’s letter to Fatih Kerimi, NART f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 104.
104 On the activities of this organization, see Chapter 6 of this study. This sort of discourse also appeared in a report on Akçura written by an official in the Ottoman Interior Ministry (dahiliye), who observed that Akçura and his colleagues sought to establish Istanbul as “the center of Turkism” (Türkçülüğün merkezi). See BOA, DH EUM KHL 5/131.
Yusuf Akçura—the name of this column was changed to “the Turkic world” (*Türk alemi*).\(^{105}\)

In Istanbul, Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and others sought to sketch out the “borders” (*hudud*) of the “Turkic World”. Indeed, in the first paragraph of Ağaoğlu’s first article in the very first issue of *Türk Yurdu*, deciding upon the geography of this new identity was one of Ağaoğlu’s highest priorities.

As vast as a dream, and as important as a dream, there is nothing so difficult as drawing the actual borders of the Turkish world. From the Altay mountains of Turkestan in the very heart of Asia, the Turkic people, on many occasions and at various times, got caught up in this torrent of a dream, and spread to all four corners of the globe—east, west, north and south.\(^ {106}\)

Geography and identity, and the juxtaposition of geographic terms of identity with other forms of identity, invited the interest of a large number of individuals from non-intellectual backgrounds as well. In late January of 1906, for example, the newspaper *Yoldız* published on its front page an open letter to its readers in which it addressed the concerns expressed in “about thirty” letters sent to the newspaper’s office over the previous week. “The subject of the letters,” wrote the newspaper, “was all the same.” At the heart of the complaints was the “Bulghar Controversy,”\(^ {107}\) an issue pertaining to the ethnic origins of Volga Muslims.

While some Muslims and Russian ethnographers believed that the Muslim populations of the region were the direct descendents of the Golden Horde, others argued that they were primarily the descendents of the Bulghars, a Turkic population which

\(^{105}\) See, for example, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, “Alem-i İslama bir nazar,” *İş kad* 118, November 22, 1907; “Alem-I İslama bir nazar,” *İş kad* 3, January, 1908. Also see Ahmet Ağaoğlu, “Türk alemi,” *Türk Yurdu* Vol. 1, No.1, 12-17, 1911/1327.


emerged in the Volga region in the first half of the eighth century.\textsuperscript{108} In the late nineteenth century, the issue became an increasingly heated one among specialists in the rapidly-developing field of ethnography.\textsuperscript{109} Tsarist officials tended to refer to Muslims in the region (as well as in other regions, including the Caucasus) as “Tatars” or “Muslims”, and Muslims petitioning the state also frequently used these terms interchangeably.\textsuperscript{110} In other contexts, however, Muslims in the region also referred to themselves as “Bulgars”.\textsuperscript{111} Now, Yoldiz’s readers were writing in to complain about the newspaper’s characterization of them as “Tatars”.

They all say “In your newspaper, please call us Kazan Muslims, not Tatars. We will never have any patience for the Tatar name, because we are not Tatars”.\textsuperscript{112}"

Elsewhere, Muslim journals and readers asked similar questions regarding what constituted their community. Readers of Beyan ul-Hak, for example, wrote to the newspaper to complain about how the “community” (millet) had been discussed in the newspaper, and arguing that “our actual homeland (vatan) is Kazan.”\textsuperscript{113} Meanwhile, the Kazan literary journal Ang asked readers “How do you understand the community?” (Milletni nichek anglisz?), and invited them to think further about the issue, which the journal described as “one of the most important of our time.”\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{108} Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, 6-9.
\textsuperscript{109} On ethnography in late imperial Russia, see Geraci, Window on the East 180-194.
\textsuperscript{110} See chapters 1 and 2 of this study.
\textsuperscript{111} On the “Bulgar” identity, see Frank, Islamic historiography and “Bulghar” identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia (Leiden: Brill, 1998).
\textsuperscript{112} “Biz Tatar Tugal”, Yoldiz 3, January 29, 1906.
\textsuperscript{113} “Asil vatanımız Kazan,” Beyan ul-Hak, 2, April 5, 1906.
\textsuperscript{114} “Milliyetni nichek anglisz?”, Ang 13, May 2, 1913, 176.
Speaking in the name of the community

As was discussed in Chapter 4 of this study, Muslims after 1905 both worked together and were often divided politically in the months and years which followed the Revolution of 1905. Frequently, these divisions involved not only politics, but also the question of how to represent the "community" more generally. Many Muslims, particularly on the left, questioned the need to create a "Muslim" party in the first place, and charged the İtifak leadership with religious exploitation. "Aren't they going to say that all we need is religion?" asked one column in Tang Yoldızı. "Of course they will. But do understand this: they are going to say this in the name of all of the Tatars of Russia."115

What many Muslims saw as the efforts of İtifak leaders to appropriate for themselves the role of Muslim community spokespersons was, however, also closely related to the question of political representation. At the third Muslim congress in Nizhnii Novgorod, for example, socialist speakers such as Hadi Atlasi and Fuad Tuktaroff repeatedly mocked the congress' delegates being asked to accept, without reading, a party program undertaken "in the name of twenty million Muslims."

How are we supposed to accept, without ever reading or looking at it, a program in the name of twenty million people? There are probably a lot of things in it that are harmful to the people. Accepting this in the name of twenty million people without reading or looking at it is not something to even contemplate. Since the careful reading of every one of its articles individually would result in the public exposure of its poor and unfit nature, they [İtifak's leaders] instead work behind the scenes. They say we don’t

115 "Din saktarga baruçu deputatlaribiz", Tang Yoldızı 6, June 5, 1906. While Robert Geraci writes that "no sharp ideological boundaries existed between Tatar periodicals before February 1917," this is clearly not the case. Left-wing newspapers such as Ural and Tang Yoldızı were strongly critical of İtifak, while Din ve Maşter provided frequent culturally-based critiques of other journals and newspapers. See Geraci, Window on the East, 268, fn. 13.
have the time to read all of the articles one by one. If there isn’t enough time for this, then let’s forget the whole thing. Let them withdraw it. Why should they ask us to accept a party program in the name of twenty million people?116

Muslim socialists often charged that İtifak’s characterization of itself as the party of “Russian Muslims” represented a deliberate effort by the party leadership to garner the support of Muslims whose economic interests were not represented in the party program. Yet Muslims, wrote Ural, were politically diverse, “just like people all over the world.”117 In Ural, a post-Nizhnii article from late 1906 complained that “nationalists” (milletçiler) ignored dissent in the İtifak movement, and acted “as if all Muslims were naturally one person.” In another article in the same issue, İtifak was accused of employing the term “Russian Muslims” for political gain.

They won’t come out and say that this is their party. Instead they’ll perhaps be calling themselves the “Muslim Alliance” party. Because, they think, if they call themselves ‘Muslim’ then all Muslims will support them.

Community reformers themselves likewise wrote on the relationship between political power and the public expressions of community identity. In 1914, an organization calling itself the “All Russian Muslim Peoples’ Union” (Vserossiskii musul’manskiy narodnyi soiuz, also known as Strat al-Mustakim)118 was established in St. Petersburg.119 This undertaking was met with particular hostility by the İtifak leadership and their allies in the periodical press, who viewed the creation of Strat al-Mustakim as a right-wing, possibly even tsarist-financed, sham. Its purpose, in the view of İtifak’s supporters, was to divide Muslims, but what the party’s supporters resented

116 1906 senes 16-21 Avgust’ta icmiat etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi 145.
117 Ural 21, March 18, 1907.
118 The term Strat al-Mustakim means ‘the straight road’ or ‘the right path’, and was translated into Russian by İtifak supporters as pravyi put’.
119 See Chapter 4.
most of all was the audacity of this organization to claim leadership of “All-Russian Muslims”. The St. Petersburg-based Muslim newspaper İl mocked Strat al-Mustakim’s pretensions to represent the Muslims of Russia, asking “who gave you the authority to open an organization in the name of all Muslims?”

Writing in Vakit, Fatih Kerimi noted that, although the party called itself “the Union of All-Russian Muslims”, Strat al-Mustakim consisted of only “a handful of people.” Moreover, wrote Kerimi, Strat al-Mustakim did not represent the interests of Muslims in Russia more generally.

A number of people drawn from the Muslim [Duma] deputies and the intelligentsia of St. Petersburg, having discussed this issue and having looked at the charter of Strat al-Mustakim, feel that it is inappropriate that a party like this, created by a handful of people whose political and community credentials are not known and have not been made known in the press, would characterize itself as “the All-Russian Muslim Union.”

To protest the establishment of Strat al-Mustakim, an open letter was published in Vakit, İl, and other Muslim newspapers allied with İttifak. The letter was signed by twelve Muslim community leaders in St. Petersburg, including Ayaz Ishakov, the editor of İl, İttifak deputy Kutlu Mehmed Tevkelev, and İttifak general secretary İsmail Limanov. “Even if this organization claims to be working in the name of Muslims,” they wrote:

Its consequences will bring nothing but harm to Muslims. The activities that these individuals have undertaken in the


121 Or usnav, the paperwork which would be presented to the appropriate government officials to explain the aims of the group and the individuals associated with it.


123 Son of the late Mufti Salimgarai Tevkelev (1805-1885).
name of all Muslims are in fact nothing more than an expression of their own personal interests.\textsuperscript{124}

Like earlier criticism of \textit{Sirat al-Mustakim}, this letter focused particularly on the party’s claim to be an “All-Russian Muslim” organization. “We have the right”, asked the letter, “to know who is behind this organization, which has been created in the name of all Muslims.”

\textit{Muslim “unity” and the Russian state}

Just as discourses relating to ‘unity’, community solidarity, and collective identity attracted the interest of both politically active Muslims and Muslims in the community more generally, these discussions also attracted the attention of Russian bureaucrats responsible for policing the activities of Muslims. After the Revolution of 1905, tsarist bureaucrats investigating the activities of Muslim communities in the empire gained access to far more sources of information than had previously existed. Indeed, like many of the scholars who have since worked on Muslim “borderland” communities in the Russian Empire, tsarist bureaucrats turned frequently to periodical sources in their search for information about the activities of Muslims in the empire.

After 1905, moreover, Orientalist-trained bureaucrats working in the Department of Spiritual Affairs became increasingly important sources of information on Muslim communities due to their ability to read Muslim-language periodical newspapers and journals. Along with the growth of Oriental Studies (\textit{vostokovedenie}) instruction in Russia in the early twentieth century, the number of tsarist civil servants with an Orientalist education increased considerably.\textsuperscript{125} These individuals, posted both in the

\textsuperscript{124} “Müslümanlar dikkatine!,” \textit{İl}, 15, February 5, 1914. This letter was also reprinted in \textit{Vakit}.
\textsuperscript{125} On Orientalist academies in the Russian Empire, see Geraci, \textit{Window on the East}, 294-296.
capital and the provinces, were frequently given the task of translating into Russian and commenting upon for their superiors articles appearing in the Muslim periodical press.126

Discourses relating to themes such as “unity”, community solidarity, and collective identity were widespread in the Muslim periodical press and were frequently viewed by the tsarist bureaucrats reading them as evidence of separatist, pan-Islamist, or pan-Turkist sentiment. Civil servants reading the countless translations of newspaper articles from the major jadid newspapers frequently drew attention to their use of the phrase “millet,” which was almost always translated to mean “nation”, (‘natsiia’),127 much like the translations of this word in much of the historiography today.128 “In all of these Tatar newspapers, journals, and literary works,” wrote an official in the provincial gendarmerie of Kazan, “the phrases “Muslim nation”, “national undertaking”, and “national spirit” are incessantly repeated”. Moreover, he wrote, “This new type of Russian Muslim nationalist is growing not by the day, but by the hour.”129 Another civil servant, working in the press censor’s office for the guberniia of Kazan, observed that “all” of the Muslim intellectual-political leaders in Russia were “nationalists” (natsionalisti). “That is, they strive to serve the interests of their nation” (natsiia).

Tatars have always been loyal subjects, and very many of them bravely fight in the army for Russia against her enemies regardless of their religion or nationality. Nevertheless, in their souls they are Muslim first and foremost.130

126 Geraci, Window on the East, 309-342.
127 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 471.
128 Indeed, the term “nation” has been the most common translation of “millet”, which I translate as “community”. See, for example, Christian Noack, Muslimischer Nationalismus im Russischen Reich (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2000).
129 NART, f. 199, op. 881, lI. 42-43.
130 NART, f. 420, op. 1, d. 297, l. 11.
Elsewhere, bureaucrats often interpreted Muslim calls for ‘unity’ within the context of a worldwide “pan-Islamic” movement.

We must recognize the desire of these peoples for spiritual union on the basis of their common religion and ethnomorphic relationship. This will certainly have far-reaching effects upon not only the future of Europe, but for all of mankind. \[131\]

The discourse of unity employed by many in the leadership of Itifak frequently raised the suspicions of tsarist bureaucrats. While “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Islamism” became regular features of tsarist bureaucratic reports on Muslims only after the denunciation campaign of 1908-1909, civil servants looking for information on these issues in the Muslim periodical press were easily able to find evidence which they thought supported their arguments. Indeed, as the “pan-Islamism” and “pan-Turkism” of Muslims in Russia were considered to be “reflections” of movements taking place across the globe, Russian diplomats and staffers in the empire’s foreign service distributed questionnaires to French and British diplomatic personnel with regard to these issues. \[132\]

Conclusions

“This year”, wrote an article in Ural not long after the 1906 Itifak congress in Nizhni Novgorod, “without thinking very much about it, we met in the name of all Russian Muslims—saying that we were their representatives.” For Muslims across the empire, the opening of mass politics and the expansion of Muslim-language media in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution created a series of issues related to the question of community representation. Organizations of Muslims speaking in the name of “Crimean

\[131\] RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 450. Another bureaucrat overseeing Muslim education in the guberniia of Kazan wrote that the goal of Muslim community activists was “the unification of all Muslims in Russia, at the very least.” NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, l. 69-69-ob.

\[132\] See Chapter 3 of this study, p. 128.
Muslims”, “the Muslims of Kazan”, “Caucasian Muslims”, “Russian Muslims” and others appeared with regularity during the years after 1905, and frequently touched off extended disputes regarding the propriety of this manner of speaking in the name of the community.

While the loci of community representation prior to 1905 had been the regional Muslim spiritual assemblies, after 1905 Muslim community activists such as İsmail Gasprinskii, Yusuf Akçura, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu began to publicly imagine different sets of community parameters. Although the actual forms of community which these and other Muslim activists publicly embraced changed frequently, their discourses of “unity” and “progress” remained constant. Meanwhile, the types of ways in which people talked about the community also changed, with columnists and speakers now speaking out in the name of the “public” (halk) and “community” (millet).

The discourses of “unity” that were employed by community activists in Russia during these years alarmed both other Muslims and the tsarist authorities. Many Muslims who felt left out of the decision making process challenged the pretentions of Akçura, Gasprinskii, and others to speak in the name of “twenty million Russian Muslims.” Meanwhile, tsarist bureaucrats read into this discourse of “unity” their fears of “pan-Turkist” or “pan-Islamist” plots. While “unity” was a common discourse, its very use often created factions and considerable resentment.

In 1908 and 1909, Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and Ali Hüseyinzade would travel to Istanbul, where from 1911 onwards they would be active in the Turkist (or “pan-Turkist”) movement. There, they would continue to employ these discourses of “unity” in their discussions relating to both Muslim communities in Russia and their new audiences in
the Ottoman Empire. This marked a change for both Akçura and Ağaoğlu, who were both closely involved in the publication of *Türk Yurdu*.\(^{133}\) In Russia, both of these individuals had spoken in the name of the “community” mostly in the interests of community organization and cultural change. In Istanbul, particularly after 1911, the range of identities these figures would advocate was far narrower than had been the case when they were writing in Russia. Whereas Akçura and Ağaoğlu had written in Russia from the perspective of a number of identity forms, including Turks, Turk-Tatars, Russian Muslims, Caucasian Muslims, and others, from 1911 onwards both of these individuals became more closely associated with “Turkism” more exclusively.

\(^{133}\) Akçura as editor, Ağaoğlu as a very frequent contributor.
Chapter 6

Two Worlds at Once: Russian Muslims in Istanbul

In July of 1908, a group of Ottoman officers with roots in Balkans, calling themselves the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), assembled their troops in a revolt against the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The revolt, which had been precipitated by British and Russian plans to limit Ottoman sovereignty in Macedonia, succeeded quickly, with Ottoman troops called upon by the sultan to attack the mutinous armies refusing to obey their orders. Within two weeks, Sultan Abdülhamid had relented and gave into demands that the Constitution of 1876 be restored and that a parliament be created with free elections. In April of 1909, widespread anti-CUP protests in Istanbul and elsewhere led the CUP to demand the abdication of Abdülhamid, who was exiled to Thessaloniki and replaced by his younger brother Mehmet Reşat, who became Mehmet V.

The CUP and the Unionist period of Ottoman history more generally are frequently associated in the historiography with the question of ‘Turkism’ (or ‘pan-Turkism’). This movement, which had not only an intellectual but also a social and community character, is best known for the journal Türk Yurdu, which began publication

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2 This constitution, which was promulgated by Abdülhamid II as a condition of his ascending to the throne, who later suspended most of the important provisions of the constitution upon consolidating power in the months after becoming sultan. See Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 77-78.
in late 1911. This journal and the Turkist intellectual circle which formed around it are famous in part for the large role played in it by Turkic intellectuals from Russia. The editor of Türk Yurdu was Yusuf Akçura, who had lived in Istanbul as a youth and had been living there off and on since late 1908. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, moreover, was one of the journal’s main contributors, while Ali Hüseyinzade and Mehmet Emin Resulzade also contributed a smaller number of articles. Meanwhile, there were also a number of Ottoman-born intellectuals involved in the Turkist movement as well.

Studies focusing not only upon the Turkist movement in particular, but also of the Unionist period of Ottoman history more generally, have traditionally emphasized the role of the Turkist movement within the context of an “emerging” Turkish nationalism. Moreover, for decades, historians from both the Republic of Turkey and elsewhere have placed special emphasis upon the “pan-Turkism” of the Turkist circle and the “national awakening” of Turks in the lands of the future Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union. A number of scholars have argued that Akçura and other Russian-born Turkists were the “fathers” or “forefathers” of modern Turkish nationalism.

The Turkist movement was not large, but it did attract many of the best known intellectual, literary, and publicist figures from the Ottoman Empire, the Volga region,

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6 Ali Hüseyinzade (1864-1940) was born in the village of Salyan outside Baku. After studying in gymnasia in Tbilisi, Hüseyinzade arrive in St. Petersburg in 1885 to study medicine. After finishing his studies, he arrived in Istanbul in late 1888. According to Şükri Hanioğlu, Hüseyinzade was one of the original founders of the Committee of Union and Progress in 1889. See Hanioğlu, Young Turks in Opposition, 266, fn. 13. However, Hüseyinzade’s biographer, Ali Haydar Bayat, says this was not the case. See Bayat, Hüseyinzade Ali Bey, (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 1998), 9-18.

7 The best known of these individuals are Ziya Gökalp, Halide Edip, Semseddin Sami Bey, Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul), Necip Asım, and Ahmet Mithat.

8 See my discussion of this in the Introduction to this study, especially pp. 16-18.

9 See, for example, François Georgeon, in Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc. Also see the Introduction to this study.
and the Caucasus. In addition to Russian-born members of the Turkist circles, there were also a number of Ottoman-born intellectuals, poets, and writers associated with the group. These included Halide Edip, who was then emerging as one of the most popular novelists of the day. Other Ottoman intellectuals associated with Turkism were Şemseddin Sami (Fräseri), Ahmet Mithat, Necip Asım, and Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul). Meanwhile, some figures inside the government, such as Enver Pasha,\textsuperscript{10} were also sympathetic to the idea of Turkism and felt it could be usefully exploited by the Ottoman government.

\textit{The Russian Muslim émigré context, 1860-1914}

When discussing Russian-born Turkist figures like Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and Hüseyinzade, the historiography of the late Ottoman period tends to emphasize the arrival of these figures into the Ottoman Empire and their importance to the “development” of “modern Turkish nationalism.” In this respect, the assumptions of scholars studying the Turkist movement often match those of scholars looking at questions of immigration more generally in that, in both cases, the journey to the Ottoman Empire is often treated as permanent and one-way, while little attention is paid to those who return or otherwise resist complete integration into their “adopted” country.\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, both the Russian-born Turkists and Russian Muslims more generally often returned to the Russian Empire either temporally or permanently. Individuals carried on lives in both empires simultaneously, traveling between the Ottoman Empire and Russia and maintaining business and family

\textsuperscript{10} On Enver Pasha and Turkism, see Masayuki Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919-1922} (Tokyo: Institute for the study of languages and cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991).

connections in both states. Meanwhile, many Russian Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire continued to insist upon their status as Russian subjects in order to benefit from privileges afforded to Russian subjects in the Ottoman Empire, including benefits granted by the capitulatory treaties.

Muslims from across Russia returned from the Ottoman Empire for a variety of reasons, and frequently did so after having spent years abroad. In 1902, Abdulhadi Ahmedov, a native of the guberniia of Samara who had lived in the Ottoman Empire since 1891, successfully appealed to the Russian Embassy in Istanbul for assistance in gaining permission from the Ottoman Empire to leave the country and return to Russia permanently. Ahmedov, who had recently been exiled by the Ottoman government to Tripoli, claimed that he had become an Ottoman subject only because doing so was a necessary condition for pursuing his studies in the Ottoman Empire. Having, he said, recently received a job offer to work as a teacher in Tashkent, he now wished to return to Russia as a Russian subject. The Russian Embassy accepted Ahmedov’s claim and worked on his behalf to obtain the necessary permission from the Ottoman authorities allowing him to return from Tripoli to Istanbul, from where he traveled back to Russia. The Ottoman authorities, perhaps relieved to be ridding themselves altogether of an individual they had earlier exiled internally, appear to have made no objection to his departure.

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12 James von Geldern has likewise traced the “life in between” of (internal) migrants “and other lower-class members” in urban Russia of the late imperial era. See “Life In-Between: Migration and Popular Culture in Late Imperial Russia.” In Russian Review Vol. 55, No. 3 (July, 1996), 365-383.
13 See Meyer, “Immigration, return, and the politics of citizenship”. On the capitulations, see Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, 183, 254, 455-458.
14 BOA, HRH 574/26, s. 1-2.
Many Russian Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire returned to Russia on only a short-term basis to attend to various personal and financial matters. Living full-time in the Ottoman Empire, these individuals maintained homes, property, and personal relations in their places of origin. In 1898, for example, Kasım Ağə bin Abdullah, a Russian Muslim from Dagestan living in the Ottoman Empire, applied to the Russian Embassy in Istanbul for permission to visit Russia temporarily in order to attend to various personal and financial matters. It had been thirty years since Kasım Ağə had emigrated, and because he had emigrated illegally (i.e., without formally renouncing his Russian citizenship)\(^{15}\) he would be obliged to pay a fine upon returning to Russia. Nonetheless, family and financial ties still apparently bound Kasım Ağə sufficiently to his ancestral homeland in Dagestan to merit taking the trip back.\(^{16}\)

Some returns were for longer periods of time. In 1895, Russian authorities reported to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry that one İbrahim Halil, an Ottoman subject whose father had immigrated to the Ottoman Empire "many years" earlier, had traveled back to Russia and had been residing for the past year with his son Ahmed in their ancestral village of Hüseyin-Çelebi, in Dagestan. Having decided to return to the Ottoman Empire, father and son were now requesting an exit permit from the Russian authorities.\(^{17}\) As had been the case with Kasım Ağə, distance and the passing of years had not severed ties between İbrahim Halil and his relatives in Dagestan.

Sometimes, returns of Muslim émigrés from the Ottoman Empire back to Russia could be considerably larger in scale. From the end of the Crimean war until the early

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15. "Citizenship" is not, of course, the ideal term, as these were subjects, not citizens. The Russian "poddanstvo" or the Ottoman "tabiyet" reflect the status of being a subject more concisely.

16. BOA, HRH 572/55, s. 1-3.

17. ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 55, l. 12.
1860s, as many as 300,000 Muslims left the Crimea for the Ottoman Empire. 18 Beginning in 1861, however, a large number of Crimean Muslims who had arrived in the Ottoman Empire began petitioning the Russian government for permission to return. Tsarist bureaucrats in the Crimea and St. Petersburg, alarmed by the departure of two-thirds of the peninsula’s Tatar population (and more than half of its total population) authorized a partial return of the emigrants. In June of 1861 a Council of Ministers meeting in St. Petersburg recommended that:

Regarding the question of granting permission to return to the Crimea of Tatars who have departed, the Council does not deny that their return might be, to a certain degree, useful, provided it is carried out with extreme caution.19

Ultimately, it was decided to authorize Russian consulates in the Ottoman Empire to begin issuing new Russian passports to Crimean Muslims who wished to return. However, only those immigrants who owned land (or who agreed to purchase land) were eligible to receive the passports. Landless immigrants who wished to return were still allowed to petition for permission to return, but the decision to grant this permission was left to the authority of the regional governor.20 About 10,000 Tatars were granted new Russian passports and returned to the Crimea during the years 1861-1863.21 Many others—perhaps several thousand—who had not been able to receive new passports returned to the Crimea anyway with Ottoman passports. Many of these individuals would

19 ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 82, l. 39.
20 GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 24165, ll. 41-44; ADTA, f. 525, op. 1, d. 82, ll. 39-40. This is also described in Markevich, (1928), 404-405.
21 Markevich, (1928), 401.
live more or less permanently in the Crimea, as restrictions limiting their stay in Russia to six months do not appear to have been regularly enforced.22

Russian Muslim intellectuals living in Istanbul from 1908 onwards resembled a large number of other Russian Muslim émigrés in the Ottoman Empire through their continued involvement in and returns to their homelands in Russia. Indeed, this would also be the case with many Russian Muslims after the First World War had ended, including all of the best known Russian Muslims from the Turkist movement.23 There were many means through which Russian Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire stayed in touch with their homelands and fellow landsmen. In Istanbul and other cities—such as Bursa, Aleppo, or Beirut—Russian Muslims from the same region or from Russia more generally founded mutual assistance organizations, much as they had done in Russia after 1905.24

Disputed subjects

Although the great majority of Russian Muslims who immigrated to the Ottoman Empire did not return to Russia, even those who stayed in the Ottoman Empire frequently made use of their Russian citizenship to benefit from consular and other privileges extended to Russian subjects.25 In 1907, for example, one Nebi İsmailoğlu received assistance from the Russian Consulate in Erzurum and the Russian Embassy in Istanbul in defending himself against the charge of murdering his wife. Nebi, who had lived in

22 ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 82, ll. 47-48.
23 See later in this chapter.
24 See Chapter 4 of this study.
25 It is interesting to measure the tangible benefits of Russian “citizenship” to subjects of the empire, whether at home or abroad. Indeed, most of the studies on “citizenship” in the Russian Empire that have been published in recent years treat the issue largely from the perspective of states and intellectuals, rather from that of subjects or citizens. See, for example, Dov Yaroshevski, “Empire and Citizenship,” in Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 58-79; Also see Eric Lohr, “The Ideal Citizen and Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia,” Kritika, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2006) 173-194.
Erzurum for seven years, was being treated by the Ottoman authorities working in his judicial process as an Ottoman subject. In response to this, the Russian Embassy in Istanbul addressed a note personally to Ottoman Foreign Minister Tevfik Paşa and complained about the behavior in this regard of the Erzurum governor Nuri Bey, demanding that Nebi be recognized as a subject of Russia allowed to receive Russian consular assistance to help with his defense.  

26 Russian Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire routinely contacted Russian consular officials in moments of personal necessity, requesting and receiving assistance regarding a variety of legal and financial matters. Heyti Latifoğlu, a Dagestani rug merchant who had been living in Istanbul for “many years”, was aided by the Russian consulate in 1896 in getting some articles he was importing released from Ottoman customs.  

27 One year later, one Abdülkerim and three of his friends contacted the Russian consulate with regard to a legal dispute involving the purchase of some property.  

28 When Istanbul resident Gül Mehmed and his son Hüseyin were imprisoned in 1896 for one week for theft, the Russian consulate in Istanbul protested vigorously to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry over the fact that the consulate had not been notified.  

29 The Russian consulate also helped the Istanbul-based bookseller Kerimoff receive indemnification from Ottoman customs for the confiscation of 5000 copies of the Koran he was attempting to import from Russia.  

30 In each of these cases, Russian Muslims who had lived in the Ottoman Empire for years invoked their status as Russian subjects in order to receive assistance from the Russian consulate and gain leverage over Ottoman

\[\text{\footnotesize 26 BOA, HRH 576/41, s. 1-2.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 27 BOA, HRH 572/19}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 28 BOA, HRH 572/54, s. 1-2.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 29 BOA, HRH 572/21, s. 1-6.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 30 BOA, HRH 574/41, s. 1.}\]
authorities. In other instances, such support even extended beyond the grave. In 1906 the Russian Embassy in Istanbul contacted the Ottoman Foreign Ministry with regard to one Haci Mahmud Abiaoglou. Haci Mahmud had made a down payment for a farm in the region of Catalca when he had been informed by the Ottoman authorities that, being a foreigner, he was not allowed to acquire land in this area. The person to whom Mahmud had made this payment, however, then refused to return the money. Shortly thereafter, Mahmud had died, yet the Russian Embassy continued with its claim on Mahmud’s behalf.31

The Russian foreign ministry recognized as a subject of Russia everyone other than those who had specifically renounced their Russian citizenship. Since renouncing Russian citizenship was a bureaucratic process which entailed the expenditure of both money and time, many Russian Muslims had emigrated without officially notifying the Russian authorities. An example of this is the case of one Bey Sultan, a Russian Muslim immigrant living in Konya who wished to return to Russia in 1902 in order to visit his family. The Russian Embassy in Istanbul informed Bey Sultan that he could enter Russia as either an Ottoman or a Russian subject. However, if he were to arrive in Russia as an Ottoman subject he would be obliged to pay a fine for having left the country without having filled out the proper paperwork.32

In the eyes of the Russian government, Muslim emigrants from Russia continued to be subjects of Russia even after spending decades in the Ottoman Empire. As the Ottoman state often granted citizenship to immigrants arriving from Russia without requiring proof that they had renounced their Russian citizenship, Muslim immigrants

31 BOA, HRH 576/17, s. 1-2.
32 BOA, HRH 574/12
frequently were recognized by both the Russian and Ottoman foreign ministries as subjects of their respective states. These cases often led to disputes when Russian Muslim immigrants attempted to invoke the privileges afforded to Russian nationals. In these situations Russian consular officials serving in the Ottoman Empire almost always offered determined support of Russian Muslims claiming Russian citizenship, refusing help only in those cases when no record could be found to support the claim that an individual had emigrated from Russia.

In 1903, for example, Derviş Mehmed bin Arif, a Muslim from Russia, was detained by the Ottoman authorities for an unspecified crime. Having arrived in the Ottoman Empire from Russia four years earlier, Derviş Mehmed had received identification documents (tezkire-i Osmaniye) from the Ottoman authorities shortly thereafter, and as such the Ottoman authorities now considered Derviş Mehmed a subject of the Ottoman Empire. According to the Russian Embassy, however, a second piece of paper had been attached to his tezkire by the Russian Consulate in Bursa stating that the Russian government continued to recognize Derviş Mehmed as a subject of Russia. As such, wrote the Russian Embassy, Derviş Mehmed should be freed by the Ottoman authorities immediately and placed in the custody of the Russian consulate in Istanbul.33

In 1907 Russian officials likewise came to the assistance of a Russian Muslim living in the district of Sapanca. Mustafa Nalbandoğlu claimed that the director of the local administration (kaymakamlık) in Adapazari had been pressuring him to give up his Russian citizenship and become a subject of the Ottoman Empire. Having refused to do so, claimed Mustafa, he was then arrested on trumped up charges of banditry and thrown in jail for ten days. In a note of complaint to the Ottoman authorities, the Russian

33 BOA, HRH 574/49
Embassy stated that it had paid 150 piastres in order to have Mustafa released from jail and that it was now demanding that this sum be repaid by the Ottoman government.\textsuperscript{34}

Disputes over citizenship also occasionally concerned the dead. Such was the case with Muhammad Kasimbaev, who had emigrated in 1884 from Russian Central Asia to Jeddah, where he died in 1893. According to the Ottoman authorities, Kasimbaev had received an Ottoman passport upon his arrival in the Ottoman Empire. The Russian authorities, however, countered that no Ottoman passport had been found among Kasimbaev's possessions after his death. In the absence of such proof, they argued, Kasimbaev had to be considered a Russian subject. The Russian Foreign Ministry therefore requested that Kasimbaev's personal items be given to Russian consular authorities for remission to his relatives in Russia. This resulted in a protracted struggle between the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and the Russian Embassy in Istanbul which lasted over two years. Despite numerous demands from the Russian Embassy that Russian officials be allowed to take possession of Kasimbaev's belongings and send them back to Russia, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry refused to permit this, insisting that Kasimbaev had been a subject of the Ottoman Empire and that the Russian government therefore had no right to claim his belongings.\textsuperscript{35}

The question of which government had authority over Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire was, in some regions, further complicated by the transfer of territory which had taken place after the war of 1877-78. According to Article VII of the Treaty of Istanbul (1879), Ottoman subjects living in territories ceded to Russia were to automatically become Russian subjects if they did not leave the territory within a span of

\textsuperscript{34} BOA, HRH 576/48, s. 1-5.
\textsuperscript{35} BOA, HRH 571/31, s.1-2.
six months. Thus, even those individuals who immigrated to the Ottoman Empire from the provinces of Ardahan, Kars, and Batumi after this six-month period expired had ended became, often without knowing it, Russian subjects. Such was the case with one Kara Veyseloğlu, who sought the protection of the Russian consulate after he was imprisoned in Trabzon in 1905. Kara Veyseloğlu’s father was a Muslim from Batumi who had immigrated to Trabzon after the expiration of the six-month grace period. Having never formally renounced his Russian citizenship, Kara Veyseloğlu’s father had continued to be viewed by the Russian government as a subject of Russia. When Kara Veyseloğlu was arrested, the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that he and even his children were subjects of Russia. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry disagreed, arguing that since Kara Veyseloğlu himself had been born in the village of Kara-Kadi, outside Trabzon, he was a subject of the Ottoman Empire. Exchanges between the two ministries continued for two years and the case culminated with Kara Veyseloğlu and his family being expelled to Russia in 1907.36

*Liminal subjects*

Muslims traveling between the two countries were able to evade restrictions placed upon them by both the Russian and Ottoman governments through other means as well. In January of 1897, for example, the Russian government placed a medical quarantine on Mecca and banned Muslims from taking the pilgrimage. Before long, however, it became clear that Russian Muslims were traveling to the region anyway. Those who could obtain a foreign travel passport would go first to Istanbul, where they would obtain Ottoman identification documents (*tezkire-i osmaniye*). From Istanbul, they would then travel to Mecca, eventually returning to Russia with their Russian passports

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36 BOA, HRH 576/82
as Russian subjects. Meanwhile, police officials in the Crimean cities of Kerch, Sevastopol, Yalta, and Yevpatoria reported a “several fold” increase in the number of Ottoman subjects in the region reporting that their passports had been lost or stolen. Police officials believed that Ottoman subjects in the Crimea, many of whom were themselves returned Crimean Tatars, were selling their passports for up to fifty rubles, and then were reporting them stolen to the Ottoman consulate in Sevastopol to receive new ones. Muslims wishing to travel to Mecca, “primarily from the gubernias of Kazan, Simbirsk, and Astrakhan”, would then use them for travel to Istanbul and from there to Mecca.  

Tensions between the foreign ministries of the two empires derived largely from their very different concepts regarding citizenship. While the Russian authorities continued to recognize as Russian subjects virtually all Muslims who left the country, Ottoman authorities accepted nearly all comers as Ottomans. In 1860, the same year that the Russian government had erected new bureaucratic and financial impediments to Muslims wishing to emigrate, the Ottoman government established the Refugee Commission (Muhacirin Komisyonyu) in an attempt to bring more order to the process of incorporating new immigrants into the empire, steering new arrivals away from major urban centers such as Istanbul and towards areas where it was hoped their presence would help boost agricultural production. The Ottoman government then distributed money and land to these immigrants, usually about twenty-six acres per family. In some cases,

37 GAARK, f. 26, op. 2, d. 4314, ll. 1-1 ob.
38 GAARK, f. 26, op. 2, d. 4313, l. 6; f. 26, op. 2, d. 4314, ll. 1-1 ob, 5-6 ob.
39 On the establishment and activities of the Muhacirin Komisyonyu, see David Cameron Cuthell Jr., “The Muhacirin Komisyonyu.”
40 Karpat, Politicization of Islam, 184-188.
representatives of the Ottoman government also promised to not conscript *muhacirin* for a specified period of time.\textsuperscript{41}

Gaining *muhacir* status was not nearly as complicated a process as renouncing Russian citizenship. In a letter written in 1901 and intercepted by Russian authorities, a Muslim who had recently emigrated from the city of Şekki (today in Azerbaijan) recounted to a friend the relative ease with which he had been accepted as a *muhacir* by the Ottoman authorities. He was given money and, eventually, land outside the city of Bursa.

I went to the station near Shekki and from there boarded a train. Within twenty-four hours I had arrived in Batumi. Once there, I was left with just nine rubles. After five to ten more days of waiting and travel we arrived in the Ottoman city of Rize. From there I boarded a boat and, without paying anything, traveled to Trabzon. This is the seat of the regional governor’s office. In the ports of both Rize and Trabzon there were a number of Ottoman policemen looking for refugees (*muhacirin*). They separated the *muhacirin* from the non-*muhacirin*, and once they got a look at our clothes they put us in among the *muhacirin*. In Trabzon we met up to seventy other *muhacirin*. Some of them were Tatar some were Çerkez, some were Georgian, some Dagestani. Some of us had money, some of us didn’t. They gave us free transport to Istanbul and bread for seven days.\textsuperscript{42}

The contrast between the cumbersome and costly process of renouncing Russian citizenship and the speed with which many Russian Muslims were given Ottoman citizenship sometimes led to strains between the bureaucracies of the two empires. The Russian Embassy in Istanbul complained that the Ottoman authorities recognized Russian

\textsuperscript{41} ADTA f. 45, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 22-23. A Muslim immigrant from Sheki, having settled outside of Bursa, wrote that the *muhacirin* in his area had been told they would be exempt from conscription for seven years. Fuat Dündar also remarks upon this, but states that such practices occurred only in the case of married men. See Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 225.

\textsuperscript{42} ADTA, f. 45, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 22-23-ob.
Muslims as *muhacir* "simply upon their declaration of a desire to settle in the [Ottoman] empire, even if they do not possess a Russian foreign travel passport" and insisted that it would "never" recognize as *muhacir* Muslims who had left Russia without renouncing their Russian citizenship first.\(^ {43} \) Meanwhile, Ottoman authorities would occasionally detain Muslims attempting to return to Russia after having accepted money or land through their *muhacir* status, leading to heated diplomatic exchanges.\(^ {44} \) Other disputes between the Ottoman and Russian foreign ministries involved Russian Muslims accused by the Ottoman government of spying for Russia, the most famous of which was Mehmed Shahtakhtinskii.\(^ {45} \)

In the months which followed the 1908 Unionist takeover in Istanbul, thousands of Muslim families that had immigrated to the Ottoman Empire in 1901-1902 began returning to the Crimea.\(^ {46} \) Most of these families had purchased foreign travel passports and had renounced their Russian citizenship. Unable to receive official permission from the Russian government to return to the Crimea permanently, they had entered Russia with Ottoman passports. With growing apprehension, officials in the Ministry of Interior noted that many of these families were settling semi-permanently and in numbers that

\(^{43}\) BOA, HRH 575/40.

\(^{44}\) BOA, HRH 579/43.

\(^{45}\) On Shahtakhtinskii, see later in this chapter. Also see Michael A. Reynolds, "The Ottoman-Russian struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus", 2003), 147-148 and BOA, DH SYS 56/10, s. 8. One of Shahtakhtinskii’s activities involved infiltrating Russian Muslim student groups in Istanbul suspected by the Russian embassy of panturkist activities. Shahtakhtinskii’s report for the embassy was emphatic in its claims that the students had no such interests. See Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI), Moscow, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 4226, ll. 27-30. For other cases of suspected Russian Muslim spying in the Ottoman Empire, see BOA, Y. PRK, EŞA 30/21; DH EUM 5. Şube, 3/60, s. 1/1; and DH EUM 5. Şube, 9/7.

\(^{46}\) A noticeable increase in the number of formerly Russian—and currently Ottoman—Muslims applying for residence permits or Russian citizenship can be detected after the 1908 Unionist takeover in Istanbul, and particularly from mid-1909 onwards. See GAARK, f. 27, op. 7, dd. 6434, 6447, 6461, 6468, 6493, 6494, 6495, 6553, 6568, 6573, and many others. Also see ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 83, l. 67.
were growing larger by the year.\textsuperscript{47} Of the several thousand (perhaps as many as 10,000) families which had left the Crimea in 1901-1902, a total of 1652 families were registered by 1913 as having returned to Crimea with hopes of residing permanently.\textsuperscript{48}

Unwilling to allow such a large number of foreign subjects to reside permanently in the peninsula, a decision was made to allow the returning Tatars to become Russian subjects once again. A substantial proportion of the families (1104) accepted the offer, while 548 families declined.\textsuperscript{49} Ultimately, the regional administration decided to allow all of the Tatars who had emigrated in 1902 and who had returned to Crimea before May 1, 1913 to resettle in Crimea provided they give up their Ottoman citizenship and once again become subjects of Russia.\textsuperscript{50} In theory, those families which refused to return to Russian citizenship were supposed to leave the country. However, local authorities appear to have been unwilling or unable to enforce regulations obliging them to leave and there was no effective way of preventing their return to Russia even after they had been deported.\textsuperscript{51} In 1913 and 1914, Russian consulates in the Ottoman Empire received still more requests from Crimean Tatars who had immigrated in 1902 to receive Russian passports and return to the Crimea, but these requests were denied on the grounds that they had missed the deadline to apply for Russian passports. Crimean Tatars who had left in 1901-1902 without renouncing their Russian citizenship were, however, allowed to return until the closing of the frontier with the Ottoman Empire after the onset of hostilities in 1914.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, even in 1902 police in the Crimea had begun to investigate the ‘noticeable’ increase in Ottoman subjects living in the region permanently and without registration. GAARK f. 26, op. 3, d. 262, l. 2.
\textsuperscript{48} ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 83, ll. 79, 90.
\textsuperscript{49} ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 83, l. 90.
\textsuperscript{50} ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 83, ll. 1-8 ob.
\textsuperscript{51} ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 83, ll. 11-14.
\textsuperscript{52} ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 83, ll. 15-18.
The Turkists, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire

The three Russian Muslims who are best known for having taken part in the Turkist movement are Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Ali Hüseyinzade. While the arrival of these individuals in Istanbul and their involvement in the Turkist movement are typically presented in the historiography as constituting a fairly straightforward “one-way” trip, these individuals resembled the body of Russian Muslims more generally through their continued maintenance of relations with their lands of origin.

Akçura was born in the Volga city of Simbirsk, approximately 200 miles from Kazan. While Akçura’s immediate family was not particularly wealthy, the Akçurins were a wealthy and prominent family in the Volga region with considerable commercial interests. As was frequently the case in such families, sons who did not go into the family business often became religious personnel in the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly. When Yusuf was seven or eight his father died, at which time Yusuf and his mother moved to Istanbul. After studying at the War College of Istanbul, Akçura became involved in a student organization that was considered revolutionary by the Ottoman security apparati. Exiled internally to Trablus (Libya), Akçura fled to Paris with a friend where he attended classes at the Sorbonne and became familiar with the works of a number of then-popular French intellectuals. In 1903 Akçura returned to Russia, where he wrote “Three Types of Policy” (“Üç tarz-ı siyaset”) and published it in the Cairene Turkish-language newspaper Türk in 1904. After five years of political and journalistic

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53 Tairov, Akçuriny. Also see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
activity in Russia, Akçura returned to Istanbul in 1908 as a foreign correspondent for the Orenburg newspaper *Vakit*.\(^{54}\)

Between Akçura’s arrival in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and the beginning of the First World War, Akçura traveled back to Russia frequently. Spending the end of 1908 in Istanbul, Akçura went back to Russia in February of 1909, where he rented an apartment in St. Petersburg. He returned yet again to Istanbul in the fall of 1909. In 1914, tsarist security offices reported that Akçura had again returned to Russia, spending the months January through March in St. Petersburg and Simbirsk before departing again for Istanbul, where he would spend the war years.\(^{55}\) Letters written by Akçura to Fatih Kerimi in Orenburg during the years 1908-1913 often express a longing to return to Russia and an indecisiveness regarding where he wanted to live.\(^{56}\) Professionally, Akçura continued an active career in Russia even after moving to Istanbul in 1908. Having arrived in Istanbul as a foreign correspondent for the Orenburg newspaper *Vakit*, Akçura continued to publish articles in the newspaper on at least a weekly basis even after he had undertaken full-time duties as the editor of *Türk Yurdu* in 1911.

Indeed, Akçura’s professional prospects in Istanbul appear to have been considerably stronger than they had been in Russia. Whereas Akçura had been in demand in Russia as a publicist, political operator, and negotiator with the Russian government in the years immediately after the 1905 Revolution, these conditions changed drastically in 1907 and 1908. During these years, Akçura was still publishing frequently in both *Vakit* and *Ehber* (he had left *Kazan Mukhibiri* in 1907), but politically his prospects were not as

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\(^{54}\) For Akçura’s biography, see François Georgeon, *Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc*, 12-15.

\(^{55}\) NART f. 199, op. 1, d. 948, ll. 52, 178.

\(^{56}\) On Akçura missing Russia, see NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 18. On not knowing where he wanted to live, see NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 66-67; f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 80-81; f. 1370, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 80-83; f. 1370, op. 2, d. 23, l. 3; f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, ll. 3-4.
bright as they had been in 1905 and early 1906. With the changes in the election laws after the dissolution of the second Duma, heightened criticism of Akçura personally and the İttifak leadership more generally among politically active Muslims, and growing political apathy among Muslims, the İttifak movement was becoming a less relevant part of the political composition of Russia and its Muslim communities.\footnote{See Chapter 4 of this study.} Meanwhile, investigations and arrests made in the wake of the denunciation campaigns which had targeted the İttifak leadership and other jadidist figures from late 1908 onwards had contributed to an increasingly tenuous climate for Akçura in Russia.

Ahmet Ağaoğlu is another of the best-known Russian Muslim figures from the Turkist movement. Born in the city of Şekki, now in the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ağaoğlu was born into a family of considerable local prestige. At age seventeen Ağaoğlu was sent to St. Petersburg, where he studied for one year before moving to Paris. In Paris, Ağaoğlu studied with the famous Orientalist Ernest Renan as well as a number of other contemporary well-known scholars. In 1897 Ağaoğlu returned to the Caucasus, where he occasionally submitted articles to the Tagiev-sponsored Russian-language newspaper Kaspii, the editor of which was Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev. After the declaration of the October Manifesto of 1905, Ağaoğlu became editor of Hayat. After Hayat was closed due to financial problems (leading to an apparent split with Tagiev, whom Ağaoğlu blamed for the paper’s closure), Ağaoğlu became editor of İrşad. In the time and place in which he lived, Ağaoğlu was best known for his blistering attacks upon the leadership of the Shi’ite spiritual assembly in the Caucasus, his stewardship of the educational foundation Ýenâ-i Maarîf, and his emergence as a community spokesperson in the tripartite negotiations then taking place between the Shiite community, the Armenians,
and the Russian vice-regency. Today, however, Ağaoğlu is best known for the various forms of collective identity he used to describe the community of Caucasian Muslims in which he lived.\textsuperscript{58}

A doctor, Ali Hüseyinçade\textsuperscript{59} had also lived in the Ottoman Empire prior to 1908. Born in Tbilisi, Hüseyinçade had studied medicine in St. Petersburg, graduating in the 1880s. He then moved to Istanbul, where he taught medicine at the War College. According to some of his biographers, Hüseyinçade was one of the original founders of the Committee of Ottoman Unity (İttihat-ı Osmani Cemiyeti) in 1889 along with Abdullah Cevdet, İbrahim Temo, and İshak Sukutî.\textsuperscript{60} Others, however, argue that this was not true.\textsuperscript{61} Hüseyinçade returned to Russia in 1902, where he worked as a teacher and doctor in Baku. Following the October Manifest in 1905, he became a regular contributor to the Tagiev-sponsored Hayat and İrşad newspapers, as well as editor of the literary journal Füyuzat. Of all of the Russian Muslim reformers who later gained fame in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, Hüseyinçade was by far the most removed from active involvement in politics. Although Hüseyinçade was a representative, along with Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ali Merdan bey Topçibaşev, to the early, pre-Muslim Fraction meetings held in St. Petersburg and Nizhnii Novgorod, Hüseyinçade was not as active in community politics as Akçura, Gasprinskii, or Ağaoğlu. Instead, Hüseyinçade concentrated more on literary and philosophical issues, including the question of national identity. One of his most famous article series is entitled “Who are the Turks and of

\textsuperscript{58} Shissler, especially 43-63.
\textsuperscript{59} Ali Hüseyinçade is often called “Hüseyinçade Ali” in the historiography. However, in his writings he usually signed his name “Ali Hüseyinçade”, and so I am following Ofelia Bayramlı’s convention in calling him this way.
\textsuperscript{60} Hanoğlu, \textit{Young Turks in Opposition}, 266, n. 13.

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whom do they consist?" ("Türkler kimdir ve kimlerden ibareti"), and he is considered the primary influence for Ziya Gökalp’s well-known work Türkçeşmek, İslâlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak ("On becoming Turkish, Islamic, and Modern").

Apart from Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and Hüseyinzade, the best known Russian Muslim in Istanbul was Abdürrüşid İbrahimov. İbrahimov (1857-1944) was extremely well traveled. Born in the guverniia of Tobol’sk in western Siberia, İbrahimov had been a licensed imam in the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly prior to leaving Russia in 1879 for what would amount to a lifetime of travel. From 1879 to 1885 İbrahimov traveled to Medina and back, spending three years in Medina and more than one year in Istanbul en route. In 1885 İbrahimov returned to his Siberian village of Târa, where he worked as a teacher until 1890. From this time until the end of his life in Tokyo in 1944, İbrahimov was either residing in or traveling between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan. İbrahimov contributed frequently to the Muslim periodical press during the revolutionary years and sent in dispatches from all over the world, including many times from Istanbul. While in Istanbul, moreover, İbrahimov contributed to a number of newspapers, including Sirat al-Mustakim, Sebilibreşad, and İslam Dünyası (Istanbul), Beyan ul-hak and Ahber (Kazan), and others.

Another contributor to Türk Yurdu was Mehmet Emin Resulzade (1884-1954), who wrote a series of articles entitled “The Turks of Iran.” Like most of the Russian-born figures considered emblematic of the Turkist movement, Resulzade’s life was very

63 See Türkoğlu, Siberyalı meşhur seyyah Abdürrüşid İbrahim, 109-114.

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cosmopolitan. Resulzade lived in Tbilisi, Baku, Tabriz, and Istanbul, and published articles in Russian, Ottoman Turkish, Azeri Turkish, and Persian. Born in Baku, Resulzade had helped in the publication of two socialist publications, Tekemmiil and Yoldas. In 1908, Resulzade traveled to Iran, which had undergone a reformist revolution in 1905. From 1908 to 1910, he edited a Persian-language newspaper called Iran-i Nev, the “New Iran”. Expelled, allegedly on Russian orders, from Iran in 1910, Resulzade traveled from Tehran to Istanbul, where he stayed until 1913. In 1913, Resulzade returned to Russia under an amnesty provided as part of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty. Spending the war in Baku (where he published the newspaper Açık Söz), Resulzade would become president of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan until the fall of Baku to the Bolsheviks in 1920.65

A number of other well known Muslim intellectuals in Russia also spent time in Istanbul during these years. İsmail Gasprinskii traveled to Istanbul nearly every year66, and occasionally published pieces in Istanbul-based journals such as Türk Yurdu. Fatih Kerimi also spent time in Istanbul during the years 1912-1913. Writing letters back to Orenburg, which were then published in Vakit, Kerimi’s İstanbul Mektupları (Istanbul Letters) were later published as a book.67

While Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and Hüseyinzade returned to their lands of origin after the First World War, all three of them are remembered (and often celebrated) for their contributions to “Turkish nationalism” during the Unionist period primarily because they

65 Bennigsen, fn 2, pp. 109-110. In 1920, Resulzade would leave Azerbaijan for Germany, where he lived until the end of World War II. After World War II, Resulzade moved to Turkey, where he died in Ankara in 1955. On Resulzade’s life in emigration, see Nəsiman Yaqubul, Azərbaycan milli istiqlal müharibəsi və Məhəmməd Əmin Rəsulzadə (Baku: Elm, 2000), 76-118.
67 See “Fatih Kerimi,” Tatarstan Entsiklopedii Sützege, 327.
ultimately settled in the Republic of Turkey, where they carried on literary, academic, and political careers for years into the republican period. Other individuals, meanwhile, such as Fatih Kerimi, Muhammad Ağa Shahtakhtinskii, and Mehmet Emin Resulzade, also traveled between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, but found themselves in Russia when hostilities broke out between the two empires in 1914. These figures would remain in Russia throughout the war and would often play important roles in post-revolutionary (including Bolshevik) politics and administration. While Akçura traveled several times between Russia and the Ottoman Empire during the years 1908-1914, he was in Istanbul when hostilities broke out and remained in the Ottoman Empire for most of the war.  

*Living in a Turkic world*

The continued ability of Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and other Russian-born Muslim writers to earn a living continued to be bound up closely with Russia even after their departure for Istanbul. In 1908, Akçura traveled to Istanbul, where he was to work as a correspondent for the Orenburg newspaper *Vakit*. As Akçura did not have a steady writing position in Istanbul until the 1911 establishment of *Türk Yurdu*, the payments which Akçura received from Kerimi for his publications in *Vakit* represented a considerable portion of his income. Indeed, Akçura frequently complained to Kerimi about how little money he had, while many of Akçura’s letters to Kerimi begin with thanks for a recent payment.  

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68 On some of Akçura’s journeys outside of the Ottoman Empire during and immediately after the war, see later in this chapter.  
69 See, for example, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 82; f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 102; f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24 l. 16.
continued to publish articles in the Baku newspapers *Hakikat* and *Günes* for nearly two years after his 1909 departure for Istanbul.\(^{70}\)

Prior to 1911, Muslim writers from Russia living in the Ottoman capital did not write very much about Turkism (*Türkçülük*) or “The Turkish World” (*Türk Alemi* or *Türk Dünyası*),\(^{71}\) but rather positioned themselves as interpreters of events in Russia and commentators on international affairs. Publishing in journals such as *Sirat ül-Müstakim*, *Sebil ır-Reşad*, *İslam Mecmuası* and elsewhere, Russian Muslims living in Istanbul wrote frequently on Russia and Russian Muslims for an audience of Ottoman readers. A writer, calling himself “Kazanlı Ayaz” (Ayaz from Kazan), wrote a set of articles entitled “The Muslims of Russia”, as did “Ahmed Taceddin from Troisk” in his article series “The Islamic World of Russia”.\(^{72}\) Many other articles by Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and other well-traveled figures such as Abdürreşid İbrahimov focused upon international politics, and relations between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and various European states.\(^{73}\)

After 1911, however, “Turkism” (*Türkçülük*) became a much more explicit component of the writings of Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and others. For Russian Muslim intellectual-journalist figures living in Istanbul during these years, Istanbul became not only the theoretical “center” of an “imagined community”, but also constituted a community in practice. In this world, people like Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Fatih Kerimi, İsmail Gasprinskii, Mehmet Ağa Shahtakhtinskii, and others involved themselves

\(^{70}\) See, for example, “Osmanlı Ahvali”, *Hakikat* 7, January 8, 1910. Also see “Osmanlı Mektubattı”, *Günes* 25, October 26, 1910.

\(^{71}\) But there were some exceptions. See, for example, “Türklüğ’e Dair” *Sirat al-Mustakim* No. 20, 318-319, 1326/1908.

\(^{72}\) “Rusya’da İslamiyyet Alemi”, *Sirat al-Mustakim* 57 (1326/1909), 78-79.

in politics, served the “community”, published their articles, earned money, aided friends and protégés, made new friends, and carried on personal relationships.

Meanwhile, Russian Muslims like Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Ağaçoğlu continued to publish in newspapers in Russia. Yusuf Akçura produced several long articles a month for the Orenburg newspaper Vakit. In these articles Akçura writes only infrequently about “Turks” or “Turkism”, usually referring to the Muslim populations of Russia as part of the “Turk-Tatar” community (Türk-Tatar milleti). Just as Akçura and others marketed themselves as interpreters of Russia and international affairs to their audience in the Ottoman Empire, they wrote chiefly from the perspective of foreign correspondents reporting on the Ottoman Empire in their dispatches to readers in Russia. Akçura reported on politics and, occasionally, human interest stories.\textsuperscript{74} Fatih Kerimi also published a number of articles written during the course of his visit to Istanbul in the journal Şura from November 3, 1912 to March 9, 1913.\textsuperscript{75}

During the years 1908-1914, the publishing worlds of Istanbul and centers of Muslim publishing in Russia such as Kazan, Bahçesaray, and Baku became more closely connected than ever before. While many Russian Muslim newspapers had been banned in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdulhamid II,\textsuperscript{76} most of this censorship was lifted in 1908 and 1909. Meanwhile, not only were many Russian Muslims who wrote for and read the periodical press now living in Istanbul, but now Muslims who were still living in Russia also began sending their reports and articles to Istanbul-based

\textsuperscript{74} Such as “İstanbul’da Tatar Restorani”. Vakit 421, January 20, 1909.
\textsuperscript{75} Fazıl Gökçek, “Fatih Kerimi ve İstanbul Mektupları”, İstanbul Mektupları (İstanbul: Çağrı, 2001), xii.
\textsuperscript{76} BOA, ZB 21/7, s. 1. Also see İrşad 38, March 4, 1907.
publications with increasing frequency. Finally, those journals which carried the most articles by and about Russian Muslims—Sirat ül-Müstakim, Sebil ʻür-Reşad, and Türk Yurdu—were easily available in Russia, where many individuals and libraries had subscriptions to them. For Russian Muslims living and writing in Istanbul, the ability to relate events taking place among Muslim communities in Russia to the lives of Muslims in the Ottoman Empire was a matter of not only intellectual or personal interest, but also financial and professional importance.

**Russian Muslims in the age of Turkism**

On August 18, 1911, the “Turkish” Homeland Society (Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti) was created in Istanbul. The founders of this organization included Mehmet Emin, Ahmet Hikmet, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali Hüseyinzade, and Yusuf Akçura. The purpose of this organization was to manage the publication of their journal, also named Türk Yurdu (“Turkish Homeland”). Also at this time the founders of Türk Yurdu established the “Turkish Hearth” (Türk Ocağı), which was envisioned to be responsible for organizing other types of activities, such as the holding of meetings and conferences.

The first issue of Türk Yurdu was printed on November 30, 1911. The first page of this issue included a statement from the editors in which they explained that the goal of their society was “to provide service to Turkism (Türklük) and to be of benefit to

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77 Mehmet Emin Resulzade published “Iran Mektupları” in Hakikat. While in Istanbul, he wrote a series of articles for Türk Yurdu entitled “The Turks of Iran”.

78 Aidar Khabutdinov claims that there were “up to 50 subscriptions” to Türk Yurdu in the city of Kazan alone. See Khabutdinov, “Islamskii factor v Tatarskom obschestvennom dvizhenii nachala XX veka”, Islam i Musul`manskaia kul`tura v sredнем povolzh’e, 207.

79 The word “Türk” can be translated into English as either “Turkic” or “Turkish”. “Türk Yurdu” is usually translated as “Turkish Homeland”.

80 On the Turkish hearths, see Yusuf Sarımay, Türk milliyetçiliğinin tarihi gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931 (Istanbul: Ötüken, 1994); Hugh Pouton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 82-3, 86, 102, 126, 132, 133.
Turks". But Turkism was also of potential benefit to the Russian-born Turkists, whose incomes and reputations became closely bound up with the movement. Akçura and Ağaoğlu wrote frequently on the "borders" of the "Turkic World", and wrote frequently on "Turkism" (Türklük) and the Turkist movement. Akçura also worked hard to publicize not only the Turkist movement but also the Turkist name. In a 1909 letter written from Istanbul to Fatih Kerimi, for example, Akçura complained that Russian Muslim students in Istanbul had chosen the wrong word to describe their movement. Rather than using the term "Türklük" to describe "Turkism", they had used the more formal and scholarly term "eturkıa", which Akçura had found unsuitable. Elsewhere, Akçura repeated the term "Türklük" frequently in his writings. This was a movement, just like that of "All-Russian Muslims" from just a few years earlier, and now Akçura worked no less relentlessly than before in having it gain currency.

Indeed, Akçura even looked beyond Russia in his efforts to expand the Turkic World. In February of 1912, Türk Yurdu carried news that an organization called the "Turanian Society" had recently opened in Budapest. The organization, founded by orientalists and philologists, was fundamentally a scholarly organization. In 1913, the organization invited Akçura to Budapest. Akçura wanted to attend, but was unable to. He therefore attempted to persuade Fatih Kerimi, who was then preparing to return to Russia from Istanbul, to take the trip for him. "On your way back", Akçura instructed Kerimi,

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81 "Maksad ve meslek", Türk Yurdu 1/1, 17 teşrînsani 1327/November 30, 1911.
82 Letter from Yusuf Akçura to Fatih Kerimi, January 5, 1909. Nart, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 104.
83 Tanrı Demirkan, Macar Tûrancöleri (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2000), 26. Indeed, starting in 1913, a group of Hungarian Orientalists, advocating the "Asiatic roots" of the Hungarians and their kinship with Turkic communities (along with Finns and Estonians), began publishing the journal Tûrdû. On the affinity of these Hungarians with Asia and the concept of "Turán", see Paikert Alajos, "Ázsia jövöje", Tûrdû 1, No. 1 (1913), 7-14; Lendvai Károly, "Ázsia és a modern magyar építőmûvészet", Tûrdû, Vol. I., No. 2 (1913), 100-102. On the Turanian (or "pan-Turanian") movement in Budapest, also see Joseph Kessler, "Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary", Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1955.
“go to Costanca and Budapest. See them, figure out what’s happening, and write me”. Akçura believed that it was “necessary to understand the objectives” of the new organization. “Understanding their objectives”, he told Kerimi, “will be beneficial to Russian Muslims”, as well as to the Ottoman state.84

In addition to intellectuals, there was also a growing number of Russian Muslim students studying at both traditional and modern educational institutions in Istanbul, Beirut, Bursa, and other cities in the Ottoman Empire. Many of these students were training to become teachers, and planned to return to Russia to work in new method schools. Indeed, the type of literacy-based Muslim education that had become increasingly fashionable in Russia under the name usul-u cedid had been the method of education in many Ottoman schools since Abdülhamid II’s educational reforms of the 1870s and 1880s.85 Particularly in the Crimea and the Caucasus, but also in the Volga region and Central Asia, large numbers of Ottoman-educated teachers found employment in both traditional and new method schools.86 Some of these were Russian Muslims who had come to the Ottoman Empire for an education, while others were Ottoman-born Muslims traveling to Russia to take advantage of job opportunities.87 Indeed, teachers trained in Istanbul (whether Ottoman-born or not) were much sought-after by those

84 NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 29, l. 8.
85 On educational reform in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere in the nineteenth century, see Chapter 3 of this study.
86 This, in turn, fuelled fears that Ottomans were using teachers to disseminate “pan-Islamic” or “pan-Turkist” propaganda. See chapters 3 and 5 of this study. Also see A. Kemal İlkul, Türkistan ve Çin Yollarında Unutulamayan Hattılar.
87 On Ottoman subjects teaching in the Russian Empire, see, for example, RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 463, ll. 8, 23; NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, l. 10. Sometimes were also former immigrants to the Ottoman Empire who were still recognized by the Russian government as Russian subjects and who wished to return to Russia. See BOA, HRH 574/26, s. 1-2, and Meyer, “Immigration, return, and the politics of citizenship.” 21-22. Also see GAARK f. 26, op. 3, d. 362; f. 100, op. 1, d. 2360, ll. 2-5, 34-42, 164.
Russian Muslims who supported new method teaching, who often felt there was a “shortage” of teachers well-trained in the new method in Russia.  

Russian Muslims studying in Istanbul often claimed that they were obliged to do so due to the lack of first-class educational institutions for Muslims in Russia. A Russian Muslim student in Istanbul calling himself “Son of Islam”\textsuperscript{89}, for example, published an article in the Baku newspaper \textit{Taze Hayat} in 1907 in which he argued that everywhere in Russia the condition of Muslim education was dire indeed.

Even if in both Orenburg and Ufa an orderly (\textit{muntazam}) school\textsuperscript{90} has opened, for thirty million sons of Islam there is not a single reformed \textit{medrese} in Kazan. As far as Russian schools are concerned, only rich Muslims can attend them. Furthermore, studying only in Russian schools cannot serve our needs, and for this reason poor Muslim students from Russia who have little or no money have started coming to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{91}

While the organizations of Russian Muslim students in Istanbul are most frequently discussed in the context of the Unionist period of Ottoman history, Muslims from Russia began studying in Istanbul in larger numbers during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. According to Isamoğlu’s article, this surge was thanks partly to a decree issued by the sultan whereby Russian Muslims could study at Ottoman educational institutions for free. In 1907, estimated Isamoğlu, there were approximately seventy Muslim students studying in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{88} See, for example, GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2362, l. 165.

\textsuperscript{89} “İslamoğlu”

\textsuperscript{90} Meaning, in this context, a new method school. The schools being referred to are most likely the \textit{Medrese-i Hüseyniye} in the village of Kargala outside Orenburg and the \textit{Medrese-i Osmaniye} in Ufa.

\textsuperscript{91} “İstanbul da Rusyalı İslam Talebeleri”, \textit{Taze Hayat} 66, April 3, 1907.

\textsuperscript{92} “İstanbul da Rusyalı İslam Talebeleri”. In 1912, Shakhtakhtinskii would make a similar estimate in a report prepared for the Russian Embassy in Istanbul. See later in this chapter and AVPRI, f. 180, op. 5172, d. 4226, ll. 27-30-ob.
Many of these students returned to Russia after completing their education in order to teach in new method schools. Yusuf Akçura, Fatih Kerimi, and other well known and well connected Russian Muslims living in Istanbul often helped these students find financial assistance during their studies and work in Russia. In March of 1909, for example, Yusuf Akçura wrote to Fatih Kerimi in Orenburg to intervene on behalf of a Tatar student he knew in Istanbul, one Muhammad Kerim Muhammedcanov. Muhammedcanov, explained Akçura, was the “poor son of a village teacher” in Russia, who was four to five months away from completing his studies. Akçura asked Kerimi to find someone in Russia to sponsor Muhammedcanov by sending him 50-60 rubles to tide him over until he could finish his education, suggesting Zakir Rämiyev⁹³ as someone who could possibly help him.⁹⁴

On other occasions, the students themselves would write wealthy Muslims in Russia, asking them if they knew of anyone who could help them defray the expenses of studying in Istanbul.⁹⁵ In 1911, Russian authorities intercepted a fundraising letter signed by Haci İsmail Abdiushev, who described himself as the secretary of an organization of Tatar students in Istanbul, which was raising money to help Russian-born Tatars in Istanbul continue their education. The letter wrote that among the organizations’ supporters were “our thinkers and merchants” from Russia, including Yusuf Akçura and the Tatar writer Musa Akyiğit.⁹⁶ Tatar students in Istanbul, wrote Abdiushev, will be of use to Russian Muslim communities, “for upon returning to Russia a number of us will

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⁹³ Zakir Rämiyev and his brother Şakir were well-known publishing and philanthropical figures in the Muslim Volga region. See chapter 3.
⁹⁴ Letter from Yusuf Akçura to Fatih Kerimi, 10 March 1909, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 24.
⁹⁵ See, for example, the letter written by a Russian Muslim to Fatih Kerimi on March 8, 1908. NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, l. 3. Also see NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 28, l. 50 and f. 1370, op. 2, d. 28, l. 69.
⁹⁶ RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, l. 67-68.
become mullahs, others will become teachers, and we will be of benefit to the population”.

In 1911 and 1912, Muhammad Ağa Shahtakhtinskii was occasionally employed by the Russian Consulate in Istanbul, for whom he translated various articles from the Ottoman and Russian Muslim press and, on at least one occasion, wrote a several-page report on the activities of Russian Muslim students in Istanbul based upon his personal experiences in spending time with them. This led to his being expelled from the empire by the Ottoman government, which considered him a spy.97

The editor of the Turkic-language newspaper Şark-i Rus (‘The Russian East’) from 1903 until it closed in 1905, Shahtakhtinskii was, in fact, one of the best known Muslim publicists in Russia prior to the Revolution of 1905.98 Yet Shahtakhtinskii was not friendly with the likes of Topçibaşev, Tagiev, Ağaoğlu, Hüseyinzade and the other close-knit (and mostly Baku-based) reformers who dominated Muslim politics in the Caucasus after the 1905 Revolution. Moreover, he had not been invited to the early Muslim meetings in St. Petersburg in March of 1905, while Topçibaşev, Ağaoğlu, and Hüseyinzade had all attended. Kaspii newspaper, which was edited by Ali Merdan bey Topçibaşev and Ahmet Ağaoğlu, derided Şark-i Rus for its ties to the Russian state99, a charge that has occasionally been repeated in the historiography.100

97 AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 4226, ll. 27-30-ob.
98 Shahtakhtinskii was also interested in a number of issues relating to language, even before the Revolution of 1905. Lazzerini describes this at length, see “Ismail Bey Gasprinski,” 217-220.
99 See “Kaspii’ye Cevap,” Şark-i Rus, May 4, 1903. Another point of contention was Shahtakhtinskii’s proposed alphabet reform, which was sharply criticized by not only Kaspii, but also Gasprinki’s Tercüman. See Kaspii 94, April 30, 1903. Also see “Kaspii’ye cevap-i akhrı”, Şark-i Rus May 4, 1903.
100 Michael Reynolds, for example, calls Şark-i Rus a “pro-Russia and anti-Ottoman newspaper”. See Michael Reynolds, “The Ottoman-Russian struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus, 1908-1918: Identity, ideology and the geopolitics of world order,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2003), 147.
In fact, Şark-i Rus published many pro-reform articles as well as articles that were supportive of jadidism and other issues related to the question of community reform.\textsuperscript{101} Like Russian-language newspapers and other legal Muslim-language newspapers of Russia—such as İsmail Gasprinskii’s Tercüman or the government-published Turkestan Wilayetining Gazeti—Şark-i Rus generally avoided direct criticism of the government. However, this hardly made the newspaper any more “pro-Russian” than Tercüman or, for that matter, the pre-1905 editions of Kaspii itself.\textsuperscript{102}

Having studied at the Sorbonne and in Leipzig, Shahtakhtinskii was elected as a deputy to the second Duma in 1906. According to Mehmet Usal, who wrote a series of biographical sketches on the Muslim deputies in 1909, “Mehmet Ağa was on the far left with regard to issues pertaining to progress and culture, particularly the question of religion.” In parliament, Shahtakhtinskii had originally worked closely with the İtilifak party, but soon became disaffected from the leadership, with whom he had difficult relations for several years. Indeed, Shahtakhtinskii’s falling out with the İtilifak leadership led to his virtual isolation from the Muslim parliamentary delegation. He rarely spoke in parliament and was not elected to join any commissions.\textsuperscript{103}

Shahtakhtinskii’s report on the activities of Russian Muslim students in Istanbul emphasized that they represented no threat whatsoever to Russian interests.\textsuperscript{104} The students, he wrote, “work hard” and “enjoy their studies”. “In total”, wrote

\textsuperscript{101} See, for example, “Hadim-i Millet”, Şark-i Rus, May 14, 1902; “Cemiyet-i Hayriyeler”, Şark-i Rus May 30, 1902; “Sebib-i terakki-yi ilimi”, Şark-i Rus May 25, 1903.
\textsuperscript{102} On the relations between Tercüman and local authorities in the Crimea, see Chapter 2 of this study.
\textsuperscript{103} M.F. Usal, Birinci, ikinci, ve üçüncü Duma’dan müslüman deputatlar hâmin alarının Kilğan işleri (Kazan: Hüseyin Abuzarîf Neşri, 1909), 186-188.
\textsuperscript{104} Indeed, in this respect Shahtakhtinskii’s report was completely different from those sent to the Embassy from St. Petersburg or from those written by the Embassy’s staff. See, for example, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 4226, II. 2-8; f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 4222, II. 1-2, 8, 11, 40.

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Shahtakhtinski, there were “no more than 60-70” Muslim students in Istanbul’s universities and medreses who were active in cultural and political activities concerning Russian Muslims in Istanbul. Shahtakhtinski argued in his report that the Russian government should not be alarmed that Russian Muslims would want to study in Istanbul, writing “if in Russia there were a center where Tatars could receive, in their own language, a secular (obschechelovecheskoe) education, not a single Tatar from Russia would come to Turkey to study in Constantinople”.105

The students, wroteShahtakhtinski, attended conferences “one or two times a year”.106 These conferences, often focusing upon the Turcic or Turanic “worlds”, attracted a number of well known speakers from both the Russian and Ottoman empires, including Akçura, Ağaoğlu, Hüseyinzade, the Ottoman writer and publicist Ahmet Midhat, and others. The organizations established by these students included groups of Russian Muslims such as the “Union of Crimean Students” (1908), the “Bukhariote Society for the Spread of Knowledge in Constantinople” (1909), “Turcic Unity”, and the “Society of Tatar Emigrants from Russia” (both in 1911).107 The existence of these organizations in Istanbul has often been taken as evidence to support the argument that there existed a well-organized pan-Turkist movement which had Ottoman government backing. Far from encouraging the formation of “pan-Turkist” groups of Muslim students in Istanbul, however, the Ottoman government hindered their development through laws restricting foreign nationals from leading officially recognized organizations.

105 For Shahtakhtinski’s report, see AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 4226, ll. 27-30-ob.
106 AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 4226, l. 30
107 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia}, 108. Also see Zavdat Minullin, “Zemliachestva i blagotvoritel’nye obshestva tatarskikh uchashchikhsya v musul’manskih stranakh (nachalo XX v.), Mir Islama No. 1, 1999, 135-144. Also see Minullin, “Fraternal and Benevolent Associations of Tatar Students in Muslim Countries at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century”, in Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the early 20th centuries (Anke von Kügelgen, editor), (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998).
Organizations such as these only gained official permission to open after repeated appeals to government officials.⁹⁸

**Turkism in the Ottoman Empire**

There were several well known Ottoman-born intellectuals who were interested in Turkism during these years. These included Halide Edip, Ahmet Mithat, Ziya Gökalp, and a number of other figures who are today remembered for their contribution to Ottoman literature and intellectual history. While these figures often socialized with the Russian-born Turkists¹⁰⁹ and attended Turkist conferences¹¹⁰ However, there are some clear differences between the Turkism of Ottoman-born writers and intellectuals and that of the Russian-born publicists. While Russian-born Turkists emphasized the place of “Turks” in Russia, China, and other countries within the broader “Turkic World”, Ottoman born intellectual figures tended to view Turkism primarily in terms of how it could strengthen the Ottoman state and benefit a society and culture that was increasingly viewed in terms of the Turkish communities of the empire. Compared to the circle of Russian-born Muslims in Istanbul, there was little interest in the broader “Turkic World” beyond the Ottoman borders.

For the most part, Ottoman-born intellectual figures associated with the Turkist movement¹¹¹ were concerned with questions pertaining to language and society in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman language, and its simplification in particular, were the

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⁹⁸ On the efforts of Russian Muslim student organizations in Istanbul to finally gain permission to open, see BOA, DH ID 132/8, s. 37; MV 211/145; On a 1909 Ottoman ruling that a foreigner could not be the head of an officially recognized group, see BOA, DH 49-1/24.


¹¹⁰ See, for example, Ahmet Mithat’s speech at a meeting of the “Association of Russian Muslim Students.” “Türkliğ’e Dair” *Strat al-Mustakim* No. 20, 328-319, 1908/1326.

¹¹¹ Most notably, Ziya Gökalp, Halide Edip, Semseddin Sami Bey, Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul), Necip Asim, and Ahmet Mithat.
special focus of attention in the journal *Genç Kalemler*, which was published in Thessaloniki from 1910 to 1911. Writers contributing to this journal did not usually talk about “Turkism” (*Türklük*) or the “Turkic World”, instead they focused upon the role of the Turkish language and its relation to Ottoman literature.\(^{112}\) *Genç Kalemler* frequently discussed the topic of “The new language” (*Yeni Lisan*), which would constitute a revitalization of Ottoman literature through a new discourse that would be both simplified and increasingly “Turkish”, meaning with fewer words of Arabic or Persian origin.\(^{113}\)

Other Ottoman-born Turkists saw Turkism as a form of collective identity that could potentially be harnessed in the interests of a project of social mobilization and regeneration. In these cases as well, however, Turkism was conceived of primarily in terms of what it could deliver to the Ottoman Empire, and not the broader “Turkic World”. In Halide Edip’s novel *The New Turan*, for example, cultural and social regeneration are brought forth by the state. Taking place in the future (the Ottoman Empire in the year 1347/1928), the novel describes the individuals involved with a party calling itself the “New Turan”, which has recently been elected to office. The party supports political decentralization and more autonomy for minorities while giving the state a more Turkish image. Their rivals, meanwhile, the New Ottomans, argue for a strongly centralized state with an “Ottomanist” identity. As the novel’s plot unfolds, “Turanist” and “Ottomanist” characters clash both ideologically and culturally.\(^{114}\)

**Russian Muslims and the Ottoman state**

While both Russian and Ottoman foreign ministry officials were involved in frequent exchanges regarding Russian Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman

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\(^{112}\) See, for example, “Türkçe mi, Osmanlıca mı?”, *Genç Kalemler* Vol. 1, No. 12 (1911), 132-133.


\(^{114}\) Halide Edib, *Yeni Turan* (Istanbul: Tanin Matbaası, 1911).
policymakers and bureaucrats also paid attention to events concerning Russian Muslims living in Russia. Often using local informants, Ottoman diplomatic officials in Tbilisi, Sevastopol, St. Petersburg, and elsewhere frequently reported upon Russian state policies regarding Muslims and Russian Muslim attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire. Policies regarding the conscription of Muslims in the Caucasus, for example, were frequently reported upon by Ottoman diplomats, who also made written accounts of attitudes of Russian Muslims towards their own government and that of the Ottoman Empire. After the Unionists came to power in 1908, Ottoman bureaucrats filed reports on Russian Muslim attitudes towards the creation of a constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire.

On a handful of occasions, some Ottoman officials attempted to enlist Russian-born “Turkists” or other Russian Muslims in anti-Russian propaganda campaigns or for other state purposes. In 1915, Akçura, along with Ali Hüseyinzade, the Crimean Mehmed Esad Çelебizada and the Buhan Mukameddin Begcan Bey, established the “Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Turko-Tatar Muslims in Russia”. In 1915, this committee succeeded in having a pamphlet published in the German-language Budapest newspaper, Pester Lloyd. In June of 1916, Akçura was sent to Lausanne, Switzerland in order to attend the Third Congress of Oppressed Peoples. On the way to the conference, however, Akçura had been detained. Having not received his passport in time, Akçura could not

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115 On Ottoman reports concerning Russian conscription of Russian Muslims in the Caucasus and Muslim responses to these policies, see, for example, BOA DH SYS 3/17, which discussed Muslim objections to the collection of a tax in lieu of Muslim military service in 1912. For a report harshly critical of Müfti Gubayev in the Caucasus, see BOA, YA HUS 203/20. Also see Selim Deringil, “The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: brothers or rivals?”, Central Asian Survey 13, (1994), 409-416. Occasionally, Muslims in the Caucasus would petition Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II via the Ottoman authorities in Tbilisi. See BOA, Y.A. HUS 488/5, and Y PRK HR 26/97.

116 BOA, Y.A. HUS 525/8.
proceed beyond the borders of Bulgaria. Sending numerous telegrams to Ottoman officials in an effort to receive his passport and make the conference before it ended, Akçura managed to get his paperwork straightened out in time to attend the final day of the congress.

Following the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, a small number of Ottoman officials discussed the idea of sending Akçura, Hüseyinzade, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu ("or one or two other such people") on a mission for the state. The idea, floated by the Ottoman representative in Budapest to the Grand Vezir, was to send the three Turkists to Germany and Austria in order to talk to Russian Muslim soldiers being held there. A handful of soldiers would be selected, and would then be given road money to return to Russia in order to agitate against the continuation of the war against the Ottoman Empire. After the war was over, Akçura returned to Russia on behalf of the Ottoman Red Crescent in order to assist in securing the release of nearly seventy thousand Ottoman soldiers being held in camps in Russia. During the course of this nearly two year journey, which also included travel through Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Denmark, and Switzerland, Akçura was in Russia from January 13, 1918 until February 1, 1919.

Conclusions

The Turkist movement was not a mass movement on a par with that of the Russian Muslim congresses of 1905 and 1906. At most, there appear to have been upwards of one hundred Russian born Muslim students and others who actively

\begin{footnotes}
117 BOA, DH EUM SSM 6/26.
118 Reynolds, "The Ottoman-Russian struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus", 232-233. On this congress, also see G. Jäschke, "1917 Lozan Kongresinde Rusya Mahkunu Milletler", Kurtuluş 4, No. 29-30 (March-April 1937), 24-28. Also see BOA, DH EUM 4. Şube, 21/37, s. 1.
119 BOA, DH KMS 44-1/50.
\end{footnotes}

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participated in meetings and conferences. Nevertheless, the movement attracted a large number of influential individuals, particularly intellectuals and writers, as well as some government figures.

A liminal population often both claimed by both the Russian and Ottoman states, Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were often distrusted by civil servants in both countries. While the historiography has often presented the proliferation of Russian Muslim student groups in the Ottoman Empire after 1908 as an example of CUP encouragement of “pan-Turkism”, these groups actually had difficulty opening due to the reluctance of the Ottoman bureaucracy to approve the opening of organizations whose leaders were not subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Although some individuals within the Ottoman bureaucracy did advocate using Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and Hüseyinzade for propaganda and other state purposes, these efforts did not represent a coordinated plan.

As was the case with Russian Muslims more generally, Russian Muslim intellectuals in Istanbul maintained lives and careers in Russia even after arriving in Istanbul. Indeed, during their early years in Istanbul, Akçura and Ağaoğlu did not associate themselves as closely with Turkism as they would after the founding of Türk Yurdu in 1911. From that point forward, Turkism became not simply an intellectual preoccupation, but also a vocation of considerable personal, professional and financial importance.
Conclusions

The final decades of empire in Russia are often celebrated as a period of "national movements and national identity," a time in which the various Muslim populations of the empire experienced a "cultural renaissance" leading to "national struggles" against "Russian" rule. But the struggles taking place within Muslim communities did not pit the entirety of Muslim communities against the tsarist administration. Indeed, Muslim communities in the Volga region, the southern Caucasus, the Crimea, and elsewhere in the empire were themselves fractured politically, following different political and cultural agendas and looking to different loci of authority in their efforts to communicate and negotiate with government officials. At the same time, the tsarist government itself did not function monolithically, and among the various departments and ministries of the government, as well as between officials working in St. Petersburg and those staffing provincial offices of administration, there were often conflicts of opinion and diversions in policy.

This study began with an exploration of the institutions and practices of the tsarist administration of Muslim communities in the provinces of Kazan and Baku. Chapters 1 and 2 were concerned primarily with identifying and outlining the locations of "representative" authority among Muslim communities in an era before representative politics. I thus looked at issues such as the individuals and institutions to whom Muslims would turn for assistance in solving their problems and in communicating with the tsarist authorities, particularly with regard to issues that were understood to impact Muslims as a community. With regard to the Volga region, I found that the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly as an institution and the issue of who could best mediate communication between Muslims and the government were highly contentious matters decades before the Revolution of 1905. This I contrasted with the situation in the
southern Caucasus, where the spiritual assemblies were under greater direct government supervision than in the Volga region. Due to differences in the social conditions and in the manner of tsarist rule and Muslim administration in the two provinces, the issue of Muslim community leadership was a less politicized one in Baku than in Kazan. Muslims in Kazan were more familiar with the institutions and practices of tsarist rule, as well as with the Russian language, giving them a greater number of options when approaching their relations with the tsarist authorities. These differences were compounded in the years following the Great Reforms, which were implemented entirely in the Volga region but only piecemeal in the Caucasus. The expansion of the state which came in the wake of the reforms, attempts by the state to centralize Muslim schools and the institutions of Muslim administration more fully into tsarist administration, and the revival of state-sponsored missionary activities in the Volga region led, by the end of the nineteenth century, to the emergence of a greater number of issues in the Volga region that both Muslims and state officials viewed as impacting Muslims as a community.

Chapter 3 focused on education, and on the attempts by both the Russian state and Muslim reformers to modernize Muslim education in the provinces of Kazan and Baku. Once again, different conditions in the Volga region and southern Caucasus led to this issue emerging differently in the cultural and political milieux of the two provinces. In the Volga region, the rapid expansion of new method education in the months and years after the 1905 Revolution exacerbated tensions in the region between jadids and non-jadids, as rival teachers often competed directly with one another for students, prestige, and scarce material support. In the Caucasus, jadidism was less visible as a cultural and social movement but there still existed a reformist movement dedicated to expanding literacy and the teaching of Russian. But in the Caucasus, antagonisms between “jadids” and their opponents did not surface nearly to the degree
as in the Volga region, and Muslim supporters of educational reform tended to work in closer cooperation with both the tsarist authorities and Muslim populations. Compared to the Volga region, however, this approach also resulted in the opening of fewer schools. Tsarist officials, meanwhile, struggled to keep up with events surrounding the post-1905 explosion in new method education, offering accounts and numerical estimates that varied wildly from one another even as the regional governors of Muslim-populated regions across the empire worked more closely with one another than ever before in combating a "pan-Turkism" and "pan-Islamism" that they viewed in increasingly categorical and universal terms.

In Chapter 4, I discussed Muslim politics in Russia during and after the Revolution of 1905. Rather than accept the premise that "Muslim politics" in Russia at this time constitutes simply the activities of a "united" Muslim front facing off against the "Russian" authorities, I investigated in this chapter the many divisions taking place within Muslim communities at this time along axes that were not only cultural (the subject of Chapter 3), but also ideological and political. Particularly in the early months of the revolution, the leaders of the Muslim spiritual assemblies continued to play an important role in the minds of both tsarist officials and Muslim communities, and the assemblies also loomed large in plans of Muslim community activists across the empire. İttifak leaders, based mostly in the Volga region, often worked closely with Orenburg Müfti Soltanov and, to a lesser extent, with Crimean Müfti Karashaiskii, while in the Caucasus Ahmet Ağaoğlu developed a spiteful relationship with Sheyh ul-Islam Akhundzade that was often characterized by public invective. After the Third Muslim Congress at Nizhnii Novgorod, İttifak formally became a political party and the character of the movement changed considerably. Decisions made at Nizhnii Novgorod to change the structure of spiritual administration and Muslim education, even if never enforced or accepted by the tsarist
government, attracted considerable outcry from Muslims and concern from government officials. A small number of Muslims turned to Muslim or non-Muslim political alternatives to *Itifak*, while others stopped voting. These events, combined with the decrees of June 3, 1906 unilaterally changing the power and makeup of the Duma, led to a steep decline in interest among Muslims in parliamentary politics.

Chapters 5 and 6 examined the “bloody crossroads”, where “identity” and “politics” meet. While most of the historiography of either of these subjects tends to discuss the importance of the other, my study focuses upon how issues relating to “identity” were used in “politics”, and vice-versa. Like Muslim “politics”, Muslim “identity” is usually discussed in the historiography from the perspective of the Muslim periodical press. In Chapter 5 I look at writings appearing in the periodical press, but combine these sources with others to place these writings within the context of both the Muslim congresses and the street. I also place these public articulations of identity within a number of discursive contexts which Russian Muslims often shared with both Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the Russian Empire and beyond. This chapter looked particularly at the writings and speeches of individuals who would later become well-known for their roles in the Istanbul-based Turkist (or “pan-Turkist”) movement, most notably Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Ağaoğlu. Akçura and Ağaoğlu, I argue, resembled many other Muslim community reformers in Russia in that their intellectual conceptions regarding identity focused primarily upon “unity” more generally, and that the specific metaphors of unity they championed changed over time and varied according to contexts which were not only intellectual, but also political and professional. Meanwhile the Russian government, like much of the historiography that has been written ever since, focused primarily upon Muslim expressions of “unity” and often attributed to them an anti-government, even separatist, meaning.
Chapter 6 was likewise concerned with how public expressions of collective identity (in this case, "Turkism" or "Türklük") intersect with the professional careers of Akçura and Ağaoğlu. This chapter also investigated the social and organizational dimensions of Turkism, and places individuals involved in the Turkist movement within a number of contexts, particularly that of Russian Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire. Like Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire more generally, the Russian-born intellectuals, publicists, students, and activists involved in the Turkist movement often lived, in many ways, virtually simultaneous lives in Russian and the Ottoman Empire. Particularly after Hamidian-era restrictions on the importation of Russian Muslim newspapers were ended in 1908, news and publications traveled quickly and frequently between the two empires, and for decades, large numbers of Muslims (like Christians and Jews) had traveled between the two states, maintaining business and family connections on both sides of the frontier. Both Russian and Ottoman bureaucrats tended to view Muslim émigrés with suspicion, whether they were living in Russia or the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, Russian Muslim émigrés had a long tradition of avoiding the sanctions and laws of both states by playing the two empires off of one another. The Turkist movement was not a Turkish national movement of the sort which would be championed in the Turkish Republic after its establishment in 1923, but rather was primarily concerned with the affairs of Muslims in the Russian Empire. The symbols, expressions, and ideas of this movement have had, however, a significant impact upon the ways in which Turkish nationalism is perceived.¹

The Russian Empire did not administer all of its Muslims in the same way. Regional variations in the tactics of administration as well as with regard to other aspects of daily life led to different sets of political conditions in the provinces of Kazan and Baku. Decisions made in

¹ On Turkish nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s and the impact and role of the Turkist movement and figures from that movement, see Shissler, Between two Empires, 185-208; Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
the late nineteenth century contributed to the shaping of options available to Muslims and
bureaucrats in both of these provinces, and the different experiences of these individuals
contributed to the emergence of further differences. This would especially be the case after 1905,
when Muslims in all regions of the empire sought to articulate their personal, intellectual, and
political interests through discourses that were both regional and universal, and which drew upon
a complex and interconnected set of influences.

"Pan-Turkism" was not "an explicitly political, global, and irredentist" ideology. Rather,
it was primarily a means for Russian-born intellectuals to maintain intellectual, political,
professional, and other types of contact with Muslim communities in Russia. Like Russian
Muslims more generally, Türkist figures traveled frequently to Russia, and prior to 1911 there
was very little that was "Türkist" about their writings at all. Yusuf Akçura's 1904 publication Üç
Tarz-ı Siyaset, while considered a "manifesto" for "pan-Turkism", hardly represents the
beginning point of a straight Türkist trajectory towards the 1911 establishment of Türk Yurdu.
During the intervening years, Akçura embraced a number of different identity forms. Nor was he
alone. Ahmet Ağaoğlu also embraced a number of identity forms during the course of his career,
and after World War I Ağaoğlu returned to Baku, where he would sit in the parliament of the
newly (and shortly) independent Republic of Azerbaijan.3 There, Ağaoğlu gave speeches on the
floor of parliament in which he spoke at length, for the first time in his life, on issues which he
described in terms of the "national" interest of "Azerbaijan".4 Ultimately, both Akçura and
Ağaoğlu, as well as Ali Hüseyinzade and many other less well-known figures from this era
would become "Turks", and would play an active role in the formulation of a Turkish nationalist

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2 Robert Geraci writes, in reference to Yusuf Akçura, "An explicitly political, global, and irredentist Pan-Turkist
ideology did exist, and in a sense it was born in Kazan.". Window on the East, 279.
3 Whose president was Mehmet Emin Resulzade, another Türk Yurdu contributor.
4 See, for example, Ağaoğlu's speeches in parliament in Azərbaycan xalq fənərliyyətini (1918-1920). Parlament
(Stenografik hesabatlar), I jild, (Baku: Azərbaycan nəşriyyət, 1998), 129-130.
(but not pan-Turkist) identity. A number of other Russian Muslim figures from this era, meanwhile, such as Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Fatih Kerimi, Hadi Atlasov, and others would have prominent careers in the Soviet Union. Like many early Bolsheviks, however, most of these individuals perished in the 1930s.

The obsession with the politics of identity displayed by Russian Muslim intellectuals after 1905 is often attributed to their position in Russia and exposure to “Western ascendancy and penetration”.[5] Others have made similar arguments, meanwhile, regarding the predominant role of Russian-born intellectuals in the Istanbul-based Turkist movement, presenting “pan-Turkism” as largely a reaction to the “pan-Slavism” of Russian intellectuals.[6] While the arguments that the Turkist intellectuals made regarding the community (millet) and the nation (milliyet) were indeed rooted in an intellectual tradition reflecting European, Ottoman, and other influences, the experiences of the Russian-born Turkists between the years 1904-1908 also played an important role in the types of identity they advocated in both Russia and Istanbul. Having cut their political teeth in the highly charged intellectual and political environment that pervaded Muslim politics in late imperial Russia, the skills which Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and their cohort developed during these years were ultimately reflected in the growth of their own fame and position in both empires.

The years 1905-1914 formed, along with the years during and immediately after, part of a revolutionary era in Russia and the Middle East, with revolutions occurring in Russia, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire over the course of a four-year period. In comparison with models of modernity and nationality which were to emerge in the years which followed, such as Bolshevism or Kemalism in Turkey, the identity conceptions of the Turkist movement were not

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particularly far-fetched. In an age of revolution, the range of possibilities concerning the reorganization of both state and society appeared far more wide-open during these years than had been the case just a short while earlier. It was this sense of possibility which attracted talented and ambitious individuals such as Akçura, Ağaoğlu, Hüseyinzade, and others to the world of ideas. Grounded in a context which was not just intellectual, but also social, professional, and political, Russian Muslim community activists of the late imperial era articulated identity within a variety of discourses, including political ones, as they lived astride not only empires, but also identities.
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